Girdling the Globe, Networking the World - A Discourse Analysis of the Media Representation of Nineteenth-Century Transport and Communication Technologies in Victorian Britain, 1838 - 1871 by Karagöl, Jessica
 GIRDLING THE GLOBE, NETWORKING THE WORLD 
–  
A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE MEDIA REPRESENTATION OF 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION 
TECHNOLOGIES IN VICTORIAN BRITAIN, 1838 – 1871 
 
 
 
 
Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde  
der Philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Heidelberg, 
vorgelegt von Jessica Karagöl  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Erstgutachter: PD Dr. Roland Wenzlhuemer  
Zweitgutachterin: Prof. Dr. Madeleine Herren-Oesch  
Eingereicht am: 10.12.2013 
 
I 
 
Abstract 
The nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of an unprecedented global transport 
and communication infrastructure in shape of steamships, railways, telegraph landlines 
and submarine cables and related engineering works, such as canals and railway tunnels. 
For various reasons, Great Britain could position itself at the centre of these new 
networks. Their ramifications on various spheres, such as global trade and the conduct 
of imperial policy, have received sustained scholarly attention. An in-depth analysis of 
the general public’s reactions to the burgeoning infrastructure and the technologies 
involved, however, has not been carried out. Providing a discourse analysis of the 
various technologies’ representation in Victorian print publications, this dissertation 
closes this gap. Focusing specifically on the newly established connections between 
Britain and India, on the one hand, and Britain and the United States, on the other, it 
investigates contemporaries’ attitudes, perceptions and expectations and shows that in 
many ways, Victorian approaches anticipated postmodern analyses. For this, specific 
events have been selected and were monitored in a variety of British newspapers, 
magazines and other relevant printed material of the time. In so doing, this dissertation 
reveals that Victorian approaches towards technology reached beyond simplistic 
technological determinist beliefs and that their understanding of changing 
spatiotemporal arrangements was more sophisticated than the oft-quoted phrase of the 
‘annihilation of time and space’ suggests. Further, it reveals the social and cultural 
frameworks into which these transport and communication technologies were embedded 
and illustrates the role they were given in the context of the formation of collective 
identities and interstate rivalries.  
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1. Introduction 
In the beginning of Jules Verne’s by now classic tale of the journey Around the World 
in 80 Days, the novel’s main character Phileas Fogg gets involved in a discussion about 
a robbery that has just occurred at the Bank of England. In this connection, the members 
meeting at the Reform Club discuss the investigators’ chances of finding the thief and 
returning the stolen money. Andrew Stuart, one of Fogg’s fellow card-players at the 
Club, points out that “the chances are in favour of the thief,” for “[t]he world is big 
enough”1 to find a place to hide. Fogg briefly replies that the world is no longer as big 
as it used to be. In the following discussion, Gauthier Ralph, another of Fogg’s 
acquaintances, supports this assumption, pointing out that “[t]he world has grown 
smaller, since a man can now go round it ten times more quickly than a hundred years 
ago.”2 Fogg finally asserts that it is possible to circumnavigate the world in eighty days. 
He is supported by yet another gentleman who presents the following estimate taken 
from the Daily Telegraph: 
 From London to Suez via Mont Cenis and Brindisi, by rail and by steamboats…. 7. 
 From Suez to Bombay by steamer …. 13 ‘ 
 From Bombay to Calcutta, by rail … 3 ‘  
 From Calcutta to Hong Kong, by steamer …. 13 ‘ 
 From Hong Kong to Yokohama (Japan), by steamer …. 6 ’ 
 From Yokohama to San Francisco, by steamer …. 22 ’ 
 From San Francisco to New York, by rail …. 7 ’  
 From New York to London, by steamer and rail …. 9 ‘ 
 Total …… 80 days.3 [italics in original] 
Despite his comrades’ disbelief and doubts, Fogg adheres to his idea of proving the 
Daily Telegraph’s estimate right, and the wager is recorded on the spot.  
As soon as Fogg and his servant Passepartout depart from London, the bet turns into a 
matter of public interest: Not only does the press discuss Fogg’s chances of returning to 
London in time, with “[t]he Times, Standard, Morning Post, and Daily News, and 
twenty other highly respectable newspapers [scouting] Mr. Fogg’s project as madness; 
                                                          
1
 Jules Verne, Around the World in 80 Days (Blacksburg: Wilder Publications, 2009 [1873]), 11. 
2
 Ibid, 12. 
3
 Ibid. 
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the Daily Telegraph alone hesitatingly [supporting] him;”4 moreover, people would bet 
for or against Fogg “as if he were a race-horse.”5  
Adding to the suspense of the story is the fact that Fogg himself is suspected of being 
involved in the robbery. For this reason, Fogg and Passepartout are pursued by 
Detective Fix. During his journey, Fix avails himself of the telegraph in order to keep 
the authorities in London informed about his whereabouts or to announce Fogg’s arrival 
at the next harbour up-front, for instance when he decided to “warn the English 
authorities, and signal the Rangoon before her arrival [in Hong Kong]. This was easy to 
do, since the steamer stopped at Singapore, whence there is a telegraphic wire to Hong 
Kong.”6  
Verne is often referred to as one of the founding fathers of science fiction,
7
 yet when the 
book was first published in 1873,
8
 his account of Phileas Fogg’s journey around the 
world was highly topical in many respects. On the one hand, the nineteenth century 
witnessed the emergence of what may be referred to as “backbone of media 
modernity,”9 in other words, the establishment of a global transport and communication 
infrastructure: after centuries in which oceanic passage had to be mastered in wooden 
ships of one kind or the other, propelled by either wind or sheer physical effort, the first 
wooden steamships crossed the Atlantic Ocean in the 1830s, not long after to be 
superseded by iron steamers. Oceanic transport had become not only faster, but also 
more reliable. Similarly, land transport underwent massive changes. In 1825, the first 
railway built especially for public transport was inaugurated in Great Britain. In the 
following decades, the railway network grew steadily, criss-crossing first Europe, then 
North America and other continents. Both sea and land transport were further improved 
and accelerated by means of no less ground-breaking engineering works: the Suez Canal 
and the Panama Canal (inaugurated in 1869 and 1914, respectively) rendered the 
circumnavigation of the African and South American continents unnecessary. Alpine 
tunnels, such as the Mont Cenis Railway Tunnel (opened in 1871, connecting France 
and Italy) or the Gotthard Tunnel between Switzerland and Italy (opened in 1882) made 
for facilitated and speedier access to the Mediterranean for travellers coming from 
                                                          
4
 Ibid., 17. 
5
 Ibid., 18.  
6
 Ibid., 60.  
7
 Cf. Adam Roberts, The History of Science Fiction (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), xv and 129.  
8
 The story had originally been published as a serial from November 1872 onwards; see footnote 13.  
9
 Frank Hartmann, Globale Medienkultur. Technik, Geschichte, Theorien (Wien: WUV, 2006), 75. My 
translation. German original: “Backbone der Medienmoderne.”[italics in original] 
 
3 
 
North and Central Europe.
10
 Along with these developments, mailing times had been 
reduced drastically, yet global communication reached an entirely new quality with the 
‘invention’ of electric telegraphy: the first electric telegraph line was inaugurated in 
Britain in July 1839. Throughout the century, the global network of landlines and 
submarine cables was gradually extended and – at least from a British perspective – 
reached a preliminary climax in 1902, when a submarine cable connecting British 
Columbia and New Zealand was completed and “all parts of the British Empire could 
(…) communicate by a cable network upon which the sun never set.”11 
What is more, the fact that, in the novel, Fogg’s attempt is widely covered in the press 
indicates that questions of improving channels of transport and communication were 
issues the general public was not only aware of, but also took an interest in. Indeed, 
contemporaries were highly fascinated by the new transport and communication 
technologies and the opportunities they seemed to offer. Calculations similar to those 
presented in the novel were published in nineteenth-century newspapers in the aftermath 
of the opening of the Suez Canal,
12
 and the circumstance that the novel was an 
immediate success certainly indicates that the public took to the topic.
13
  
This dissertation therefore aims to provide a discourse analysis of the British media 
coverage of nineteenth-century transport and communication technologies and the 
emerging and/or burgeoning global infrastructure in the Victorian era. It examines the 
various attitudes, perceptions and expectations that existed among the general British 
public towards these transport and communication channels. Victorian press coverage 
of these technologies addresses many aspects, and therefore a wide range of topics will 
be taken up in the analysis, such as: in which cultural, social and historical frameworks 
                                                          
10
 In combination with steamships and railways, respectively, the canals and tunnels form large 
technological systems, which, according to Hughes, consist of both physical and legislative artefacts and 
organizations and “solve problems or fulfill goals using whatever means are available and appropriate,” 
with “the problems [having] to do mostly with reordering the physical world in ways considered useful or 
desirable.” In this study, I therefore subsume them under the term transport and communication 
technologies. Cf. Thomas Hughes, “The Evolution of Large Technological Systems,” in The Social 
Construction of Technological Systems. New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, eds. 
Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor J. Pinch (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 51-53. 
11
 Daniel Headrick, The Tools of Empire. Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth 
Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 160.  
12
 Cf. Volker Dehs, Jules Verne. Eine kritische Biographie (Düsseldorf: Artemis und Winkler, 2005), 211. 
13
 The public’s fascination with the opportunities these new technologies offered becomes all the more 
apparent taking into consideration how the story of Fogg’s journey around the world was received by its 
readers: When published as a serial in Le Temps from November 1872 onwards, the time of publication 
coincided with the period covered in the story; the boundaries between reality and fiction were blurred 
and ‘real life’ readership was just as captivated by Fogg’s enterprise as the public in the novel. Cf. ibid., 
218. 
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were the new means of transport and communication embedded? What were the 
ramifications contemporaries expected to accrue from these networks? How did they 
conceptualize changing relations of time and space? And were these technologies 
thought to bear witness to seemingly typically British qualities? An examination of 
these media representations therefore allows for deeper insights into Victorian mindsets 
and mentalities in general.
14
  
Conventional accounts of the expectations towards technology in the nineteenth century 
tend to veer between the extremes of an overoptimistic belief in progress, on the one 
hand, and a pronounced, if not profound fear of the emerging technological juggernaut, 
on the other. Both accounts are based on the fact that technological determinist beliefs 
are nowadays usually deemed to have “become dogma by the end of the [nineteenth] 
century.”15 These apparently typical, technological determinist beliefs (whether positive 
or dystopian) will be traced in this analysis of Victorian media coverage. Examining the 
way these technologies were represented in nineteenth-century newspapers, magazines 
and other printed material, however, I will also show that these conventional accounts 
are largely insufficient and misleading.
16
 It will be demonstrated that Victorian 
approaches towards technologies in general were more complex and multilayered than 
is widely assumed and went beyond such determinist and naive ideas. In fact, I argue 
that they in various ways anticipated postmodern sociological perspectives and therefore 
illustrate that (as Krueger formulated aptly, although in a different context), “[n]o matter 
how vociferously we protest our postmodern condition, we are in many respects post-
Victorians.”17 
                                                          
14
 As Rössler points out, analysis of media coverage is only to a certain extent able to take into 
consideration the ways in which readers reacted to the reporting under scrutiny (the only exception being 
letters to the editor). Media coverage is thus not necessarily a generally valid representation of reality. 
Rössler does, however, also point out that in particular in a historical context, it can be assumed that 
media coverage provides insights into social reality of the time. Cf. Patrick Rössler, Inhaltsanalyse 
(Konstanz: UVK, 2005), 31f.  
15
 Merritt Roe Smith, “Technological Determinism in American Culture,” in Does Technology Drive 
History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, ed. Merritt Roe and Leo Marx (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1995), 7.  
16
 A notable exception is Tamara Ketabgian’s The Lives of Machines, in which she engages in a 
postmodern rereading of Victorian technoculture and stresses aspects of hybridity and mingling; Tamara 
Ketabgian, The Lives of Machines: The Industrial Imaginary in Victorian Literature and Culture (Ann 
Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 2011). 
17
 Christine L. Krueger (ed.), introduction to Functions of Victorian Culture at the Present Time (Athens: 
Ohio University Press, 2002), xi.  
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As Mussell has pointed out, the press is an indispensable vehicle for understanding the 
nineteenth century.
18
 The reason for this is primarily that in the course of the nineteenth 
century, newspapers, magazines and other press products became part of everyday life 
and were more widely read than ever before. An analysis of newspapers and magazines 
published at different places and aimed at different strata of society was therefore 
deemed the best way to gain insights into the attitudes and perceptions of the general 
public (rather than focusing on the ways in which intellectual circles or the business 
community responded to them).
19
 An analysis of press coverage has the additional 
benefit that there is a large amount of source material available, covering a long period 
of time. This enables us to draw comparisons over time and between the various 
technologies and can help us comprehend if, or indeed, how, attitudes and perceptions 
differed significantly or changed over time.  
It is by no means coincidental that, in Verne’s novel, Fogg’s journey begins and ends in 
London. Similarly, the focus on printed material published in nineteenth-century Britain 
has not been chosen arbitrarily. Rather, in the present context, Victorian Britain is of 
peculiar interest and significance, in large part because, as previously mentioned, in the 
course of the nineteenth century transport and communication technologies improved 
decisively. The exchange of people, goods and information could now be carried out in 
a fraction of the time needed earlier and with a previously unknown reliability and 
predictability (at least for those who, like Phileas Fogg, could afford to make use of, and 
had access to these media). It is therefore not surprising that Osterhammel suggests 
mobility as one of the key terms to epitomize the nineteenth century:  
 Mobility was no longer only a way of living pursued by nomadic populations, an 
 emergency state of being of refugees or displaced people, or a requirement for 
 breadwinning for seamen. It had become a dimension of organized social life, whose 
 pace differed from that of small-scale everyday life.
20
  
In particular the period from 1830 till the end of the nineteenth century (roughly 
equivalent to Victoria’s reign) is therefore often referred to as the first information 
                                                          
18
 Cf. James Mussell, The Nineteenth-Century Press in the Digital Age (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012), 1.  
19
 As will be seen, the publications chosen for analysis are among the most widely read of the period 
under observation, which is why it seems appropriate to refer to their readership as the ‘general public’ or 
‘contemporaries’. 
20
 Jürgen Osterhammel, Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts (Munich: C.H. 
Beck, 2004), 1291. My translation. German original: “Mobilität war nun nicht mehr nur eine Lebensweise 
nomadischer Populationen, ein Notzustand von Flüchtlingen und Vertriebenen oder die Bedingung des 
Broterwerbs von Seeleuten. Sie war eine Dimension organisierten gesellschaftlichen Lebens geworden, 
deren Tempo sich von dem des kleinräumigeren Alltags unterschied.” 
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age.
21
 What is more, on a global level, Great Britain held a special position within this 
infrastructure and could “[establish] itself securely as the information hegemon by the 
late 1800s.”22 There are a variety of reasons for this, the fact that Britain as a trading 
state and imperial power depended on speedy and reliable means of transport and 
communication certainly being pivotal. It can therefore be safely assumed that the 
British press covered these technologies more extensively and in more detail than, for 
instance, French, American or German newspapers (although, as we will see later, 
analyzing the media representation of the various transport and communication 
technologies in these countries would certainly also yield very interesting results).  
As this study is concerned with perceptions of transport and communication 
technologies – rather than with, for instance, their ‘invention’ or the scientists, engineers 
and statesmen involved in this process – it does not fit in any of the ‘classic’ categories 
of technological history.
23
 Instead, my approach to the topic conforms to Marsden and 
Smith’s claim that “the study of technology in history is part of the study of culture 
more generally.”24 [italics in original] They define cultural history as “the study of the 
construction (or production) and the dissemination (or reproduction) of meanings in 
varying historical and cultural settings,”25 and it is this area that this dissertation seeks 
to make a contribution to. As has been hinted, it can thus help us grasp Victorian 
mindsets in a wider context, for instance concerning the ways in which contemporaries 
reconciled scientific progress with traditional Christian belief, or in understanding the 
role technology and industrialization played for European self-conception. What is more, 
given that we are living through equally radical changes (the Victorians witnessing the 
so-called communication revolution, the transformations from the late twentieth century 
onwards being referred to as the digital revolution), an examination of attitudes towards 
transport and communication technologies in this first information age will almost 
inevitably bring up the question of how we today respond to the respective media. In the 
                                                          
21
 Cf. Richard Menke, Telegraphic Realism. Victorian Fiction and Other Information Systems (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 9; Miles Taylor and Michael Wolff (eds.), The Victorians Since 
1901. Histories, Representations and Revisions (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 8.  
22
 Peter J. Hugill, Global Communications since 1844. Geopolitics and Technology (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1999), 28. 
23
 Marsden and Smith distinguish three types of histories of technology: firstly, popular histories of 
technology, producing progress- and triumph-oriented narratives that “comfort rather than challenge;” 
secondly, economic and business histories which engage in quantitative questions; and thirdly, what they 
call antiquarian histories of technology, revolving around details of design and construction. Cf. Ben 
Marsden and Crosbie Smith, Engineering Empires. A Cultural History of Technology in Nineteenth-
Century Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 1f.  
24
 Ibid., 5. 
25
 Ibid., 4.  
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broadest sense, therefore, this dissertation also pursues the question of technology’s 
place in, and contribution towards twenty-first century society.  
In the following section, I will further elaborate on the relevance of this approach 
towards the study of technology in history and the advantages it has to offer. To start 
with, however, I will briefly contemplate why the study of nineteenth-century 
technologies of transport and communication is of particular relevance at this moment 
in time. 
 
1.1 Relevance and Purpose of Dissertation 
As an academic discipline, history – although evidently devoted to the study of the 
past – is inevitably and inextricably always engaging with the present, for, as the late 
Eric Hobsbawm pointed out, “where we stand in regard to the past, what the relations 
are between past, present and future are not only matters of vital interest to all: they are 
quite indispensable.”26 He does indeed admit that “[s]ince industrialization began, the 
novelty of what every generation brings is much more striking than its similarity to what 
has gone before,” 27  but nonetheless emphasizes that the past is after all a most 
significant benchmark in order to make sense of present-day events. Furthermore, he 
sets forth that looking backward is essential for anyone wanting to ‘forecast’ the future, 
as far as this is possible, for “[h]istory alone provides orientation and anyone who faces 
the future without it is not only blind but dangerous, especially in the era of high 
technology.”28  
With Hobsbawm’s contemplations on the significance of the study of the past in mind, 
we can identify several rationales for which the study of the Victorian ideas of and 
approaches towards transport and communication technologies is important. The first 
reason revolves mainly around the aspect of globalization and the corresponding 
research interest of historians: hardly surprising, trends within the academic discipline 
of history do not emerge arbitrarily, but are shaped and informed by current political, 
social or cultural conditions and developments (just think of how, in the nineteenth 
century, the emergence of nation states was accompanied by attempts to create national 
                                                          
26
 Eric Hobsbawm, On History (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997), 24.  
27
 Ibid., 26. 
28
 Ibid., 52.  
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histories).
29
 Given the fact that we live in a deeply globalized world (globalization is 
here defined as “changes in the density of international and global interactions relative 
to local or national networks”),30 [italics in original] it does not come as a surprise that 
historians have come to ‘cast off’ the limitations the nation state as an analytical ‘box’ 
within which to think has imposed on them.
31
 Instead, approaches interested in 
“communication, contacts and transfers between world regions” 32  (world or global 
history) or “processes of border crossing” 33  (transcultural history) have become 
increasingly popular.
34
 An integral part of studying the history of contacts, transfer or 
border crossings of whichever kind is the study of the carriers along which these 
processes unfolded. It is in this context that nineteenth-century transport and 
communication structures are of paramount interest: Although studies such as Tom 
Standage’s The Victorian Internet35 are oversimplified and misleading in the sense that 
they present the electric telegraph network as a direct precursor of today’s 
communication and information infrastructure,
36
 there are several reasons for which 
studying and comparing the underlying structures and functions of the two can turn out 
insightful and help us understand current globalization processes; both, for instance, 
contributed to a closer integration of world markets and changed the way news are 
gathered and reported.
37
 In a similar manner, studying contemporaries’ attitudes 
towards these global networks of transport and communication and their reactions to the 
                                                          
29
 Cf. Ron Robin, “Historians and the Nation State,” in The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History, 
eds. Akira Iriye and Pierre-Yves Saunier (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 486; Jürgen 
Osterhammel, “Imperien,” in Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien, eds. Gunilla 
Budde, Sebastian Conrad, and Oliver Janz (Göttingen: Vanderhoek and Ruprecht, 2006), 56.   
30
 Christopher Chase-Dunn, Yukio Kawano and Benjamin D. Brewer, “Trade Globalization Since 1795: 
Waves of Integration in the World-System,” American Sociological Review 65, no. 1 (2000):78.  
31
 Osterhammel, however, highlighting the manifold motives behind national historiography and pointing 
to the many newly emerging nation states in search of what he calls a “usable past,” is nonetheless 
confident that the nation state will remain a most crucial instrument in the historian’s tool box; cf. 
Osterhammel, “Imperien,” 56.   
32
 Roland Wenzlhuemer, “Globalization, Communication, and the Concept of Space in Global History,” 
in Historical Social Research – Historische Sozialforschung. Global Communication: Telecommunication 
and Global Flows of Information in the Late 19
th
 and Early 20
th
 Century, ed. Roland Wenzlhuemer 
(Cologne: Center for Historical Social Research, 2010), 21. 
33
 Madeleine Herren, Martin Rüesch and Christiane Sibille, Transcultural History: Theories, Methods, 
Sources (Berlin: Springer, 2012), 6. 
34
 Other approaches with similar objectives are, for instance, world history, entangled histories or 
transnational history; cf. Akira Iriye and Yves-Pierre Saunier, The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational 
History (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), xviii.  
35
 Tom Standage, The Victorian Internet: The Remarkable Story of the Telegraph and the Nineteenth 
Century’s Online Pioneers (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998). 
36
 As Wenzlhuemer highlights, the nineteenth-century electric telegraphy network and today’s internet 
differ, among other things, in terms of public access, transmission costs and the content that could be 
transmitted. Cf. Roland Wenzlhuemer, Connecting the Nineteenth-Century World: The Telegraph and 
Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 7f. 
37
 Cf. ibid, 9.  
9 
 
resulting integration processes (rather than underlying structures and functions only) can 
help us understand the way we think about and respond to similar processes today. How, 
for instance, Victorians made sense of changes in the relation between time and space 
brought about by the electric telegraph and the dematerialization of information flows, 
is a highly topical question at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
But studying perceptions of transport and communication technologies is necessary and 
relevant on a more general level, reaching beyond aspects of globalization. As Mikael 
Hård and Andrew Jamison have aptly pointed out, “[t]echnological artifacts and 
scientific knowledge have become increasingly constitutive of what we do and what we 
think.”38 This is best understood when we look at the many ways in which science and 
technology ‘permeate’ the human body (in shape of, for instance, critical-care medicine, 
genetic engineering or so-called wearable computers, such as the newly developed 
Google Glass) or how we use technological devices as medium through which we 
perceive the world and participate in events at a local, national and global level (just 
think of the ways in which people in their everyday life base their decisions on the 
information provided by means of a smart phone, for instance when using it as a mobile 
navigation device, or how social networking platforms such as Facebook and Twitter 
enable us to support pressure groups fighting for their course at the other end of the 
world). In light of such developments, the well-established subject-object dichotomy is 
an anachronism that can no longer be deemed an adequate approach in order to 
conceptualize the multidimensional relations and interactions between humans and 
technology. It is therefore hardly surprising that sociologists have developed new 
perspectives, focusing on the actual usage of technologies and highlighting aspects of 
hybridity (I will discuss these approaches in more detail at a later point). 
Similarly, history as an academic discipline also needs to find new ways of dealing with 
technology-related questions: traditional approaches, in particular those focusing on the 
‘supply side’ (that is, on innovation and inventions, revolving mainly around the idea of 
progress) are inadequate in the sense that they, a priori, have a limited geographic, 
temporal and social scope.
39
 In terms of transport and communication technologies, this 
means that they concentrate largely on, for instance, the launch and maiden voyage of a 
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new type of ship, the details of its construction and the extent to which it is therefore 
superior to its predecessors, or the economic benefits deriving from this new means of 
transport. Certainly, such studies are interesting and important in their own right, yet as 
Hård and Jamison highlight, “[f]or historians, the task is to provide a richer account of 
the past, to develop narratives that bring out our multifarious interactions with 
technology and science.”40 Studies as the ones mentioned above all too often provide 
nothing but fairytale-like ‘happily ever after’-accounts, assuming that, once a 
technology has been introduced, it is just ‘there’ and ‘does’ what it was initially  
supposed to do. In this case, neither processes of decline and disappearance, nor the 
cultural and social contexts in which a particular technology is embedded, are taken into 
consideration. David Edgerton thus proclaims that, rather than restricting themselves to 
innovation-oriented perspectives, historians should turn to what he calls “technology in 
use.” 41  This approach, he argues, allows for an entirely different picture of the 
development of technologies and their impact. What is more – and most important in 
the context of this study – is the fact that it enables us to reconsider the roles we 
attribute to technology, to trace their historical roots and to “undermine most 
contemporary claims to novelty.”42 
Three examples (two of which I will come back to at a later stage) can help us 
understand this better: Edgerton himself points to the fact that various technologies have 
traditionally been expected to bring about universal peace. It was repeatedly assumed 
that the efficacy of new technologies of destruction – be it battleships, bombing aircrafts 
or nuclear bombs, just to name a few – would force statesmen to seek other solutions 
than military conflict and would therefore foster world peace. Moreover, transport and 
communication technologies, such as steamships, railways, the electric telegraph and 
the telephone, were also expected to bring about universal peace: as they enabled people 
to communicate faster, if not instantly, it was assumed that misunderstandings, which 
frequently resulted in armed conflict, could be avoided. 
43
 The latter aspect is 
particularly interesting in the context of this study: Taking into consideration that the 
internet was allegedly nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize – the rationale of the 
supporters also being that it fostered international communication and global 
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exchange
44
 – it becomes obvious what Edgerton means when he sets forth that 
“[h]istory reveals that technological futurism is largely unchanging over time. Present 
visions of the future display a startling unselfconscious lack of originality.”45  
Another example is to be found in Regine Buschauer’s study on Mobile Räume 
(‘Mobile Spaces’), in which she investigates the discourses on spatial transformations 
resulting from new technologies of transport, communication and information (more 
precisely, the telegraph, railways, the internet and mobile telephony).
46
 Buschauer 
illustrates that the topos of space being ‘annihilated’, ‘overcome’ or ‘lost’ has been 
drawn upon repeatedly whenever new transport, communication and information 
technologies confounded previously valid notions of time and space. In this context, she 
emphasizes the remarkable similarities between the discourse on the changes brought 
about by the electric telegraph and the digital media of the twenty-first century. She 
consequently (and in concert with Edgerton) points out that the changes we have been 
experiencing from the late twentieth century onwards and which we often consider to be 
new and unprecedented (and therefore typical of the so-called information age) in fact 
have their historical predecessors.
47
  
A third example I would like to mention here is the opening of the Channel Tunnel: six 
years after construction works had commenced and around three and a half years after 
French and British workers had joined their respective halves of the submarine tunnel, 
the ‘Chunnel’ connecting England and France between Folkestone and Calais was 
completed. At the inauguration ceremony on 6 May 1994, Queen Elizabeth II described 
the tunnel as “one of the world’s great technological achievements,” and further 
remarked that it “stands as a monument to the joint efforts and talents of [the] engineers, 
technicians and construction workers.”48 As expected, the official opening of the tunnel 
received wide coverage in the international press; the Guardian, for instance, 
considered it a “hi-tech triumph of ideology,”49 the Chicago Tribune declared it to be 
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“one of the technological marvels of the 20th century,”50  and the New York Times 
described it as “an engineering triumph comparable to that of the Panama and Suez 
Canals” and “a tunnel to bring England closer to France.”51 Indeed, the New York Times 
is the only of the three newspapers mentioned here that draws a direct comparison with 
a nineteenth-century engineering work. Beyond this obvious reference, though, it is 
fascinating to see that twentieth-century commentary on the inauguration of an 
engineering structure is astonishingly similar to what Victorian newspapers would have 
written around a hundred years earlier (in the sense that the tunnel is referred to as 
‘triumph’, ‘marvel’ and ‘monument,’ and is deemed to reduce the distance between the 
two countries). Obviously, these are only a few snippets taken from the particular 
newspapers’ coverage on the opening, and as such they do by no means allow for any 
definite conclusion. Nonetheless we can take them as indication of the extent to which 
our thinking about technology has been influenced by Victorian narratives.
52
  
These three examples already demonstrate that studying Victorian ideas, expectations 
and anxieties will not only provide insights into nineteenth-century mindsets and 
mentalities, that is, the way(s) in which contemporaries saw themselves in relation to, 
for instance, nature or non-European civilizations and what role the seemingly all-
pervasive idea of progress played. Teasing out similarities and continuities, such 
analysis will also show that, rather than thinking of ourselves “as reaching across a 
postmodern historical rupture (…), we may instead begin to suspect how far we haven’t 
come in one hundred years, that we appeal to Victorian culture in order to think about 
problems and needs that are not wholly unprecedented.”53 As Linda Simon highlights in 
her study on the social and cultural history of electric technologies and electrification in 
the United States in the second half of the nineteenth century, “[a]s we respond to new 
technologies (…) we carry with us an inheritance from those who gazed with 
fascination and trepidation at the first incandescent light bulb, and at the astounding 
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shadowy image of their bones, made visible by an inexplicable ray.“54 In this sense, she 
points out that the historical study of responses to new technologies enables us “to 
reflect upon our responses, to illuminate who we once were, and to imagine who we 
might become.”55 As pointed out by Eric Hobsbawm, these are the main functions of 
studying the past.   
 
1.2 Objects of Study and Methodological Approaches  
Due to the ongoing digitalization of (not only) British press products of previous 
centuries, access to this kind of material was comparatively easy to achieve. Owing to 
the abundance of publications available and the length of the period under observation, 
however, this (digital) ‘archive’ was seemingly unlimited. The author function not being 
available as a tool by means of which to delimit these vast collections (bear in mind that 
most of what was printed in nineteenth-century newspapers and periodicals was 
published anonymously), other strategies were necessary in order to narrow down the 
material and make it manageable.
56
 For this purpose, the following selection criteria 
have been imposed (with this study aiming at a qualitative evaluation of media coverage, 
rather than a quantitative analysis, methodological representativeness in the strict sense 
was not aimed for): 
To start with, it seemed reasonable to delimit the material available by concentrating on 
certain world regions. The dissertation therefore focuses primarily on channels of 
transport and communication between Great Britain and the Indian subcontinent, on the 
one hand, and Great Britain and the United States, on the other. In the nineteenth 
century, Great Britain’s prosperity hinged to a considerable extent on the Indian 
subcontinent. The reasons for this were manifold: firstly, India had become the major 
market for textiles produced in Britain. Secondly, under Lord Dalhousie a system was 
introduced according to which companies investing in the construction of Indian 
railways were guaranteed a yield return of 5 percent; British companies made ample use 
of this opportunity, and capital export thus has to be viewed as another reason for which 
India was of particular importance to Great Britain. Furthermore, with both raw 
materials, on the one hand, and locomotives and coaches, on the other, being imported 
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from Britain, British economy as a whole profited from railway construction in India.
57
 
For all these commercial activities, speedy and reliable means of transport and 
communication were indispensable. 
Moreover, the 1857/58 uprising revealed that the control exercised by the East India 
Company was by no means as stable as had been believed; as a result, the British 
government assumed power by means of the Act for the Better Government of India in 
1858. In the aftermath of the so-called Mutiny, the political aspect of improved means 
of transport and communication loomed large in public perception, and both the attempt 
of laying a cable through the Red Sea in 1859/60 and the construction of various land 
lines in the mid-1860s have to be viewed in light of this alleged need for state 
communication.
58
 What is more, the improved transport and communication channels 
between Britain and India were also important in the sense that they accelerated 
communication with East and South-East Asia and the Antipodes.  
The United States were another indispensable trade partner of Great Britain, and 
therefore rapid channels of transport and communication across the Atlantic Ocean were 
of paramount importance for the business community. Cotton and grain were peculiarly 
significant import goods for Britain: cotton was the most traded primary product of the 
time, and Great Britain – British cotton industry being considered the driving force 
behind the country’s industrialization – obtained 75 percent of cotton imports from the 
United States.
59
 Similarly, prior to the First World War, grain trade accounted for more 
than 9 percent of world trade. From 1870 onwards, most European states came to import 
grain from the US, and Great Britain, growing only around one fifth of the amount of 
grain needed domestically, hinged on these imports. Both trade in cotton and grain 
depended on swift channels of communication, the significance of which is also 
illustrated by the fact that the expansion of cable capacities in the North Atlantic and the 
growth in trade volume between Europe and the United States coincide 
chronologically.
60
 Moreover, stock markets depended on speedy exchange of 
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information.
61
 Given the importance of India and the United States as market outlets and 
trade partners, it was assumed that the respective emerging and/or burgeoning transport 
and communication channels were reported most regularly and frequently. 
Focusing on transport and communication channels between Great Britain and India or 
the United States still generates a seemingly endless supply of material to evaluate. The 
following ‘events’ have therefore been chosen for a more detailed analysis:  
1) The Great Western steamship’s voyage across the Atlantic in 1838 (first 
transatlantic passage of a steamship)  
2) First attempts of laying transatlantic submarine cables in 1857 and 1858 (the 
latter at least temporarily successful)  
3) Launch of the Great Eastern steamship in 1858 (originally designed for passage 
to India and Australia, eventually used as a cable-laying ship) 
4) Attempt of and successful laying of transatlantic submarine cable in 1865 and 
1866, respectively (these being cable-laying operations the Great Eastern was 
involved in)  
5) Opening of the Suez Canal in 1869  
6) Opening of the Mont Cenis Tunnel in 1871  
7) Laying of the submarine cable to India.  
Generally speaking, these particular technologies have been chosen as they all, at their 
respective time, introduced qualitative and/or quantitative improvements in terms of 
transport and communication. Just as before, I have therefore assumed that they have 
aroused intense public interest and that this would be reflected in contemporary press 
publications. Except for no. 5 and 6, these were projects carried out on the initiative of 
the British Government and/or British companies. In this connection, both the 1857/58 
attempts of laying a transatlantic submarine cable and the launch of the Great Eastern 
steamship are particularly noteworthy in the sense that they ‘failed’; how such setbacks 
were reported will be of peculiar interest. Despite being of paramount importance for 
transport and communication between Britain and the Indian subcontinent, both the 
Suez Canal and the Mont Cenis Tunnel were initiated and constructed by rivaling 
European states (the Suez Canal under French, the Mont Cenis Tunnel under French and 
Italian auspices). What is more, the Suez Canal was – at least at the outset – openly 
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rejected by the British government. If, and if so, to what extent, this is reflected in 
media coverage, can provide further information about the extent to which technologies 
were viewed as national achievements. Moreover, I have decided to take into account 
the reporting on the Great Exhibition of 1851. As Asa Briggs has pointed out in his 
study on Victorian People (originally published in 1954), the year 1851 presents a 
“perfect vantage point for a survey of nineteenth-century England.”62 Analyzing the 
media coverage the Exhibition – which both historians and contemporaries considered 
one of the most important events of the year
63
 – received will therefore allow for further 
insights into Victorian attitudes to science and technology in general. What is more, the 
emerging transport and communication technologies were of paramount importance for 
the speedy realization of the Exhibition, and it has been assumed that this was also 
reflected in the various publications.  
Finally, the following newspapers and periodicals have been selected:  
1) The London Times (hereafter Times)  
2) The Manchester Guardian  
3) The Scotsman  
4) The Liverpool Mercury (all of which published daily)  
5) The Observer 
6) The Illustrated London News 
7) Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper (the latter three published on a weekly basis).64 
 
In addition, other printed publications of relevance, such as books or pamphlets 
published on the occasion or in the aftermath of the inauguration of any of the relevant 
technologies, are taken into consideration, their objective usually being to provide 
further information on the particular technology and to point out their (potential) 
ramifications.
65
 The selection of newspapers is based on the fact that at least a minimal 
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degree of national representativeness was aimed for (rather than analyzing London-
based publications only), particularly taking into consideration that the business 
communities in Manchester, Liverpool and Edinburgh certainly had an interest in 
improving channels of transport and communication. Moreover, it seemed fruitful to 
examine newspapers and periodicals aiming at different audiences (for a detailed 
presentation of the various publications, see chapter 1.3.3).  
The contents of the newspapers and periodicals were evaluated by scanning the entire 
year in which one of the relevant technologies became operational (rather than only the 
weeks immediately before and after inauguration). I have adopted this approach for 
several reasons: at times, dates of inauguration or launch could not be adhered to as 
originally scheduled and had to the postponed (such as in case of the Great Eastern). In 
other cases, initially successfully installed devices ceased functioning after a few weeks’ 
time (as mentioned before, the transatlantic submarine cable of 1858) and would 
therefore receive attention once again. Moreover, towards the end of the year, 
newspapers and periodicals reminisced about the past year and thus addressed certain 
topics once more. In analyzing the reporting published immediately before or after the 
implementation only, a great deal of material directly related to the research interests of 
this study would have been disregarded. For this reason, as concerns projects whose 
construction extended over a particularly long period of time (bear in mind that 
construction works of both the Suez Canal and the Mont Cenis Tunnel extended over 
more than a decade), coverage in the years preceding their inauguration was taken into 
consideration as well. Besides reports on current news and editorials, letters to the editor 
and speeches related to these technologies (held, for instance, at inauguration festivities 
or public meetings, usually printed verbatim) were taken into consideration. 
Advertisements, articles revolving mainly around questions of financing and 
profitability, and illustrations, on the other hand, were not taken into account. Owing to 
these selection criteria, the amount of material to be included could be limited in a 
reasonable way.  
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I have decided to subsume this analysis under the term discourse. Given the fact that the 
term is used differently in a wide range of disciplines, such as sociology, philosophy 
and linguistics (sometimes there may even be different approaches towards it within one 
single discipline),
66
 and that Foucault himself used in it a variety of ways,
67
 it seems 
appropriate to briefly elaborate on the reasons for which I have chosen to do so.
68
 In 
general, Foucault’s work can be categorized under the domains of archaeology, 
genealogy and ethics.
69
 In the context of this dissertation, the domain of archaeology is 
of particular interest, for it is here that discourse analysis is conceptualized – in the 
words of Reiner Keller – as a historical snapshot of a particular point in time in 
history.
70
 Generally speaking, Foucault, being dissatisfied with the way in which 
primary source material was drawn upon in order to reconstruct the past, was not 
interested in judging the validity of primary sources or in contemplating the ideas and 
opinions of seemingly particularly important public figures. Instead, the objective he 
aimed for with the ‘historical snapshot’ was to disclose ‘hidden’ structures which 
unnoticed organize knowledge and determine what is counted as such (that is, the rules 
which determine what is considered true or false at a given point in time). In the style of 
an archaeologist, Foucault was therefore concerned with ‘excavating’ these underlying 
structures.
71
 According so Sarasin, discourse analysis is therefore looking for the 
algorithm according to which certain statements are being generated, while others are 
eliminated.
72
 As this dissertation analyzes the media coverage of nineteenth-century 
transport and communication technologies and, in so doing, ‘excavates’ 
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contemporaries’ approaches towards and perceptions of these technologies (thus 
exposing what was counted as ‘knowledge’ and ‘true’ in this connection), it seemed 
appropriate to use the term discourse analysis. 
  
1.3 Reading the Past – Victorian Newspapers and Periodicals as Primary 
Sources  
As Mark Hampton points out, newspapers, the information they provided and the very 
act of reading a newspaper were made mention of in many nineteenth-century novels, 
which is why he draws the conclusion that they “attained a prominent place in British 
society”73 in the course of the second half of the nineteenth century. Similarly, Lucy 
Brown highlights that “the newspaper became established as part of the normal furniture 
of life for all classes”74 [my italics] from around 1850 onwards. In fact, newspapers and 
periodicals flourished at the time and are a treasure trove for everyone wishing to 
acquaint himself with and reconsider what he knows about the Victorians’ outlook on 
the world they lived in. An analysis of the media coverage of transport and 
communication technologies in Victorian Britain is therefore primarily an examination 
of these two genres. This centrality of newspapers and periodicals in Victorian society is 
due to several concomitant developments, which I will briefly outline on the following 
pages, before I introduce the publications I have chosen for analysis.  
 
1.3.1 Education, Literacy and Access to Print Publications 
In the course of the nineteenth century, literacy rates had risen. This improvement, 
along with the resulting growth of readership and the formation of a mass public, is 
often (albeit incorrectly) attributed to the Education Act of 1870.
75
 Despite the fact that 
there had been no national schooling system before 1870, though, the population was 
far from being unschooled: There was a wide variety of voluntary institutions, such as 
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Sunday schools organized by the parish. Most of these institutions were small and of an 
ephemeral character, but people “dipped [into these educational opportunities] as and 
when they could and at the level they could best afford.”76 As Vincent has convincingly 
demonstrated, literacy rates had improved throughout the century, and the transition 
towards a literate society had been much smoother than is widely assumed.
77
 The notion 
of a largely analphabetic society at the turn of the nineteenth century and “ghettoes of 
illiteracy” 78  before 1870 is therefore misleading. Accordingly, around mid-century, 
individual basic literacy rates ranged in England between around 70 percent for men 
and 55 percent for women.
79
 Moreover, as Vincent emphasizes,  
[f]ew people lived alone in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and fewer still 
lacked either relatives or close friends. In households, in the informal relationships in 
the neighbourhood, literate and illiterate were everywhere in each other’s company.80 
Around the middle of the nineteenth century there was thus a collective literacy rate of 
85 percent, so that “at least at a collective level, most had access to the literacy required 
for enjoying newspapers.”81  
Mainly due to their high prices before the repeal of the so-called taxes on knowledge 
(see below), newspapers and other print publications were often purchased collectively 
anyway or were read in public places. Many coffee houses, pubs or public institutes 
provided their guests and visitors with reading material. What is more, newspapers 
would be read out aloud at times. Alternatively, people would purchase a newspaper for 
a cheaper price a few days after its publication. Therefore, the circulation figures given 
for any newspaper during this period can only offer a rough guide as to actual 
readership, and estimates vary accordingly.
82
 It is clear, though, that more people than 
ever before were either capable of reading newspapers and periodicals themselves or 
could indulge in them through their social network.  
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1.3.2 Victorian Press Market 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, the British press was still subject 
to various restrictions, such as stamp and advertisement duties. As a consequence, it 
performed poorly in international comparison: Drawing on an article published in the 
Working Man’s Friend, Cranfield points out that in 1833, there were 320 newspapers 
with a annual gross circulation of 30 million available to Britain’s 24 million population. 
At the same time, the 15 million population of the United States, where there were no 
taxes on knowledge, were offered 850 newspapers with a gross circulation of 65 
million.
83
 Moreover, neither the process of production nor that of distribution had 
changed very much in the course of the eighteenth century. Printing devices, such as the 
Stanhope Iron Press, introduced in 1800, helped improve impression, but required 
manual operation after all; accordingly, output was still limited to 250 copies an hour. 
News ‘gathering’ was very often tantamount to ‘recycling’ what other papers had 
printed before, and generally speaking, the press still catered mostly to the needs and 
interests of influential circles in the cities.   
From the 1830s onwards, however, the press witnessed changes in many domains. The 
taxes on knowledge were gradually reduced and finally abolished in the 1850s. This 
came to play a most significant role in the extension of the newspaper market and the 
introduction of the daily penny press in the following decades. In 1860, there were no 
more than 15 London and 16 provincial daily papers in England, but these numbers 
increased enormously in the following decades. By 1890, there were around 150 dailies 
across the country. Correspondingly, they sold more copies than ever before (1851: 85 
million copies in England; 1920: 5,604 million copies).
84
  
What is more, the production and distribution of newspapers was transformed 
throughout the nineteenth century. With the introduction of König’s steam-press in 1814, 
the production of 1,000 copies an hour had become viable, and the rotary press 
(introduced in 1848), allowed for up to 12,000 impressions per hour.
85
 The gradual 
establishment of a railway network from the 1830s onwards helped accelerate the 
distribution of newspapers throughout the country. Moreover, the growing electric 
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telegraph network and the emerging press agencies offered new chances and 
opportunities in terms of the gathering and distribution of news. From early on, 
telegraph companies, making use of the cables’ surplus capacities during night-time, 
provided services for both national and foreign news. In so doing, they did not only 
reveal the ways in which the press could benefit from electric telegraphy, but also 
inspired resourceful businessmen such as Julius Reuter: the foundation of Reuter’s 
eponymous press agency in London in 1851, the formation of the Press Association in 
1868 and the close cooperation between these two companies that was to develop in the 
years to follow – Reuters providing international news which the Press Association 
distributed in Britain; the Press Association, in turn, supplied Reuters with domestic 
news – were of paramount importance in this context.   
Closely related to all the developments mentioned above is the circumstance that the 
style of newspapers also underwent drastic changes in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. These are generally subsumed under the term ‘new journalism’. With regard to 
contents, readers were supplied with an increasing amount of news instead of 
commentaries, and politics were only one sphere of activity that was covered among 
many. The focus shifted towards articles of a more personal and sensational type, such 
as gossip columns, women’s pages, human-interest stories, and sports coverage. 86 
Telegraphy also came to play a prominent role in this context, with Reuters developing 
the forerunner of today’s breaking news by “publishing a flash or an outline before 
anyone else.” 87  The design of newspapers underwent far-reaching changes, and by 
means of shorter paragraphs, larger type, cross-heads, headlines and an increasing 
amount of illustrations, they became more easily legible.
88
  
All told, the British press market changed tremendously in the course of the nineteenth 
century. Various factors, such as the repeal of newspaper taxation, technological 
progress both in terms of production (printing) and news gathering (telegraphy, press 
agencies) and increasing literacy rates contributed their share to this transformation. As 
a result, the press no longer aimed at the upper strata of society only, but catered to the 
needs and interests of a larger share of the population than ever before. Newspapers and 
periodicals had thus become a central element of Victorian society and culture.  
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1.3.3 Selected Publications  
With regard to the historical relevance of the Times and the role it played in Great 
Britain from the early nineteenth century onwards, press historians seem to be 
unanimous in their appraisal. They consider it, among other things, “the most powerful 
title of the entire first half of the nineteenth century,”89 or describe the era as “the age of 
the primacy of The Times.”90 Indeed, the Times was to set standards in many respects. 
Founded in 1785 as the Daily Universal Register, the originally four-paged newspaper 
introduced a new typesetting technique which allowed for cheaper and faster printing. 
In 1788, its name was changed to The Times or Daily Universal Register and was 
finally shortened to The Times two months later. In 1814, the Times was the first 
newspaper to make use of Koenig’s steam press, by means of which the amount of 
copies printed per hour increased decisively.
91
 As a result, printing could be done in a 
fraction of the time needed previously, and the Times could therefore provide more up-
to-date news. In the following decades, both the factual news and comments it presented 
became increasingly appreciated and the Times could establish itself as the most 
significant newspaper for business men and industrial circles. By 1841 (that is, at the 
end of the editorship of Thomas Barnes), it sold more than double the amount of copies 
three of its rivals (Morning Chronicle, Morning Herald, Morning Post) combined.
92
 
This growth was to continue under the editorship of John Delane (1841 to 1877). Given 
the paper’s enormous audience among influential circles, it became difficult, if not 
impossible for the government (or any other politician) to ignore it; indeed, the Times 
was considered to have “an influence (…) so imperious that the Speaker, instead of 
demanding from the Sovereign freedom of speech had much better ask it from The 
Times.” 93  It was during the Crimean War that it became peculiarly obvious how 
influential the paper had become, when it was not only the first newspaper sending a 
special war correspondent to the scene, but thereby also contributed decisively to the 
government’s resignation in 1855. 94  Its coverage of foreign news is particularly 
noteworthy: from early on, the Times had established its own correspondents on the 
continent, for instance in Bologna and Marseilles, but also in extra-European 
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metropolises such as Alexandria. Moreover, it was indeed the only daily newspaper 
with its own network of foreign correspondents in India prior to 1850.  
When, in the aftermath of the repeal of the taxes on knowledge, a tide of so-called 
penny papers was founded in the 1850s and 1860s, they were hardly considered to be 
serious competitors; their style and coverage was too different from what the Times’ 
readers would appreciate, and thus, at least on certain occasions, the Times would still 
sell around 100,000 copies of a single issue.
95
 
As long as there were taxes imposed on newspapers, daily publications were mostly 
limited to London. In smaller cities or provincial towns, publishers were unlikely to find 
a sufficiently large audience affluent enough to purchase a newspaper at a price of six or 
seven pence every day, and the enterprise would thus have to remain unprofitable. For 
this reason, most people outside London would generally receive their news from 
weekly publications until the middle of the century. It was only with the reduction and 
abolition of the various taxes in the 1850s that provincial weekly papers were turned 
into dailies, and new daily publications were launched altogether.
96
  
It should therefore not come as a surprise that the Manchester Guardian commenced as 
a weekly paper, too, originally published on Saturdays only. It was founded in the 
aftermath of the so-called Peterloo massacre of 1819, the first edition being published in 
May 1821. The founder, John Edward Taylor, considered it to be “primarily (…) a 
means of political expression and communication,” its main objective (at least at the 
outset) being to expedite the issue of reform.
97
 Starting with a circulation of 1,000 per 
issue, the number had doubled by 1823 and trebled two years later. Already at this point 
in time, Taylor experimented with turning the paper into a bi-weekly by purchasing the 
Manchester Mercury, which practically was a “mid-week edition of the Guardian.”98 It 
was not before 1836, though, that the Manchester Guardian was officially turned into a 
bi-weekly. When Taylor died in 1844, the Guardian had, in terms of circulation, 
become the biggest newspaper outside London (8,000 copies per issue) and was turned 
into a daily newspaper in 1855. In the 1850s, it reached a regular weekday circulation of 
20,000 (up to 30,000 on Saturdays).
99
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The Manchester Guardian came to play a significant role within the British newspaper 
market. Although it started as a regional newspaper fulfilling its readers’ cravings for 
local news, it also gained national importance. This is (mostly) due to the circumstance 
that Manchester had become Britain’s main transfer site for cotton and yarn, with 90 
percent of British cotton industry being located in the adjacent areas by 1830.
100
 Ayerst 
therefore points out that already in the 1820s, Manchester was the centre of a growing 
economic region in the North of England and asserts that by 1840,  
 [t]here was something more than local interest (…) in Manchester and Lancashire 
 news (…). What happened was often of national importance: its trade mattered greatly 
 to the whole country; it was a dominant centre of Chartist activities, the possible scene 
 of revolutionary disturbances; and it was the headquarters of England’s first modern 
 political machine, the Anti-Corn Law League. While remaining essentially a local 
 paper, the Guardian was in the course of its ordinary duties necessarily beginning to 
 play a significant part in national life.
101
 [italics in original] 
Moreover, the Manchester Guardian was deeply involved in the formation of the Press 
Association in 1868, which not only liberated provincial newspapers from the unreliable 
and incomplete service of the telegraph companies, but also put them in a position 
where they could compete with London papers.    
The Liverpool Mercury was first published in July 1811, the aim of its proprietors being 
to “promote a free intercourse of ideas relative to government, trade, literature, and the 
fine arts” and to blend “[i]nformation, discussion, utility and amusement […] in a public 
journal.”102 Until 1858, it was published once a week only, but in the aftermath of the 
repeal of the taxes on knowledge, it was also made a daily newspaper. Similar to 
Manchester, Liverpool was of paramount importance to British trade and commerce in 
the nineteenth century, in particular in terms of cotton imports from the United States: 
In fact, the amount of cotton processed at Liverpool port tripled between 1820 and 1850 
and amounted to 80 percent of Great Britain’s total cotton import. 103  It is hardly 
surprising, then, that the Liverpool Mercury was not only read in Liverpool and the 
adjacent areas, but also in Wales and London. 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Scotsman became Scotland’s leading 
newspaper. Founded in Edinburgh by William Ritchie and Charles MacIaren out of 
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dissatisfaction with the existing local papers and first published on a weekly basis from 
January 1817 onward, it commenced with a circulation of around 900 copies. From 
1822, it was published twice weekly. In the wake of the repeal of both advertisement 
and stamp duty, circulation increased to around 6,000 copies in the 1850s. Soon 
afterwards, the Scotsman was turned into a daily newspaper and circulation numbers 
grew steadily, amounting to 17,000 in 1865 and 40,000 in 1873.
104
 One of the factors 
contributing to this ascent from a local to a truly transregional newspaper is the 
proprietors’ innovative spirit and their willingness to avail themselves of new transport 
and communication technologies. In the mid-1860s, for instance, they decided to cover 
the high expenses for rail carriage out of their own pockets. In so doing, agents outside 
Edinburgh could still sell the paper for the original price (rather than adding the 
transport costs) which, at least partially, made for the increasing circulation figures. 
From around 1870, early-morning high-speed trains were used in order to transport 
papers coming fresh off the press from Edinburgh to Glasgow. As a result, the morning 
edition of the Scotsman was published almost simultaneously in both cities. What is 
more, the Scotsman availed itself of the Electric Telegraph Company’s services from 
1866 onwards, hiring a cable for exclusive use, and was the first British provincial 
newspaper to open an office on Fleet Street in 1868.  
If the Times was considered among the leading journals of Europe, the Manchester 
Guardian, the Liverpool Mercury and the Scotsman certainly took a similarly 
outstanding position among Britain’s provincial papers of the time. All of these 
newspapers were read by a comparatively large audience and provided services and 
information British businessmen and trading houses involved in international commerce 
depended on. It is therefore reasonable to assume that all of these newspapers, catering 
to the interests of the business community, paid close attention to and provided adequate 
information about the newly emerging networks of transport and communication. 
Moreover, they were not only read in their specific ‘hometown’, but reached a wider 
audience.  
Nonetheless, it was not daily, but weekly papers that were most widely read at that time: 
even after the repeal of the taxes on knowledge, daily papers were financially out of 
reach for the majority of society, and, as mentioned earlier, they would either buy them 
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collectively or read them in public places, such as coffee houses or reading rooms. In 
private, on the other hand, most people would rather resort to weekly publications in 
order to read the news and/or entertain themselves. Sunday papers – appearing on what 
would usually be a free day and, similarly important, just after pay day – were 
particularly popular, and are in retrospect considered one of the major developments in 
nineteenth-century publishing.
105
 Founded in 1791, the Observer is widely considered 
the oldest Sunday newspaper in the world. Facing enormous difficulty a few years after 
its launch, the proprietor attempted to sell the newspaper to the government, which did 
not show any interest, though. Nonetheless, in so doing, he had managed to make useful 
connections: under the leadership of William Clement, who owned the Observer from 
1815 onwards, the paper profited from government subsidies and, by extension, 
“became a mouthpiece of the ruling party.”106 What is more, prominent political figures, 
such as Lord Palmerston, used the Observer as a forum and wrote editorials supporting 
government policies. The government’s impact is also reflected in circulation figures: in 
1819, for instance, the Observer sold a total of around 13,000 copies a week. On top of 
that, though, some 10,000 copies were distributed freely in order to promote 
government policy.
107
 The Observer is furthermore noteworthy in that it pioneered the 
use of woodcuts and provided illustrated supplements, for instance about the coronation 
of King George IV in July 1821.  
In fact, illustrated newspapers were another significant development from around 1840 
onwards. In contrast to newspapers such as the Observer, which would only include 
illustrations in the reporting of outstanding events, these new publications would by 
default make use of woodcuts. In 1842, the Illustrated London News was founded by 
Herbert Ingram, who had observed that sales figures of newspapers increased whenever 
they featured illustrations. In the first issue, it was therefore declared that “[t]he public 
[would have] henceforth under their glance, and within their grasp, the very form and 
presence of events as they transpire, in all their substantial reality, and with evidence 
visible as well as circumstantial.”108 The Illustrated London News covered a wide range 
of topics, such as ‘The Markets’, Foreign Intelligence and Science, and declared that it 
was “by the publication of this very newspaper, launching the giant vessel of illustration 
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into a channel the broadest and the widest that it has ever dared to stem.”109 The first 
issue appeared on 14 May, the date being well-chosen: two days earlier, Queen Victoria 
had held a fancy-dress ball at Buckingham palace, and readers were provided with many 
illustrations. The first issue sold 26,000 copies and was reprinted several times 
afterwards. Priced six pence, the Illustrated London News was relatively expensive and 
was thus from the outset a “popular journal of the middle-brow and middle class.”110 
The makers of the Illustrated London News considered it a “Pictorial Family 
Newspaper”111 and, as a result, the “ethical mandate of the paper [was] expressed in 
terms of middle-class family values.”112 In the final issue of the year 1842, however, the 
Illustrated London News pointed to the diverse readership it had found in the first few 
months of its existence: 
 Circulating much, perhaps chiefly, amongst the higher and middle classes, we have yet 
 stood sturdily by the swelling bulk of the people, and have heartily championized the 
 poor. It is no small pride to us that we have won the esteem of the working classes, and 
 we have hundreds of testimonials to that effect.
113
  
In fact, already in 1843, the Illustrated London News had established itself among the 
leading weekly papers in Britain (selling more than 40,000 copies per issue) and soon 
spawned international imitators.
114
 Circulation rose continuously (from 67,000 in 1850 
to 123,000 in 1855) and occasionally, for instance when covering the wedding of Prince 
Edward and Princess Alexandra in 1863, reached an outstanding 310,000.
115
 It was 
therefore not only the most well-known illustrated newspaper of the time, but had also 
managed to establish itself as “part of the social fabric.”116   
Popular as it was, the Illustrated London News did not only spawn imitators abroad, but 
also at home. Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper was by far the most successful of these.117 
Edward Lloyd – a London publisher who had previously launched several other 
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publications such as the Penny Sunday Times – founded the eponymous Sunday paper 
in 1842, the first issue being published on 27 November. Until January 1843, the paper 
was published unstamped and sold for a mere two pence – in other words, a third of the 
price of the Illustrated London News – before the authorities intervened and taxes had to 
be paid. Nonetheless, Lloyd’s was still far less expensive than the Illustrated London 
News. There was a demand for cheap magazines, and with “[t]hose whose means were 
scantier, or who knew the value of money, [buying] Lloyd’s,” 118  Edward Lloyd 
managed to delineate his paper from the middle-class pioneer and, “lending itself more 
to topics of general interest than particular politics,”119 appealed to a lower-middle and 
working-class audience.  
The demand for this kind of publication among the lower strata of Victorian society is 
sufficiently illustrated by the steadily increasing circulation figures: Whereas in 1843 – 
that is, only one year after the magazine had been launched – 43,000 copies were sold a 
week, this number was to double within the following ten years (1853: 90,000). In 
anticipation of the repeal of the paper duty, the price was reduced to one penny in 
September 1861, and circulation increased to 170,000; two years later, it had reached an 
unprecedented 350,000, and, in so doing, had achieved “a success unparalleled in its 
way.”120 
The Observer, the Illustrated London News and Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper thus 
represent one of the major developments of Britain’s nineteenth-century media 
landscape. Particularly the Illustrated London News and Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper 
found a ready market among their respective target readership, and both covered a wide 
range of topics, explicitly including imperial and foreign news. It has therefore been 
assumed that they gave ample coverage to the various events and expeditions related to 
the newly emerging transport and communication networks.  
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1.4 Literature Review  
The various transport and communication technologies which emerged in the course of 
the nineteenth century, the growth of a global transport and communication network and 
its impact (or sometimes also lack hereof) on a multitude of spheres and fields of 
activity have received persistent scholarly attention. The number of publications tracing 
the emergence and construction of the new links and lines has grown steadily. Already 
in 1929, Hoskins’ British Routes to India was published, providing detailed information 
on British efforts to establish secure, speedy and efficient channels of transport and 
communication with their possessions on the subcontinent and the many problems and 
conflicts they had to face in the process.
121
 In Steaming East, Sarah Searight has in a 
similar manner engaged in the Forging of Steamship and Rail Links Between Europe 
and Asia.
122
 As the title indicates, she does not only consider connections between 
Britain and India, but also looks at railway lines and steamship services to the Middle 
East. The Suez Canal and its role within the context of the Eastern Question and the 
Great Game have been elaborated on by William Jackson
123
 and Zachary Karabell.
124
 
Ransom, in turn, has traced the construction of the Mont Cenis Fell Railway.
125
 
Although – as the title indicates – he is primarily interested in the summit railway, he 
also dwells on the construction of the Mont Cenis Tunnel and the significance of speedy 
passage through this part of the Southern Alps in terms of Britain’s communication with 
the Middle East and South Asia. Stephen Fox, on the other hand, has looked into the 
development of Atlantic passage, retracing the developments and changes occurring 
between 1830 and the early twentieth century.
126
  
The development of a global communications infrastructure, specifically the electric 
telegraph network, has received special attention. The reason for this may primarily be 
that by means of the telegraph and the inherent dematerialization of information flows, 
the speed at which information travelled reached an entirely new quality.
127
 Tracing the 
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integration of various world regions into the electric telegraphy network, Ahvenainen, 
for instance, has made valuable contributions to the historiography of global 
communication structures.
128
 
Looking at the sheer amount of publications, the imperial utilization of transport and 
communication technologies appears to have been a matter of special interest to 
historians. Innis’ Empire and Communications provides a general overview over the 
role communication and the respective media and technologies played for imperial 
integration and administration.
129
 Around thirty years later, Daniel Headrick’s Tools of 
Empire was published, in which he examines the nexus between Technology and 
European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century.
130
 A large part of the book is devoted 
to what Headrick refers to as communication revolution. Here, he dwells on (among 
other things) the significance of steamships for imperial purposes; the role the Suez 
Canal came to play in this context; and the relevance of British submarine cables in 
terms of control over British colonial possessions. It was this account of how various 
technologies enabled and facilitated New Imperialism that intensified historians’ 
interest in these (and related) questions. Headrick himself explored the topic in several 
subsequent publications, such as The Invisible Weapon,
131
 and other historians followed 
suit and addressed questions of Geopolitics and Technology
132
 or Telegraphic 
Imperialism.
133
 Obviously, other imperial powers would also avail themselves of 
telecommunications: Daqing Yang, for example, has investigated the role electric 
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telegraphy came to play in the Japanese Empire.
134
 Moreover, technologies of transport 
and communication also had an impact on international relations in the sense that they 
influenced the way diplomacy, on the one hand, and warfare, on the other, were 
conducted.
135
 
The new transport and communication technologies, however, were more than mere 
tools of empire; they also catered to the needs of business communities, which were in 
dire need of speedy and reliable channels of communication.
136
 Various studies have 
demonstrated that both railways and telegraphy contributed to closer integration of 
markets,
137
 and the Suez Canal’s impact on world trade has also been examined. 138 The 
impact of telegraphic communication on shipping and the far-reaching changes this 
brought about for global trade have been investigated by Byron Lew and Bruce Cater,
139
 
who emphasize the advantages resulting from quasi-instantaneous communication (such 
as up-to-date information, based on which ship-owners could reschedule the ship’s 
itinerary after it had left port). They therefore concluded that “[i]f the telegraph 
benefited shipping, then it must have benefited trade.”140 It must be warned against 
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oversimplified and monocausal analysis, though: David Jacks and Krishna Pendakur 
have investigated “Global Trade and the Maritime Transport Revolution” between 1870 
and 1913 and have come to the conclusion that despite the seemingly obvious 
correlation (increases of 400 percent in global trade while freight rates declined on 
average by 50 percent), it was other factors, such as income growth and convergence, 
that were primarily responsible for the growth in world trade.
141
 
As has been mentioned earlier, with information travelling faster than ever before, the 
gathering and distribution of news was subject to far-reaching changes in the course of 
the nineteenth century and the press benefited decisively from the newly emerging 
transport and communication infrastructure. From early on, telegraph companies would 
transmit time-critical information, such as stock-market prices and other market-
relevant news.
142
 Later, press agencies, which made full use of the opportunities the 
telegraph offered, were founded, bearing witness to the fact that news had become a 
global commodity and profitable business.
143
 Julius Reuter founded his London-based 
news agency of the same name in 1851 and managed to establish his business as “an 
institution of the British Empire.”144 Accordingly, the interplay of the electric telegraph 
network, the transmission of news, and imperial news coverage in Britain has received 
sustained scholarly attention.
145
 Kielbowicz, however, makes a stand against over-
simplified before-and-after comparisons by pointing out how, under certain 
circumstances, news exchanges by mail could compete with the electric telegraph, as 
each “occupied different functional niches in the system of news relay.”146  Similarly, 
Amelia Bonea has also questioned the role attributed to the electric telegraph when it 
comes to news reporting and, using the example of India, has examined to what extent 
socio-cultural or political factors mattered in this context.
147
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Beyond that, the various technologies had multifarious sociocultural ramifications. 
Gender issues have received attention in terms of both railways and telegraphy. Diane 
Drummond has outlined how railway usage was gender-specific and how the 
experiences men and women made with this new means of transport therefore 
differed.
148
 The emergence of new professional groups with the advent of electric 
telegraphy has also been examined in several studies.
149
  
Furthermore, railways and steamships helped ‘opening up’ the country in various ways. 
New technologies of transport contributed to the emergence of popular tourism and thus 
enabled a growing number of people to travel the country and visit sights and areas 
which had previously been difficult to access.
150
 What is more, railways changed both 
cities and landscapes. Questions of the railways’ influence on urban development and 
growth have therefore been at the centre of numerous studies.
151
 As regards telegraphy 
in urban areas, Tarr, Finholt and Goldman attended to Urban Telecommunications in the 
Pre-Telephone Era
152
 and came to the conclusion that “in spite of the critical nature of 
communications techniques for urban development, we have only a limited knowledge 
of their effects on the city.”153 To this date, this does not seem to have changed and 
matters of inner-city telegraphy are still disregarded in favour of imperial or global 
issues.
154
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Given the fact that this dissertation is primarily interested in the ways newly emerging 
transport and communication technologies were represented in Victorian media, 
publications addressing their reception in contemporary literature are of peculiar interest. 
Charles Dickens is certainly the most prominent English author frequently dwelling on 
the railway. Robin Atthill
155
 and Helmut Viebrock
156
 have thus focused on how Dickens 
portrayed the railway in his literary works. In this connection, Atthill has drawn the 
conclusion that “[t]wo contrasting moods predominate in Dickens’s writings about the 
railway: the humorous and the horrific – the satirical and the sensational.”157 Ewald 
Mengel also dealt with The Railway Through Dickens’s World,158 yet he provided a 
mere compilation, rather than an analysis of texts from the magazines Household Words 
and All the Year Round, both of which were edited by Dickens. The lack of any analysis 
is somewhat deplorable, particularly taking into consideration that Mengel himself 
pointed out that “[a]n investigation of the image of the railway in Household Words and 
All the Year Round shows the many-sided, complex and contradictory reactions of 
Dickens’s contemporaries towards the new means of transport.”159 Dickens also figured 
in Michael Freeman’s Railways and the Victorian Imagination,160 where he investigated, 
among other things, how railways were represented in contemporary art and literature. 
With electric telegraphy “[bringing] about changes in the nature of language, of 
ordinary knowledge, of the very structures of awareness,”161 it is hardly surprising that 
these transformations have been subject of an increasing number of publications. 
Richard Menke’s Telegraphic Realism, in which he examined nineteenth-century 
British fictional writing (and therefore also resorts to Dickens) and argued that 
“imaginative writing responds in crucial and defining ways to the nineteenth century’s 
new media and the ideas they encouraged about information, communication, and 
language,” is but one example of this kind of study.162 Menke has not only considered 
how new information technologies were represented in contemporary literature, but has 
also shown how they transformed fictional writing – in the words of the author himself, 
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these are “cross-pollination[s] between imaginative writing and media innovation in 
nineteenth-century Britain.”163 
In what follows, I will briefly outline the key texts addressing the representation of 
nineteenth-century transport and communication technologies and their impact on 
contemporaries’ perceptions and experience.    
In a – sadly – rather short article on “Representations of Transatlantic Telegraphy,” 
Colin Hempstead set out to investigate typical representations of the first transatlantic 
submarine cables in contemporary British and American prose, poetry and pictures.
164
 
His aim was twofold: on the one hand, he wished to trace how the public was 
familiarized with the cables spanning the North Atlantic. Analyzing the content of 
publications aimed at a general public (rather than at a professional audience), on the 
other hand, he argued that “we can learn of otherwise hidden social and political 
attitudes.”165 He has demonstrated that the accounts of the various transatlantic cable 
ventures were not provided in a vacuum, but were both “embedded (…) in existing 
social structures”166 and “placed into the social, cultural and technological history of 
Western Europe.”167  Images repeatedly drawn upon include, inter alia, biblical and 
Shakespearean motifs, tales of explorations and progress, and patriotic lyric. As 
Hempstead has pointed out, it was in particular biblical and Shakespearean images that 
were most often resorted to, for instance in order to illustrate the speed at which 
messages were transmitted along the telegraph cables. An example given by 
Hempstead
168
 is the following passage taken from the Atlantic Monthly, in which the 
author draws on Shakespeare’s Midsummer Night’s Dream:  
 When Shakespeare made Puck promise to ‘put a girdle round about the earth in forty 
 minutes,’ he undoubtedly supposed he would thereby accomplish a remarkable feat; but 
 when the great Russo-American line viâ [sic] Behring’s Strait and the Amoor is 
 completed, and the Atlantic Cable is again in operation, we can put an electric girdle 
 round about the earth before Puck could have time to spread his wings!
169
 
As Hempstead modestly noted in his final remarks, his examinations do not allow for 
any definite conclusion. Nonetheless, his study has inspired this dissertation and 
informed its research objectives. Rather than analyzing the representation of the 
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transatlantic telegraph only, however, this dissertation investigates the representation of 
transport and communication technologies on a wider scale and, in so doing, will 
advance Hempstead’s preliminary findings.  
Stephen Kern’s monograph on The Culture of Time and Space was first published in 
1983.
170
 With time and space being universal and essential categories, Kern considered 
them “particularly suitable as a framework for a general cultural history” 171  and 
therefore set out to illustrate how from “around 1880 to the outbreak of World War I a 
series of sweeping changes in technology and culture created distinctive new modes of 
thinking about and experiencing time and space.”172 The technologies Kern addressed 
included, inter alia, the telephone, wireless telegraphy, bicycles, x-ray and the 
automobile. Looking into coeval developments in the fields of, for instance, literature 
(for example the works of Joseph Conrad, Franz Kafka and James Joyce), painting 
(Pablo Picasso, Jean Metzinger) or philosophy (Karl Jaspers, Émile Durkheim, Henri-
Louis Bergson), Kern attempted to illustrate how these technologies have jumbled up 
previously valid ideas of time and space and brought about new approaches and 
interpretations. In order to make his point, he firstly contemplated the ‘nature of time’, 
and subsequently examined how notions of the past, the present and the future were 
shaped by the respective technologies. After an interlude on ‘speed’, he dwelled on the 
‘nature of space’, coping with issues such as form, distance and direction. Attempting to 
illustrate “how the changes in thinking about and experiencing these abstract 
philosophical categories were manifested in a concrete historical situation,”173 he finally 
elaborated on the interrelation between new perceptions of time and space and the 
outbreak of the First World War.  
Indeed, Kern has been given credit for having written “a thoroughly interesting book,” 
which is described as being “bold and daring. In a world filled with safe, pedestrian, and 
narrow monographs, there must be preserved a place for such books.”174 One of the 
factors making the book so interesting was its truly international outlook; moreover, the 
way he traced how well-established political and social structures were called into 
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question by what is conceived of as “potentially democratic technology,”175on the one 
hand, and new ways of thinking in both the sciences and the arts, on the other, was 
positively commented on. However, Kern has also met with criticism: Turner, for 
instance, has pointed out that the intellectual trends Kern drew upon mostly originated 
in countries which did not belong to the vanguard in terms of technological 
developments in the nineteenth century, such as Russia, Italy or Austria. In Great 
Britain, in turn, which was spearheading scientific and technological progress at that 
time, these movements were not particularly well-developed.
176
Furthermore, despite 
warning against monocausal technological determinism in the introduction,
177
 Kern 
declared in the preface to the second edition that “[t]echnology offers a compelling way 
to explain cultural change.”178 He further pointed out that  
 [c]ultural historians struggle to explain the gradual evolution of fluid concepts such as 
 romanticism and realism that have no precise starting date and no specific material 
 manifestation. Technologies like the telephone present no such problems. They begin to 
 affect history at a relatively precise starting date and are things that can be touched or 
 held. They also  affect the masses and not just an esoteric readership, as did many 
 modernist classics.
179
 
This is astonishing, if not disturbing in many ways. To start with, emphasizing 
technologies’ tangibility as reason for which they are particularly appropriate means to 
explain cultural change seems fairly naive. What is more, with Edgerton’s claim in 
mind that analyses of the interrelation between technology and society should primarily 
deal with “technology which is in widespread use,”180 [my italics] Kern’s statement 
appears all the more crude, as he does not seem to take into account questions 
concerning the diffusion of a particular technology, access to it and its actual usage.  
Wolfgang Schivelbusch, in turn, set out to examine the psychological effects train 
journeys had on contemporaries and was primarily interested in railways’ impact on 
changing perceptions of time and space.
181
 For this reason, he took a closer look at the 
experiences of various professional groups involved, such as businessmen, engineers 
and medical doctors, as well as the general public. Contrary to what the title indicates, 
though, the issue of changing perceptions of time, space and landscape (and related 
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phenomena, such as the introduction of unified railway time) has been dealt with in one 
single chapter only. Beyond that, Schivelbusch has looked into a wide array of other 
aspects related to train journeys, such as the question whether railways could possibly 
alleviate social distinctions, the potential effects travelling by train could have on 
passengers’ health and how railway stations came to dominate cities and towns. These 
are certainly important facets which have all too often been disregarded in ‘ordinary’ 
railway histories, and Schivelbusch has quite rightly been given credit for having 
written an interesting book. Nonetheless, he also had to face harsh criticism: Owing to 
the wide array of topics covered, for instance, it has been criticized that the book was 
“neither tightly organized nor unified by a single overriding thesis”182 and that it was 
therefore “a collection of essays [rather] than a well-organized reference work.”183  
As mentioned earlier, in her study on Mobile Räume, Regine Buschauer set out to 
examine the discourses on spatial transformations in the context of new transport, 
communication and information technologies. Drawing upon a wide range of material, 
such as nineteenth-century novels and letters, correspondence between governmental 
bodies or computer game instructions, Buschauer has shown that space was repeatedly 
declared to have been ‘abolished’, ‘lost’ or ‘overcome’. She has therefore reinforced 
Edgerton’s hypothesis that our thinking about technologies has roots that reach far into 
the past. What is more, though, she has also demonstrated that, rather than condensing 
the discourses on the spatial reconfigurations brought about by the various technologies, 
one needs to distinguish them: in the context of railways, for instance, questions of 
speed are at the heart of the discourse. Concerning telegraphy, network structures and 
questions of immaterialness are more important.
184
 
With Dark Light, Linda Simon has presented a cultural and social history of electric 
technologies and the electrification taking place in the United States in the course of the 
second half of the nineteenth century: By means of newspapers, magazines and fictional 
writing, she has examined the reception of electrically driven inventions, with a focus 
on illumination. As indicated in the title, the author was first of all interested in the 
anxieties that arose in this context. She therefore paid particular attention to the 
contradictions between the enthusiasm with which electricity was hailed (including 
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medical treatments, which were quite popular among contemporaries in both North 
America and Europe), on the one hand, and the fact that it acquired belated foothold in 
American households, on the other. Starting point for her examination was the 
perception of the electric telegraph; further, she also considered responses to the 
telephone, the phonograph, first light bulbs and X-rays. Among the questions she 
addressed were: What did contemporaries actually know about electricity as a physical 
phenomenon? What did they think about the relationship between electrical and human 
energy? And what were the cultural legacies that had informed their reaction to 
electricity? In this context she also looked into belief systems of the time, such as 
spiritualism, vitalism and mesmerism, thus embedding these anxieties over electricity 
into “a much larger anxiety about the place of the immaterial within an world [sic] of 
science increasingly dominated by matter.”185 What is more, Simon highlighted that this 
was not only a book about nineteenth-century responses to electric technologies. Rather, 
it addressed questions that are still valid more than a century later, for,  
 truth be told, we, too, worry about invisible emanations – from power lines or from the 
 cell phones that we carry with us everywhere. New technologies unsettle us. (…) Many 
 of us have inherited from our nineteenth-century forebears some cherished assumptions: 
 that nature will and must keep its secrets, that humans should not transgress, that nature 
 will enact punishment against those who try to control it or probe too closely.
186
  
The book offered interesting insights into the perception of electricity, but, given the 
fact that the author herself has repeatedly pointed out that the book addressed topics that 
are of paramount significance for us to understand the world we live in today, it is 
somewhat disappointing that she has not dwelt on the similarities (and differences) 
between past and present any further.  
In his recent publication Connecting the Nineteenth-Century World, Roland 
Wenzlhuemer has investigated the multilayered interrelations between actors and 
network technologies, using the global telegraph network of the nineteenth century as a 
case study. In so doing, his aim was to study “the actors of late nineteenth-century 
processes of globalization embedded into global communication structures.” 187 
Combining quantitative and qualitative methods and looking at statistical data and 
network maps as well as letters, diaries, newspaper articles and cartoons, he aimed for 
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an “integrated perspective.”188 The underlying questions he sought to answer were, on 
the one hand, to what extent structures of a network are informed by the specific 
functions a technology performs, and, on the other, how these structures in turn affect 
the ways in which actors utilize this particular technology. Within this framework, he 
addressed – among other things – the question to what degree and in which ways 
telegraphic communication had an effect on contemporaries’ experiences and thoughts. 
He was, for instance, interested in whether perceptions of time and space changed, to 
what extent language was influenced and whether tensions between established social 
and cultural practices, on the one hand, and the opportunities and/or limitations inherent 
to the technology, on the other, emerged. The following example illustrates how the 
interplay of qualitative and quantitative methods can provide useful insights: analyzing 
the shipping information which was regularly published in the Times and which 
provided information about incoming ships and their date of arrival, Wenzlhuemer was 
able to illustrate that global communication times shrank in the second half of the 
century and were no longer necessarily related to geographical distance. At the turn of 
the century, geographic space and (what Wenzlhuemer refers to as) global 
communication space were therefore no longer congruent.
189
 Such structural changes, in 
turn, came to be reflected in contemporaries’ perception of the world they lived in. This 
is illustrated in a letter to the editor published in the Times in December 1870.
190
 In this 
letter, a gentleman who “had occasion to telegraph to Calcutta”191 describes what seems 
like an absurd odyssey through the maze of post and telegraph offices in Central 
London and the multifarious problems he encountered when all he wished to do was to 
telegraph to the capital of British India. Reading between the lines, it becomes apparent 
that, due to its integration into the global communication infrastructure, the gentleman 
seems to perceive Calcutta to be much closer to London than other, less integrated 
places (despite them being closer to London in terms of geographic space). (I will come 
back to this example at a later point, see chapter 5.)  
Combining these different types of source material, Wenzlhuemer has thus been able to 
draw a vivid picture of how the nineteenth-century global telegraph network informed 
perceptions of space and influenced contemporaries’ everyday experiences.  
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Analyzing nineteenth-century transport and communication technology’s media 
representation, this dissertation also seeks to contribute to the growing body of research 
on the ways in which these informed and transformed contemporaries’ everyday 
experiences and perceptions. As set out earlier, it aims at providing a more 
comprehensive analysis, though, in the sense that it looks at newspapers and other 
printed material aimed at various strata of society. In so doing, it will also make a 
valuable contribution to the field of Victorian studies in general, and Victorian cultural 
history in particular.  
As Susie Steinbach remarks aptly, “[h]istorians have been attempting to provide 
overviews of Victorian Britain for a long time.” 192  At this, she points out, both 
temporary boundaries as well as geographic foci have varied. With the nineteenth 
century witnessing the formation of Britain’s political parties and the piecemeal 
extension of franchise throughout the century, it is hardly surprising that questions of 
political thought and procedures have attracted scholarly interest.
193
 Similarly, imperial 
and economic issues have steadily received attention, and the nexus between the two
194
 
has also been subject to examination. Asa Briggs’ The Age of Improvement certainly is 
of particular interest in this context: although the first edition was published in 1959 and 
the book covers what the author himself calls the “‘unconventional’ period”195 between 
1783 and 1867, it is still one of the most comprehensive works on (at least a part of) the 
Victorian era, the author interweaving all of the issues mentioned above. 
Along with this distinct interest in political, economic and imperial history, Victorian 
mindsets and mentalities have also been paid attention to from very early on. Already in 
1936, Young engaged in drawing the Portrait of an Age and was particularly concerned 
with contemporaries’ perceptions and attitudes towards the world they lived in, as for 
him, “the real, central theme of History is not what happened, but what people felt about 
it when it was happening.”196 This is particularly interesting in light of the fact that 
Young is more interested in the inconsistencies and ruptures, rather than in finding 
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overriding and unifying characteristics of the age. Consequently, Young’s picture of 
England under Victoria’s reign is complex and multilayered, “a dazzling chiaroscuro, an 
intricate network of themes and counterthemes blending to form a masterly work of art 
which successfully conveys a sense of the organic life of Victorian England.”197 In spite 
of such praise, though, there are some aspects the reader should be aware of: firstly, 
Young’s Portrait is, as the title indicates, one of Victorian England rather than Britain. 
Secondly, as the author’s focus is on a liberal and highly educated middle class, the 
Portrait shows only a very limited fraction of English society of the time. Moreover, 
more than other books on the Victorian period, the Portrait has to be seen as a product 
of the particular period during which it was written: in the early twentieth century and 
particularly after the First World War, the Victorians were looked down upon – first and 
foremost by the so-called Bloomsbury Group – for what was deemed naivety and 
hypocrisy. This only came to change thirty years later, when Britain had to come to 
terms with seemingly insurmountable economic and political problems. The era under 
the reign of Queen Victoria then came to be remembered as a time of political stability 
and a period in which Great Britain was internationally held in high esteem for its role 
as a global superpower. Readers should therefore keep in mind that, in writing the 
Portrait, Young   
 intended to convey a message to his contemporaries who were grappling with the 
 problems of the inter-war years. The Portrait contains a warning: only by re-capturing 
 the vigorous and flexible intelligence of their early and mid-Victorian past can the 
 English safely step into the future.
198
 [italics in original] 
In 1949, Ideas and Beliefs of the Victorians was published as an accompanying volume 
to the eponymous radio series that had been broadcast by the BBC Third Programme 
throughout 1948.
199
 The circumstance of the book being published as an accompanying 
volume should be taken into account in order to understand its structure and extent: As 
highlighted in the preface, “broadcasting is essentially discontinuous. In a sense it 
should be so. Each item heard should be a completed experience.” 200  Therefore, 
although contributions to the series were meant to adhere to a “unifying principle,”201 
each piece should be self-contained in the sense that the audience could listen to it 
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without getting the impression they were lacking elementary knowledge from earlier 
broadcasts.
202
 The contributions to the radio programme – and the companion volume, 
accordingly – were arranged in five categories: ‘Theory of Progress,’ ‘Victorian 
Religious Belief and Controversy,’ ‘Man and Nature,’ ‘The Liberal Idea,’ and the 
somewhat vaguely formulated ‘‘Working out’ of Victorian Ideas.’ Rather than covering 
what can be considered conventional aspects only, topics such as sexuality in the 
Victorian era or biographies of well-known personalities were also included in order to 
attract the widest possible audience. This approach, on the one hand, presents an 
advantage in the sense that it offers patchwork-like insights into a wide spectrum of 
topics interwoven with one another. Contributions dwelling on the roots and 
proliferation of the idea of progress, for instance, are completed by pieces on the 
relationship between man and nature and its representation in contemporary works of art 
(although it is questionable if radio listeners were able to relate all these contributions to 
one another). At the same time, though, this approach is one of the major shortcomings 
of the book: owing to the specifications concerning the content of the programme (in 
terms of discontinuity of broadcasting, self-containment of the single contributions and 
lack of narrative structure) the patchwork remains somewhat fragmentary and 
unconnected in spite of the many different topics covered.  
In 1957, Walter Houghton set out to examine the Victorian Frame of Mind,
203
 
attempting to explore   
 those general ideas and attitudes about life which Victorians of the middle and upper 
 classes  would have breathed in with the air – the main grounds of hope and uneasiness 
 which they felt, the modes of thought and behavior they followed, often spontaneously, 
 the standards of value they held – in a word, the frame of mind in which they were 
 living and thinking.
204
 
As Houghton pointed out, such examination of the Victorian Frame of Mind is of 
particular importance, for “to look into the Victorian mind is to see some primary 
sources of the modern mind.”205 Following a brief introduction on what he considers the 
‘Character of the Age,’ Houghton addressed the emotional, intellectual and moral 
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attitudes of the Victorians. At this, he concentrated on the period from 1830 to 1870 
(following prominent predecessors such as Young
206
) and dealt with, among other 
things, ‘Optimism and Anxiety’, ‘Dogmatism’ or the ‘Commercial Spirit’. Houghton’s 
survey being based on “literature in the broad sense” 207  it is first and foremost 
intellectuals, such as Arnold, Carlyle and Huxley, that are being heard and which 
Houghton regarded as representative of both the upper and middle class. Similar to 
Young, Houghton explicitly did not consider the “working class as such,”208 and it is 
therefore once again only a particular section of Victorian society the reader is 
introduced to.   
David Newsome’s The Victorian World Picture is yet another and much more recent 
attempt to come to terms with Perceptions and Introspections in an Age of Change.
209
 
The questions Newsome addressed are as follows:  
 How did the Victorians observe their own times? What troubled or excited them, as they 
 looked at their internal problems and crises? How did they see themselves and their 
 country in relation to what was happening in Europe and elsewhere? What did history 
 tell them as a guide to the future (when they looked ‘before and after’, in fact)?210 
Newsome, like Houghton, highlighted that contemporaries were well aware they lived 
in times of profound changes and therefore emphasized that the Victorian world picture 
must be a collage and a moving picture “rather than an ordered composition.”211 He also 
addressed the problem of representativeness, pointing out two things readers should 
keep in mind: firstly, the issue of regional variations, for even within England there 
were distinct local identities, let alone Scottish and Welsh ones; and secondly, the 
question of how the attitudes and world views of the lower classes could be brought to 
the fore. Despite these efforts, it was in this context that Newsome encountered 
criticism for what was considered a narrow focus on certain strata of society: “When 
treating the class frictions that constituted the intellectual, religious and political elites, 
Newsome is on firm ground. These apparently were the real Victorians; we are left 
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unsure about the rest of the population.”212 Nonetheless, Newsome is considered to be 
the “G.M. Young de nos jours”213 [italics in original] and readers new to the topic are 
advised that, before venturing on Young’s Portrait, they should consult Newsome’s 
Victorian World Picture.  
This dissertation by no means attempts to provide a similarly comprehensive overview 
over Victorian zeitgeist. As Newsome has pointed out, though, “the massive advance of 
technology and industrialization which was visibly reshaping both the landscape and the 
social structure of the country” had “a most powerful impact”214 and was one of the 
distinguishing features of the Victorian era. Examining the media representation of 
transport and communication technology, one will therefore undoubtedly gain insights 
into Victorian mindsets in a wider sense, and this dissertation can therefore make a 
valuable contribution to the research on Victorian ideas and beliefs.  
 
1.5 Chapter Structure  
This introductory chapter took passages from Jules Verne’s Around the World in 80 
Days as point of departure to illustrate the general public’s excitement about nineteenth-
century transport and communication technologies and the ways in which they seemed 
to make the world a smaller place. It illustrated that – despite a large body of scholarly 
publications on transport and communication technologies and their application in 
various fields – contemporaries’ attitudes and expectations towards these technologies 
have not been researched sufficiently. Further, it identified the questions this 
dissertation seeks to answer. The chapter also elaborated the relevance of this 
dissertation and outlined both the significance of nineteenth-century newspapers and 
periodicals as primary sources and how the vast amount of material available had been 
rendered manageable.  
Chapter 2 traces the historical development of the global transport and communication 
infrastructure with a focus on the North Atlantic and the various routes between Great 
Britain and India. The chapter illustrates that the establishment of these new channels of 
transport and/or communication was a cumbersome affair, rather than a smooth and 
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steady process. Drawing on contemporary commentatorship, it illustrates the 
commercial and political rationale of the various actors involved in these processes. In 
so doing it offers a detailed account of the problems and conflicting interests, which is 
necessary in order to provide for a critical reading of the source material.  
Introducing different approaches towards the relationship between technology and 
society, Chapter 3 provides a basic analytical framework. To begin with, it addresses the 
concepts of technological determinism, on the one hand, and the social determination of 
technology, on the other, and highlights why these are no longer deemed suitable to 
describe and analyze this relation sufficiently. Subsequently, the chapter outlines a 
sociological understanding of technology and briefly introduces relevant aspects of 
Actor-Network-Theory, both of which take into account the actual application of 
technology (albeit in different ways). My contention is that the Victorian understanding 
of the relationship between technology and society exceeded the technological 
determinist and somewhat naive beliefs that are ascribed to them nowadays. It is 
therefore essential to examine what could be described as the ‘conventional’ accounts of 
Victorian approaches towards technology. This chapter will present differing versions 
of the apparently axiomatic Victorian belief technology would inevitably bring about 
certain developments and ramifications; it will outline the intellectual movements which 
informed them, and it will examine the central concepts involved, such as the belief in 
progress and the subjugation of nature. 
Chapters 4 to 7 provide a critical reading of the source material, with chapter 4 directly 
drawing on the preceding chapter. It attends to the notion of progress, human dominion 
over nature and the ‘technological sublime’. In so doing – and in line with Hempstead’s 
findings – it also investigates to what extent transport and communication technologies 
were embedded into social and cultural history and sets forth the reasons for this.   
Chapter 5 focuses on the shifting perceptions of time, space and distance brought about 
by new transport and communication technologies. It starts with a brief introduction to 
various concepts of space and illustrates the interplay between media of transport and 
communication, on the one hand, and perceptions of time, space and distance, on the 
other. The chapter argues that the idea of the annihilation of time and space, which is 
often considered to be contemporaries’ attempt to ‘conceptualize’ changing spatio-
temporal arrangements, is rather to be viewed in terms of the subjugation of nature. 
Further, it detects an alternative and much more sophisticated approach to and 
48 
 
understanding of how contemporary transport and communication technologies 
transformed perceptions of time and space.  
Addressing the question to what extent technologies of transport and communication 
were considered to be ‘tools of peace’, chapter 6 explores whether Victorian 
contemporaries’ ideas concerning technology’s ‘impact’ reached beyond technological 
determinist approaches. For this purpose, the chapter first of all investigates whether 
rapid communication was necessarily beneficial as concerns international conflict 
situations and demonstrates that, at times, swift exchange of information could indeed 
make the situation worse. In the subsequent analysis of relevant media content, it 
ponders if contemporaries were aware of this and, if so, how they addressed this issue.  
Chapter 7 focuses on the role technological achievements, specifically transport and 
communication technologies, played in the context of national identities and interstate 
rivalries. For this purpose, it briefly contemplates the formation of national identities 
and the factors that are generally most significant in this context, before it looks into the 
core features of British national identity. In this chapter, reporting on the Great 
Exhibition and the way other countries and cultures were presented will be of particular 
significance. Further, the ways in which the Suez Canal and the Mont Cenis Tunnel 
were reported will be investigated more closely.  
The concluding chapter integrates the various topics addressed previously with a view 
to the dissertation’s main questions set forth in the introduction. In conclusion, it points 
to questions which should be addressed in future studies.  
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2. Of Iron Horses and Floating Towns – The Development of Global 
Transport and Communication Infrastructure in the Nineteenth 
Century  
In the nineteenth century, what is often referred to as a transport and communication 
revolution
215
 occurred. Given the fact that infrastructure had developed steadily during 
the previous century, the term ‘revolution’ may be slightly inappropriate. These earlier 
improvements, however, had reached their limits and new technologies were needed in 
order to reduce transmission times further.
216
 The new technologies filling this gap in 
the nineteenth century were the steam engine (with its effects on both land and marine 
transport), on the one hand, and electric telegraphy, on the other.  
Searight, dwelling on the opportunities steam engines and the resultant transport 
technologies promised in the nineteenth century, draws a vivid picture of the spirit of 
the time:  
Steam was thrilling because it was obvious almost at once that it was going to give 
wings to ordinary men and women. People brought up to be stationary were bewitched 
by the movement, the sight and sound of a steam engine. (…) Soon it was opening up 
continents, melding provinces into nations, shifting populations across the world – and 
also aiding and confirming military conquest. Men had discovered that he was born to 
go faster.
217
 
Although this statement should be treated with some caution, it illustrates aptly that 
there was hardly any other invention which had so profound an influence on 
transportation (and, by extension, also on communication) as the steam engine.  
In 1712, Thomas Newcomen devised what was later to become known as the 
Newcomen steam engine; although it worked more efficiently than the preceding 
atmospheric engines, it still was economically unviable. More than half a century later, 
James Watt improved Newcomen’s engine decisively and made it more efficient. The 
first factory producing steam engines was founded in 1774, and “[i]n the phraseology of 
the time the glorious day of steam had arrived:” 218  Steam engines were gradually 
improved in the years to follow, and by the end of the eighteenth century, around 5000 
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steam engines were in use in England.
219
 At that point in time, however, the majority of 
steam engines was still stationary, “[b]ut the impetus to apply steam to movement 
quickly grew.”220 
On the following pages, the evolution of steam-propelled transport both on land and on 
water will be traced. For the sake of a clear arrangement, the development of steamships 
and railways will be outlined separately. Concerning the former, I will provide an 
overview over their development from the early nineteenth century onward and 
highlight the most significant improvements as to the passage across the North Atlantic, 
on the one hand, and the establishment of constant and reliable steam communication 
with India, on the other. In this context, I will also outline the development and 
ramifications of the Suez Canal. Concerning railways, I will briefly depict the 
development of a continental railway network and the attempts of establishing a direct 
connection between Europe and India, before I focus on the Mont Cenis Tunnel and its 
effect on communication between Great Britain and the subcontinent.  
 
2.1 Steamships 
Writing on developments and improvements of transport to and communication with 
India in the nineteenth century, Headrick asserts in a rather laconic way that “[b]y the 
mid-fifties the once arduous and risky trip to the Orient had become fast and 
comparatively easy.”221 The development of steamships and the resultant opening up of 
new routes, however, was not as straightforward as this statement implies. Instead, it 
was characterized by trial and error and conflicting interest of the protagonists involved. 
Hardly surprising, there were several routes to India. The decision which route to use 
hinged on the naval technology available at the time and the political situation in the 
Middle East.
222
 From a British point of view, the most important route in the era of 
sailing ships was the one circumnavigating the Cape of Good Hope (usually referred to 
as the Cape route), which was “a highway dominated by English ships and marked by 
English way stations.”223  This was mostly due to the fact that there was no time-
consuming transshipment required on this route. Moreover, as a result of the Napoleonic 
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Wars, Britain had obtained unchallenged global naval superiority, which meant that the 
circumnavigation of the Cape was a relatively safe journey. The voyage to India around 
the Cape was a lengthy one, though: In 1825, a one-way trip from London to Calcutta 
would require between four and eight months. Because of the monsoons, which 
inhibited year-round navigation on this route, a round trip between London and 
Calcutta – and thus the time it took before one could expect a reply to any kind of 
correspondence – could amount to two years.224 Furthermore, the long duration of the 
journey posed other problems, concerning, for instance, logistics (food supply) and 
passengers’ health (outbreak of scurvy).225 
Other possible routes to India were generally referred to as ‘overland routes’, one 
leading from Europe via the Mediterranean to Syria, through Mesopotamia and 
subsequently down the Persian Gulf to India (also called the ‘direct’ route);226 the other 
one crossing the Mediterranean towards Egypt, and, after transshipment and the 
crossing of the Isthmus of Suez on land, further towards India via the Red Sea. There 
were drawbacks inherent to both of these routes, too: travelling along the direct route, 
one had to traverse the Ottoman Empire, facing “xenophobic Arab tribes and unreliable 
Turkish administrators,”227 whereas the Red Sea route, with its capricious winds and 
abrupt storms, was hardly navigable for sailing ships. 
As a result, the Cape route was the most popular route to the East at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. The introduction of steamships, however, would in the long run 
change these preferences and open up entirely new opportunities.  
In the North Atlantic – which was not only the most trafficked, but also the most 
perilous sea passage
228
 – so-called packet lines had been established in the early 
nineteenth century, offering the advantage of regular service. Not only were they 
considered to have introduced an unprecedented level of comfort; what is more, they 
made journeys more reliable, as they would leave port at a scheduled date, rather than 
waiting for a sufficient amount of cargo and number of people aboard before casting off 
(which had previously been common practice). In the 1830s, the journey from New 
York to Liverpool amounted to around 24 days, while the return trip would take about 
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38 days.
229
 These sailing ships, though, were after all subject to weather conditions and 
therefore prone to delays: the departure date was fixed, but the actual length of the 
journey was still uncertain.  
 
2.1.1 From Wood to Iron – Early Developments and First Atlantic Crossings 
Technological developments do not just ‘happen’, but are fostered by certain social, 
cultural or economic factors. Hardly surprising, this is also the case concerning the 
emergence of steamships. Their development was closely intertwined with 
industrialization processes and the growth in trade from the late eighteenth century 
onwards, which necessitated and promoted a new type of ship. Given the fact that India 
had become of central importance for the maintenance of British economy, both the 
routes and modes of transport to and communication with the subcontinent were of 
paramount significance. Headrick therefore considers the “entrepreneurs who handled 
this trade [to be] the catalysts of improved communications in the nineteenth 
century.”230 For their purposes, the long journey around the Cape of Good Hope would 
only do for the shipment of goods; communication and the exchange of important 
business information depended on more efficient channels. Besides such economic 
aspects, there was also a political rationale: Napoleon’s policy of expansion towards the 
East gave the British an understanding of the significance of improved and speedier 
means of communication with the Indian subcontinent. Moreover, an increasing number 
of British clerks and businessmen resided in India, longing for speedy channels of 
communication so that they could keep in touch with their loved ones back home.
231
  
Despite earlier attempts of propelling ships by steam power, it was only in the early 
years of the nineteenth century that marine steam propulsion made noteworthy 
progress.
232
 Although the Charlotte Dundas, designed by the Scottish engineer William 
Symington in 1802, is considered the first practical steam vessel,
233
 the Clermont, built 
by Robert Fulton and Robert Livingston in New York City (equipped with a British 
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engine, though) in 1807 is looked upon as the first commercially successful 
steamship.
234
 Both the Charlotte Dundas and the Clermont, as virtually all steamships 
to be built in the following three decades, were paddle steamers, as the method 
employing wire ropes to move oars had turned out to be rather wasteful and prone to 
disruptions.
235
  
In contrast to the rapidly increasing number of steamships in the United States, the 
development in the British Empire was comparatively slow: by 1819, there were around 
100 steam vessels in the United States; in the entire British Empire, there were only a 
meagre 43.
236
 Nonetheless, services improved steadily; in 1812, the Comet was taken 
into service between Glasgow and Helensburgh.
237
 In 1816, the Margery, which had 
been in operation on the river Thames since 1815, was to become the first steamship to 
cross the English Channel; the same year, a service across the Irish Sea was 
inaugurated.
238
 A regular steamer service across the English Channel was introduced in 
1822, and by 1825, there was an “extensive system of steamship services around the 
British Isles and to Europe.”239 While steam-propelled vessels had soon become widely 
accepted means of transport in terms of inland and coastal navigation, they were still not 
deemed suitable for the open sea.
240
 As a result, ocean-going vessels would still be 
equipped with masts carrying sails.
241
  
One of these ships equipped with both spread of sails and steam engine was the 
Savannah. The first crossing of the Atlantic under steam is often attributed to this 
hybrid ship, although, on her trip from Savannah, Georgia, to Liverpool in May 1819, 
she sailed for most of the time. In fact, steam propulsion was used for no more than 85 
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hours.
242
 Despite the many problems and limitations inherent to steam-propelled ships, 
the Savannah demonstrated that it was indeed possible to employ steamships on the 
open sea. Consequently, numerous ‘hybrid ships’ crossed the Atlantic in the following 
years, but not one of them would do so on steam power only.
243
  
It was only in 1838 that both the Sirius and the Great Western traversed the Atlantic 
powered by steam alone, the latter crossing the ocean in little more than 15 days.
244
 
Isambard Kingdom Brunel had previously solved the problem of efficiency and had 
designed the Great Western specifically for ocean crossings. Indeed, compared to other 
steamships, she turned out to be a thorough success in terms of efficiency: The Sirius 
had run out of fuel towards the end of the journey and the crew had to burn parts of the 
interior fitting.
245
 The Great Western, in contrast, entered port in New York with more 
than 40 tons of coal aboard.
246
 Brunel had thus proven that, if only ships were designed 
appropriately, the problem of fuel supply for long journeys could be overcome. As a 
result, from 1840 onwards, regular steamship services crossing the Atlantic Ocean were 
introduced.
247
  
Contemporaries were well aware of the significance of these first Atlantic crossings by 
steamships. The Manchester Guardian, for instance, reprints an article from the 
Liverpool Times, in which it is declared that “[i]t is a remarkable fact that the outward 
and inward voyage should have occupied the same time.”248 It is further pointed out that  
[t]his great saving of time, amounting on the voyage to America to more than a third, 
and on that from America to Europe to more than a fourth, cannot fail to produce an 
immense effect on the intercourse between the two continents, if the experiment should 
prove profitable, and regular lines of steam packets should be established. For all 
purposes of business and communication, (…) the utmost degree of regularity will be 
produced in the intercourse. In every point of view, the experiment is one of the most 
important ever tried, and the events of every year will furnish additional evidence of its 
importance.
249
 
The Scotsman also considers the regularity steamships would introduce to be of 
particular importance: 
 The benefit in the use of steam navigation is not to be estimated by the abbreviation it 
 effects in the mean length of the voyage, but by the regularity it ensures. When a 
 person sets foot in a Liverpool packet for New York, the probability is that his voyage 
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 may be finished in 30 days; but it is quite possible, as experience shows, that it may be 
 prolonged to 50. All who have business to transact; all to whom time is precious, or the 
 sea a cause of sickness or ennui, will set an inestimable value on the punctuality of 
 steam navigation, which offers a certainty of accomplishing the voyage within two or 
 three days beyond the mean period, instead of twenty or thirty.
250
 
 
Still, these early ocean-going steamships were economically unprofitable. For the ocean 
steamship to become a lucrative service, it had to be transformed in several ways. Iron 
hulls and propellers, for instance, were initiated in the late 1830s and offered various 
advantages: iron allowed for more suitable hull shapes and was less prone to 
infestations by water beetles and the like. The screw propeller, on the other hand, 
relieved ocean-going steamships from the aforementioned problems related to paddle-
wheels and became the standard means of propulsion within a decade.
251
  
The Great Britain, the second of Brunel’s ocean-going vessels, came to epitomize these 
new developments. In the 1840s, the majority of emigrants to North America would still 
cross the Atlantic on sailing ships. The Great Western Steamship Company, eager to 
profit from this tide of emigration, commissioned Brunel to build yet another steamship. 
The Great Britain was the first steamship that was both built of iron and equipped with 
a screw propeller and, by extension, came to set new standards in shipbuilding. 
Launched in 1843, she was a “culmination of these new technologies”252 and crossed 
the Atlantic in summer 1845 in what was then a record time of 14 days and 21 hours. 
Despite the fact that up to the 1860s, both sailing ships continued to play an important 
role in the North Atlantic and paddle steamers were built for this route, the Great 
Britain is considered to have ushered in the era of grand ocean liners.
253
   
The Great Eastern, Brunel’s third ocean-going steamer (launched in 1858), also set new 
standards and illustrated the enormous progress in shipbuilding that had been rendered 
possible by the introduction of iron. In light of the high number of people emigrating to 
Australia, the Great Eastern was designed with the idea in mind that she should be able 
to steam all the way to the Antipodes without having to recoal. With a length of around 
700 feet, a designed tonnage of 18,195 (in comparison: previously, the largest vessels 
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had a tonnage of no more than 5,000) and a top speed of 15 knots, she “dwarfed every 
other ship built before the twentieth century.” 254  Her enormous size is repeatedly 
commented on in contemporary publications: The Times considers it “difficult, if not 
entirely impossible, for the mind to appreciate and realize its immense hulk at once,”255 
and the Visitor’s Guide to the Great Eastern compares her to an “embattled town” and 
an “iron suburb of vast proportions.”256 Moreover, there was no other ship that was 
equipped with paddle-wheels, screw propeller and six masts. At the outset, the Great 
Eastern was therefore considered “the marvel of shipbuilding and engineering skill.”257 
Prior to her launch, she was often referred to as the “mighty ship,”258 “floating palace” 
or even “floating town.”259 However, the Leviathan, as the vessel was officially called, 
turned out to be ill-starred, with mishaps during her launch (which is why it was 
postponed several times) and explosions aboard once she was afloat. Moreover, her very 
size turned out to be a curse, rather than a blessing, as smaller ships were easier to 
control. Despite her being an outstanding piece of shipbuilding, she was finally 
considered a faulty design. She would later gain fame in the laying of the transatlantic 
submarine cable of 1866 and the Indian submarine cables in 1870, as she was, because 
of her very size, particularly suitable for an endeavour of that kind.  
 
2.1.2 Steaming East – Steamships and Routes to India 
The statement that the evolution of steamships and new routes was characterized by trial 
and error and many advancements occurring simultaneously, seems particularly 
appropriate with regard to the development of new channels of communication and 
transportation between Great Britain and India. Given the fact that there were different 
sea routes to India, but also because of the rivalry between the presidencies of Bombay 
and Calcutta, the development of these links is somewhat erratic. The most important 
developments will be depicted on the following pages.  
For various reasons, travelling to India by steamship was considered a difficult and 
financially unviable undertaking at the outset of marine steam-propulsion. On the one 
hand, the lack of efficiency made the notorious circumnavigation of the Cape of Good 
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Hope an unprofitable venture; steamships appeared to be of better use on the 
considerably shorter segments of the overland routes, where the distance that had to be 
covered amounted to less than a third of the Cape route. Due to the unsteady political 
conditions after the Napoleonic Wars, however, travelling along the overland routes was 
not necessarily a safe option either. Furthermore, the presidencies of Bombay on the one 
hand, and Calcutta and Madras, on the other, preferred different routes. Both Bombay 
government and merchants favoured the overland routes, as ships travelling along these 
would almost inevitably make the Western presidency their port of call. Calcutta’s 
political elite and business community, however, preferred the option of steaming 
around the Cape of Good Hope, as from here vessels would more of less inevitably drift 
towards the East coast of the subcontinent.  
In 1823, the Anglo-Indian community of Calcutta set up a so-called Steam Committee, 
which was shortly afterwards made the Society for the Encouragement of Steam 
Navigation between Great Britain and India and announced a reward of almost 70,000 
rupees for whoever steamed the distance between Great Britain and India first before 
the end of the year 1826. Because of Calcutta’s location in the East of the subcontinent 
and the long tradition of the Cape route, the Society clearly had the route around the 
African continent in mind.
260
 The resolution that was approved of in December 1823 
further explicated that this prize was only to be disbursed once four consecutive trips 
between Britain and Bengal had been carried out in less than 70 days each. James Henry 
Johnston’s attempt to fulfil these criteria failed totally, though. For various reasons, the 
Enterprize, a wooden paddle steamer, reached Calcutta only more than 100 days after it 
had left Falmouth in August 1825 and therefore illustrated that, at this time, steamships 
were highly inappropriate for the Cape route.  
In spite of this failure, decision-makers in the presidency of Bombay were still 
optimistic that steamships operating on the Red Sea route would accelerate 
communication between Europe and India; their aim was to make Bombay the “new 
gateway to India.”261 Mountstuart Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay from 1819 to 1827, 
had already been interested in the development of the Red Sea route and arranged for 
surveys of the Red Sea to be carried out by the Bombay Marine. His successor, John 
Malcolm, implemented Elphinstone’s plans: The Hugh Lindsay left Bombay in March 
1830 and arrived at Suez 33 days later (after having had to recoal once). Even though 
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there were certain significant and undeniable drawbacks to this pioneering journey 
through the Red Sea – such as the high costs for fuel and the resulting question if the 
trip was commercially viable – it was successful with regard to the acceleration of 
communication between Great Britain and the subcontinent: the letters aboard the Hugh 
Lindsay reached England within 59 days.
262
  
Nonetheless, rather than focusing entirely on the Red Sea route, a House of Commons 
Select Committee decided to give the so-called Euphrates route (through Mesopotamia 
and the Persian Gulf) a try. The trial exhibition of 1835 turned out a major 
disappointment, though, and was therefore officially terminated in January 1837. Even 
if it had been less unfortunate, simultaneous technological developments (such as the 
construction of the Great Western) would in all likelihood have undermined its findings 
anyway. Unsurprisingly, the report released by yet another Select Committee in 1837 
“confirmed what was already obvious: the victory of the Red Sea Route.”263 In the 
following year, the Court of Directors made the Indian navy a steam service for both 
mail and passengers, and in the years to follow various other steamers were added on 
this route.
264
  
Nonetheless, the Red Sea route still had its drawbacks at that time: once Suez had been 
reached, mails would be carried to Cairo and subsequently shipped to Alexandria via the 
River Nile. In Alexandria, though, they could be stuck for up to a month, before a 
merchant ship would take them to Malta, where the British Admiralty’s steam service 
began – an immense waste of time for everyone waiting for urgent correspondence from 
the subcontinent.   
In the end, it was a private company, the Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation 
Company, that promoted more rapid transport on the Mediterranean leg of the journey. 
From 1835 onwards, it had provided for a regular steam service between London and 
various seaports in Portugal and Spain, before it was awarded a contract to transport 
mail on these routes by the British Admiralty. From 1840 onward, it would also provide 
a steam service to Egypt. A journey from London to Alexandria – via Gibraltar, Malta, 
Athens, Smyrna, Constantinople, Rhodes, Beirut, and Jaffa – would take no more than 
14 days. The ‘P & O’ would finally also extend its service to the Eastern leg of the 
journey, offering steam services to Calcutta first (as it was not allowed to operate from 
Bombay at the outset), and later also to Penang, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Australia. 
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It could thus dwarf its competitor, the East India Company, whose only service was the 
one between Bombay and Suez.
265
 Depending on seasonal weather conditions, the trip 
from Suez to Bombay would take another 18 to 27 days.
266
  
The next step in the improvement of the overland route via Egypt was the construction 
of the Suez Canal, an undertaking which seemed hardly feasible in the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, but had been achieved by 1869. 
 
2.1.3 The Suez Canal – Water Highway to the East 
Since the official inauguration in November 1869, the Suez Canal has been of 
paramount significance for shipping between Europe, on the one hand, and South and 
East Asia and the Antipodes, on the other. Its development is of particular interest, as it 
was subject to the conflicting political motives of the Great Powers, most notably 
France and Great Britain. Especially for Great Britain, the construction of the canal was 
a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it promised a faster channel of transport and 
communication towards India, which, as the events related to the Indian Mutiny in 1857 
had shown, was much needed. On the other hand, though, the risks inherent to such a 
scheme seemed incalculable as it was feared that the canal would directly impact on 
both political and commercial alliances and, by extension, weaken Great Britain’s 
position as a global superpower. Despite the benefits a canal would offer and in sharp 
contrast with the needs and wishes of the British business community, Lord Palmerston 
therefore considered it to be to the detriment of British interests. The reasons for this 
disapproval can be found in British global policy, specifically the Eastern Question. The 
proceeding disintegration of the Ottoman Empire had raised the question of whether it 
should be divided, with Great Britain opting for its conservation. In this manner, the 
British hoped to put a stop to Russian expansionism in the East. The Oriental Crisis of 
1840, sparked off by the attempts of Viceroy Muhammad Ali to create an independent 
Egypt, was in this context considered a  
double threat to [Britain’s] imperial interests. Her communications with India had 
always, as she saw it, been menaced by Russia through Persia and Afghanistan; now 
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they were menaced by France, through her dominance over an independent Egypt and 
Syria under French protection.
267
  
However, the military defeat of Ali and the convention of 1840 (which reestablished 
Egypt as a province of the Ottoman Empire, but granted Muhammad Ali the status of a 
hereditary ruler) offered at least a temporary solution. It was for this reason, though, that 
the British government feared a canal across the isthmus might be a “global 
conception” 268  which, by cutting off Egypt from the Ottoman Empire and thereby 
altering the geography of the region, would facilitate Egypt’s separation and, in all 
likelihood, cause considerable international tension. This view was also expressed in the 
Times: 
 The neutrality of Egypt is an object of European importance. From time immemorial 
 this marvelous country has played a part in the struggle for empire quite disproportional 
 to its population or its own intrinsic value. (…) That Egypt should be independent of 
 foreign influence and not subservient to the dictation of any Western State concerns the 
 peace of the world, and this end is best secured by maintaining its dependence on 
 Turkey.
269
  
As a result, the British favoured a railway from Alexandria via Cairo to Suez: it would 
serve British purposes just as well and did not entail any of the complications inherent 
to the construction of a canal.
270
 The Times accordingly points out that  
 [t]he truth is, the roads to India are many, and the Isthmus of Suez does not offer the 
 best. If the canal could ever be constructed, it might be destroyed by competition before 
 it had been open a month. The sea is no longer the surest highway. In these days it is a 
 principle of locomotion that a steamer should be exchanged for a railroad at the first 
 practicable opportunity (…). The Euphrates Valley Railroad would leave the Suez 
 Canal where a Suez Canal might leave the route round the Cape.
271
  
It is in this context that the British government’s change of attitude towards the 
construction of the canal has to be seen, from denying the sheer feasibility of the project 
as such and sabotaging it once construction works had begun, to aiming at control over 
it as soon as first ships had passed through it. In this respect, the Suez Canal differs 
clearly from the other technologies under examination in this paper.  
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As early as around 1850 BC, attempts to cut across the Isthmus of Suez were made for 
the purposes of both transport and irrigation, yet none of these undertakings turned out 
to be permanently successful. Nonetheless, interest in creating a linkage across the 
isthmus never ceased entirely. Eventually, in the scope of his Egyptian campaign of 
1798, Napoleon arranged for surveys of the area: a waterway across the isthmus was 
considered an adequate means to hamper British access to India.
272
 What is more, the 
opportunities a canal between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean might offer as to the 
acceleration of transport and communication became manifest after the Hugh Lindsay 
had steamed all the way from Bombay to Suez in 1830 and with the development of 
better steamships, for  
[i]n an otherwise easy journey, the passage through Egypt quickly proved to be the most 
serious bottleneck along the route to the East. Travelers had to spend eight to ten days 
of misery crossing the desert, camping out, or waiting in one of Suez’s infamous squalid 
hotels.
273
 
A direct canal was not considered viable at the time, though, for the surveys carried out 
during Napoleon’s Egyptian expedition had – erroneously – shown that there was a 
significant difference of sea level between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. 
Although later surveys rectified the notion of different sea levels, making it obvious that 
the construction of a canal would not be as complicated as had previously been assumed, 
not much was achieved in the following decades. This was partly due to the Egyptian 
Viceroy’s disapproval of the project, but also to the fact that European rulers had to face 
the 1848 revolutions and were therefore sufficiently distracted for the time being. It was 
only when Said Pasha was made Viceroy in 1854 that the project received renewed 
attention. Ferdinand de Lesseps, a former French diplomat who had befriended Said 
Pasha earlier in his life, received a first concession for the construction of the canal in 
1854, followed by a second one two years later. In this second concession, the 
international and neutral status of the canal was emphasized, and it was hoped this 
would ease British anxieties and prevent further animosities. Lesseps founded the 
Universal Suez Ship Canal Company (Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de 
Suez), and shares were on offer from 1858 onwards. In order to emphasize the 
international character of the undertaking, contingents were reserved for Great Britain, 
Austria, the United States and Russia, but none of them was interested. For the French 
public, this international aspect of the canal was of subordinate importance. Instead it 
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was increasingly viewed as a “patriotic venture because of the outspoken hostility of the 
British Government.”274 
Construction works were finally commenced in April 1859, but, as it was only the 
Viceroy of Egypt who had issued a concession, and approval by the Ottoman suzerain 
was lacking, its political status was still unclear. Great Britain, meanwhile, was still 
anxious to impede the ongoing construction works and exerted pressure in 
Constantinople. Despite at least temporarily successful measures, in 1866 – that is, at a 
time when construction works were well advanced – the official firman was finally 
issued by the Ottoman suzerain.
275
 Thereafter construction progressed more rapidly, and 
with the completion of the canal being inevitable, the British government’s attitude 
began to change, for now it was imperative to find “ways of turning the new waterway 
to imperial account.”276  
The Suez Canal was finally opened on 17 November 1869, and although far from 
perfect at the time of inauguration (with sections of it not being deep enough and an 
insufficient number of sidings, just to name a few), it was easy to see that it would 
accelerate transport and communication between Britain and the subcontinent: the 
distance to be covered between Southampton and the Ceylonese port of Point de Galle 
was diminished from 11,650 miles (via the Cape route) to 6,515 miles;
277
 similarly, the 
route London-Bombay was reduced by 51 percent, London-Calcutta by 32 percent and 
London-Singapore by 29 percent.
278
 Accordingly, duration of transit was shortened, 
with estimates on savings ranging from 51 to 67 days between England and India 
compared to the Cape route, depending on various factors.
279
 What is more, due to fuel 
savings, passage to India became significantly cheaper over the decades, from £ 140 via 
the overland route in 1843 to £ 68 in 1875.
280
  
Accordingly, newspapers waxed lyrical about the newly opened canal: “What a future 
does it prophesy! What a new, and for the present incalculable, factor does it introduce 
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into the traffic of the world!”281 Lloyds Weekly Newspaper, having called it “the most 
astonishing engineering work of modern days”282 even before its opening, afterwards 
concluded that not only was the inauguration “[t]he event of the year 1869,” but that the 
entire year “will remain the Suez Canal year.”283 However, despite this enthusiasm, 
there was also some skepticism towards the actual amount of traffic that would pass 
through the canal:  
That the Suez Canal has conferred upon the world an immense boon few, perhaps, will 
be inclined to dispute. It makes a vast addition to the material resources of mankind. 
Possibly, however, there is too hasty a predisposition to over-estimate the part it is 
destined to play in the accommodation and redistribution of commerce.
284
 
 
Indeed, and despite the promising prospects mentioned above, the canal was not an 
immediate success, owing to several factors. Most importantly, as sailing ships could 
hardly use the canal and steamships built for the shorter distances of European waters 
were not apt for those east of Suez and vice versa, a new type of ship was needed. With 
improvements and adaptations in shipbuilding, however, the canal became increasingly 
popular over the years, and the number of ships navigating it grew from around 500 in 
1870 to almost 1,500 in 1875 and more than 2,000 in 1880.
285
 Moreover, from the 
beginning, the canal’s significance to Great Britain’s interests was blatant, with not only 
the very first ship passing through it in regular service being a British vessel, but also 75 
percent of the vessels navigating it in the course of the subsequent years.
286
 Already two 
days after the inauguration, the Liverpool Mercury pointed out that   
 [n]o other European nation possesses a sufficient amount of trade with the East, or a 
 sufficient number of vessels suited for the trade through the Mediterranean, down the 
 Red Sea, and across the Indian Ocean, to be able to do much towards sustaining this 
 new line of communication.
287
  
Hoskins has therefore drawn the conclusion that despite the anxieties of the British 
Government and the resultant attempts to avert its construction, the Suez Canal was 
“from the outset (…) intrinsically British.”288 
However, at this stage, Great Britain was still anxious to ensure the permanent 
neutrality of the canal, and thus aimed for achieving influence, if not control, over it.
289
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As the costs of construction in the end amounted to twice of what had originally been 
estimated,
290
 the Company faced bankruptcy at the time of the inauguration. This 
actually did provide an opportunity for Great Britain to gain influence, but because of 
increasing profits the Company recuperated over the next years. In 1875, though, the 
Viceroy’s financial troubles presented a new chance to get a grip on the canal: with the 
national debt having risen to £ 100 million and facing an annual interest of £ 5 million, 
selling his canal shares had become inevitable. Disraeli, presiding over the Conservative 
government since 1874, grasped the opportunity with both hands (despite the fact that 
Parliament was in recess and he meanwhile had to obtain funding from Baron de 
Rothschild). Finally, in November 1875, Britain purchased the Viceroy’s 176,602 
shares at a price of £ 4 million and thus became the largest single shareholder in the 
Company. Britain gained ten votes in the shareholders’ general meetings and was 
granted the right to appoint three British Directors to the Company’s Board.291 Despite 
the problems and conflicts that would arise in the decades to follow, “[t]he purchase of 
the Suez Canal shares was looked upon (…) as the last step in the long struggle to 
control or at least make safe the principal route to India, China, and Australia.”292 
 
2.2 Railways 
Harold Perkin asserts that “[t]he invention of the railway (…) is Britain’s greatest 
contribution to the progress of civilization,” which is why he declares that “it was here 
that the modern world began.” 293  Disregarding the overblown rhetoric, it is fairly 
obvious that, after centuries in which the speed of land transport or communication had 
not improved significantly, it advanced decisively with the advent of railways and steam 
locomotives.  
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Primitive schemes of railways had been used in Britain since the seventeenth century,
294
 
but profound improvements were only achieved with the introduction of the steam 
locomotive from the early nineteenth century onwards. In 1804, Richard Trevithick 
built the first successful steam railway locomotive. As the cast-iron rails used at the 
time kept breaking under such heavy burdens, however, no regular service was 
established.
295
 The engines were further improved within the next two decades, but 
these early locomotives were still rather unreliable and could hardly be used for longer 
journeys. Finally, in 1829, during the Rainhill trials – a competition whose only purpose 
was to figure out which form of power would be the most suitable for the soon to be 
opened Liverpool and Manchester Railway – the steam locomotive Rocket 
“demonstrated (…) for the first time the superiority of the steam railway over all other 
known forms of land transport.”296 The Liverpool and Manchester Railway was one of 
the first trunk lines in Great Britain. It was opened in September 1830 in response to the 
business community’s calls for better transport between the two prospering towns. The 
line was the first to combine all features of ‘modern’ railways (that is locomotive 
operation, double tracks, side and passing tracks, tunnels, viaducts, cuttings, 
embankments, signals, service according to timetables, an entire fleet of vehicles and 
first-, second-, and third-class compartments)
297
 and reduced the journey time between 
Liverpool and Manchester to around two hours (previously four and a half hours by 
stagecoach).
298
 Although it had originally been planned with regard to the faster 
transport of goods and commodities, it became very popular as a passenger service. In 
the decades following the inauguration of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway, the 
majority of British trunk lines were installed, such as the Grand Junction Railway 
between Birmingham and Warrington (opened 1837), the London and Birmingham 
Railway (1837), the Great Western Railway (1838) and the London and Southampton 
Railway (1840). The railway network grew accordingly from 1,600 miles in 1842 to a 
little over 6,000 miles in 1850, so that around the middle of the nineteenth century the 
backbone of British railways had been put in place.
299
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From Britain, railways soon spread over the European continent, yet the developments 
in the various countries followed different directions; the first line on the continent was 
opened in Belgium in 1835 and was followed by lines in Germany later that same year, 
France, Austria, Russia (all 1837), and Italy and the Netherlands (1839). The 
development of actual railway networks, however, was in some cases delayed, for 
instance in France, where debates whether they should be financed by government or 
private business slowed down their construction.
300
 Nonetheless, with railways being 
opened in more and more countries over the next decades, the continental network grew 
steadily, from around 1,800 miles by the end of the year 1840 to around 65,000 miles in 
1870.
301
  
With the establishment of main lines in Britain, the growing railway network in Europe 
and first public steam railways in India in 1854,
302
 the idea of a trunk line all the way 
from either the English Channel or the North Sea to India gained momentum in Britain. 
After the disappointing outcome of the steamship expedition in Mesopotamia in the 
1830s, the progress of railways sparked new interest in the Euphrates route. The 
proponents of the various railway schemes that emerged over the years estimated that it 
would reduce the distance to be covered by more than 900 miles; accordingly, it would 
only take one week to travel from London to India, and fares would be reduced 
tremendously. Moreover, it was suggested that any such scheme could avert the danger 
of Russian expansion towards India and that the opening up of Mesopotamia by means 
of railways would offer new opportunities for businessmen.
303
 
Whether by steamship or railway, though, British endeavours in opening up the 
Euphrates route seem to have been doomed: for various reasons, a Euphrates Valley 
Railway as intended by the British was never achieved. The first such endeavour of 
connecting the European and Indian lines by means of a railway through the Ottoman 
Empire, brought forward by the Managing Director of the East India Railway Company 
in 1855, was turned down by Lord Palmerston in light of the tense political situation 
prevalent in Europe at that time. A few years later, another proposal, presented in 1856 
by the Chairman of the Scinde, Punjab, and Delhi Railways and the newly formed 
Association for the Promotion of the Euphrates Valley, met the same fate: in fact, the 
                                                          
300
 Cf. ibid., 574f.  
301
 Cf. Rossberg, Geschichte der Eisenbahn, 89.  
302
 The Indian railway network grew rapidly from approximately 850 miles in 1860 to around 4,750 miles 
in 1870. Cf. ibid., 113. 
303
 Cf. Hoskins, British Routes to India, 327-333. 
67 
 
Ottoman government preferred the British proposal over one France had submitted at 
around the same time. The Association, however, was concerned over Ottoman state 
finances after the Crimean War and therefore approached the British government, 
hoping to achieve a guaranteed minimum rate of interest. British government’s consent 
seemed beyond doubt, given the fact that both the Anglo-Persian War and the outbreak 
of the Mutiny in India in 1857 had demonstrated the need for faster channels of 
communication and transport between Britain and India. Nonetheless, Lord Palmerston 
in the end denied financial support – apparently in view of the relationships with France, 
through which British troops were despatched to India and whose goodwill was thus 
much needed – and declared that the existing routes and telegraph lines offered 
sufficiently rapid channels of transport and communication.
304
 Despite the project being 
looked upon favourably by, amongst others, Queen Victoria and Lord Clarendon, the 
project was therefore abandoned in the end. 
Nonetheless interest in a railway line to India did not cease. In 1862, a further attempt of 
the Euphrates Valley Railway Company failed due to lack of financial support on the 
part of government. A few years later, however, with France gaining strength in 
international affairs – owing to the opening of the Suez Canal, the acquirement of a 
foothold in Somaliland and the expansion in Indochina – the establishment of new 
routes not controlled by the French had become an urgent matter. In summer 1870, 
surveys were carried out, and from the following year onwards, a House of Commons 
Select Committee attended to the matter. In the early 1870s, the Committee proposed 
several different routes, all of which had to be investigated more closely. But this was 
not to be: with British representation in the Suez Canal Company’s board of control, 
reliable and undisturbed transport to India had been secured.  
As a result, at a time when railways were prospering and trunk lines in Britain, 
continental Europe, and India had been put in place, a direct railway connection 
between Britain and the ‘Jewel in the Crown’ was not achieved. Nonetheless, railways 
came to play an important role in terms of improved transport and communication 
between Britain and India.   
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2.2.1 Alpine Railways and the Acceleration of Communication between Britain 
and India 
In terms of overland mails to India, there were – broadly speaking – two different routes 
from Britain to Egypt in the late 1830s: the Admiralty service from Southampton to 
Alexandria, with stopovers in Gibraltar and Malta, on the one hand; and the overland 
transport through France, followed by shipment from Marseilles, on the other. The 
connection via Marseilles turned out to be to the best advantage and was to improve 
further when, in the early 1860s, the railways between Calais and Marseilles were 
completed. As transport by train was much faster than by steamship, the conclusion was 
drawn that, the closer to Alexandria the European port of transshipment was, the more 
one could reduce travel time.
305
 
In the early 1860s, the Italian government therefore proposed Ancona, located on the 
Adriatic Sea, to replace Marseilles as the European port for Eastern mail 
communications. Indeed, Ancona was more than 400 miles closer to Alexandria than 
the French seaport, and it was therefore estimated that one could save around 22 hours 
on the journey between Britain and India. For various reasons, however, the plan was 
abandoned. In the following years, the Italian railway network developed further, and in 
1865, the Meridionale – a line between Ancona and the Adriatic seaport of Brindisi –
was completed.
306
 To British observers, this was a most welcome development: because 
of Brindisi’s location in southern Italy, it was estimated that transmission times for 
Eastern mail communication could be reduced by 36 hours. Moreover, once the  
Meridionale had been inaugurated, Calais and Brindisi were connected by around 870 
miles of rail, but for one gap – the Mont Cenis, a massif in the southern Alps between 
France and Italy.  
The Alpine pass Col du Mont Cenis had traditionally been the most traversed route 
between the two countries. A road across the pass was opened in the early nineteenth 
century and allowed for a stagecoach service, which represented an enormous 
improvement; with railway services being in place on either side of the pass in the 
1850s,
307
 however, the leg by coach with all its inherent drawbacks (passage would take 
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around 9 hours in summer; in winter, however, the same passage could take 
disproportionately longer, and at times progress was rendered altogether impossible by 
bad weather conditions) was a major obstacle to speedy communication between France 
and Italy. 
The most obvious solution to this problem seemed to be a tunnel, first proposals for 
which date from the 1840s. Financed by the governments of France and Sardinia, 
constructions works on such a tunnel, connecting Fourneaux in Savoy with Bardonèccia 
in Piedmont over a distance of more than 7 miles, were commenced in 1857. Once 
completed, the Fréjus Tunnel, better known as the Mont Cenis Tunnel,
308
 would exceed 
the longest railway tunnel of the time by more than 4 miles. However, due to the rather 
simple tools available at the time (basically, manual labour and gunpowder), work 
proceeded extremely slowly, and in the mid-1860s it was assumed that the tunnel would 
not be opened for another ten years.  
These estimates, in turn, caused another project, which was just as challenging as the 
tunnel itself: the construction of a railway across the pass, “pending the completion of 
the Mont Cenis (Fréjus) tunnel.”309 The British railway engineer John Barraclough Fell 
proposed the project to the governments of France and newly formed Italy, and was 
granted a concession under the condition that, once the tunnel was completed, the 
railway across the pass had to be closed again.
310
 The Mont Cenis Railway Company 
was launched in February 1866, the intention being that the railway should be 
inaugurated in May the following year. This undertaking – entirely under British 
auspices – was no less challenging than the construction of the tunnel itself. Indeed, the 
steep rise as well as weather conditions called for special technical refinements. The 
Mont Cenis railway was finally opened in June 1868, and “at the time, [it] was the last 
link in a route for the Bombay Mail from Calais to Brindisi.”311 [italics in original]  
In the meantime, however, owing to the use of newly developed tools, such as 
pneumatic drill machines and dynamite, tunneling had progressed much faster than 
previously: In the beginning of 1870, more than 6 miles had been bored and 
breakthrough was finally achieved on Christmas Day the same year. The tunnel was 
opened for traffic in October 1871 and “became and remains a vital component of the 
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European rail network.”312 Disregarding improvements on the railway lines from Calais 
to Marseilles, Brindisi was the major port of departure for Eastern mail from 1870 
onwards.
313
  
Already before the completion of the tunnel, the Illustrated London News places it in 
the wider context of British interest in the East and highlights its importance: 
 But though each of the several great improvements begun or now partly realised – viz., 
 the Alpine railways, both the summit and the tunnel lines; the harbour works at Brindisi; 
 and the  Isthmus Canal – may achieve success without the aid of the others, we shall not, 
 perhaps, be mistaken in regarding them as portions of a vast system hereafter to be 
 completed for the increased convenience, economy, and speed of our communications 
 with Asia.
314
  
The advantages the Mont Cenis Tunnel would offer seem beyond doubt, as  
 with regard to the Alpine railways and the substitution of an Italian for a French port 
 of departure and arrival for our Indian mails, there can only be one opinion in the minds 
 of Englishmen, which must be the conviction that such a change is highly desirable for 
 all the interests of the British Empire.
315
 
Shortly after its opening, the tunnel is therefore considered to have  
 already become the highway from England to India, to some extent for goods, but still 
 more for  passengers, who consider the route by the Mont Cenis Tunnel and Brindisi, 
 not only the shortest but the pleasantest way to the Presidencies of Bombay, Madras and 
 Calcutta.
316
  
Similarly, the Times asserts that the crossing of the Alps “was done in as simple a way 
as one might get from the Charing-cross to the Temple station of the London 
Underground Railway,”317 and that by “strik[ing] the Alps off the traveller’s path,”318 
Italy had become a “long pier almost half across the Mediterranean on our way to the 
East.”319 
As has been shown, in the course of the nineteenth century, global transport and, by 
extension, communication had become much faster and more reliable. Concerning 
                                                          
312
 Ransom, Mont Cenis Fell Railway, 62. 
313
 Hoskins, British Routes to India, 411. Hoskins also points out, though, that the Mont Cenis route was 
after all not the only route from Britain to Brindisi; there was, for instance, an alternative line via Ostend, 
Brussels, Cologne, Stuttgart, Munich, across the Brenner Pass and Verona. Cf. ibid., 410.  
314
 “The Mont Cenis and Brindisi Overland Route,” Illustrated London News, 16 January 1869, 70. 
315
 Ibid.  
316
 The Mont Cenis Tunnel, its Construction and Probable Consequences (London: Charles J. Skeet, 
1873), viii.  
317
 “The Mont Cenis Tunnel,” The Times, 19 September 1871, 8.  
318
 “The Mont Cenis Tunnel,” The Times, 20 September 1871, 4. 
319
 “The Mont Cenis Tunnel,” The Times, 2 September 1871, 7. 
71 
 
global communication, however, a new age altogether dawned with the invention of 
electric telegraphy.   
 
2.3 Early Telecommunications – The Electric Telegraph 
If we want to fully understand the impact the electric telegraph and the emerging 
network of landlines and submarine cables had on global communication, it is first of all 
necessary to examine telegraphy's prime asset: the dematerialization of information 
flows, by means of which the “quality of global communication was completely 
altered.”320 This is most easily understood when we think about such processes as quasi-
mathematical equations. Prior to the construction of a global network of landlines and 
submarine cables, the exchange of news and information was inseparably linked to 
transportation and migration of people.
321
 Understandably, the speed with which 
information travelled was restricted, for “information travelled as did any other traded 
commodity. It moved along with the cargo, and though not usually bulky, its speed was 
limited to that of the fastest mode of travel of the day.”322 Geographic distance was 
therefore a crucial variable in the equation, a factor that could not be eliminated: the 
further two places were apart in terms of geographic distance, the longer it would take 
to transmit information between these two places.
323
  
Dematerialization, in this context, means “the translation of information into acoustic, 
optical or (...) electric impulses instead of using tangible (i.e. material) carriers.”324 
Accordingly, when telegraphy came into being, the flow of communication and the 
exchange of information no longer hinged on messengers and transportation. As a 
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consequence, the temporal delay of several days, weeks or months that had previously 
inevitably resulted from the transport of a material message between far apart places 
could be eliminated:
325
 geographic distance became comparatively insignificant, if not 
even negligible, in the above-mentioned communication function.
326
 Consequently, the 
arrival of electric telegraphy is considered to be a “watershed in the history of 
globalization, because it created a new, virtual space in which established distances and 
limitations of time were suspended.”327 
 
2.3.1 From Optical to Electric Telegraphs – First Steps towards Instantaneous 
Communication  
The invention of the first functioning optical telegraph is generally attributed to the 
Frenchman Claude Chappe and is closely associated with the French Revolution.
328
 The 
system, developed in the late eighteenth century, submitted signals by means of pivot 
arms. Two so-called indicators were attached to a regulator, which, in turn, was 
installed on a pole. The whole apparatus was placed on top of a relay station. Using wire 
ropes, operators could move these arms and could thus, availing themselves of a code 
system specifically designed for this purpose, transmit a message. The operator at the 
relay station next in line could decode the message and retransmit it accordingly, and so 
on, until the message had finally reached its destination.
329
 Chappe’s optical telegraph is 
widely considered to be the first system by means of which long-distance 
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communication was detached from transportation. The systems had its limitations, 
though: Similar to the other early means of dematerialized communication, such as 
smoke signals, the use of optical telegraphs depended on both daylight and good 
weather conditions. Moreover, due to their visibility, relay stations were easy to detect 
and were therefore prone to attacks by anyone wishing to hamper the communication 
process.   
The French National Convention nonetheless approved Chappe's system in 1793 and the 
Paris-Lille telegraph line was inaugurated in the following year. In the decades to follow, 
further lines were established and the French network of optical telegraphs – covering 
around 3,000 miles with 534 relay stations in 1850 – was way ahead of that of its 
European competitors, who either could not afford such elaborated systems or, with 
regards to state security, simply did not consider it necessary.
330
  
Britain, however, nonetheless benefitted from these early telegraphs: On the initiative of 
the Egyptian government, optical telegraphs had been installed between Alexandria and 
Suez. The system went operational in 1823 (and was extended all the way to Suez in 
1839) and was used to announce the arrival of steamships from India. In so doing, it 
allowed for a more efficient coordination of the different legs of the journey between 
Great Britain and India and consequently helped reducing transmission times.
331
 
Similarly, in the 1820s, a telegraphic communication system between Liverpool and the 
offshore islands Anglesey and Holy Island had been established, its objective being to 
guarantee the smooth processing of business transactions in Liverpool. What is more, it 
was used to immediately forward commercial or political news incoming ships 
provided.
332
 The usefulness of telegraphic communication for different spheres of 
activity was thus well understood by contemporaries, and “[d]espite its shortcomings, 
the semaphore whetted appetites.”333 The invention of the electric telegraph was thus 
most welcome.  
Already during the first half of the nineteenth century, a variety of systems of electric 
telegraphy had been developed, yet none of them had been particularly successful.
334
 
The first line in use was finally constructed by the Englishmen Charles Wheatstone and 
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William Fothergill Cooke. Having convinced the directors of the Great Western 
Railway of the functionality of their device, they were commissioned to establish a 
telegraphic link between Paddington Station and West Drayton, covering a distance of 
around 13 miles. The line was inaugurated in July 1839 and turned out to be the 
beginning of a symbiosis between railway and telegraph companies: communicating, 
via telegraph the railroad companies could use their single-track systems in both 
directions without risking accidents. The telegraph companies, on the other hand, did 
not have to concern themselves with questions of right of way.
335
 Accordingly, other 
British railway companies soon followed suit, so that in 1850 more than a quarter of the 
approximately 7,500 miles of the British railway network were accompanied by 
telegraph lines.
336
   
Until today, however, electric telegraphy is (at least in popular culture) primarily 
associated with the name Morse. This is mostly due to the fact that the system 
developed by Samuel Finley Breese Morse, in combination with the code invented by 
Alfred Vail, proved superior to any other scheme and eventually became the prevalent 
system.
337
 Further, Morse was responsible for the diffusion of the electric telegraph in 
the United States; the first experimental line between Washington and Baltimore was 
installed in 1843 and was officially inaugurated in May 1844. A year later, the first 
public telegraph office was opened in Washington D.C., and by 1850, twenty telegraph 
companies were in business.
338
  
From the early days of electric telegraphy, first experiments concerning underwater 
telegraphy had been conducted. Investigations were carried out in Calcutta as early as 
1838, and both the 'founders’ of electrical telegraphy became involved, too: Wheatstone 
investigated the feasibility of submarine telegraphy in Wales in 1840. Morse, on the 
other hand, experimented in New York in 1843.
339
 Despite this keen interest in 
advancing the potential applications of electric telegraphy, though, the technological 
possibilities were restricted: little was known about the depths of the oceans, and the 
physical requirements for transmitting underwater messages were still unexplored. 
Problems arising were mainly related to insulation (due to its salt content, sea water 
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itself acted as a conductor) and proper protection of the cables against external 
factors.
340
 
The solution to the problem of insulation was found in 1843 with the ‘discovery’ of 
Gutta-Percha, latex of the South Asian Palaquium tree. John and Jacob Brett made a 
first serious attempt to establish a submarine telegraphic link between Dover and Calais 
in 1850, which, however, was not particularly successful: data transmission was 
defective and the cable broke soon after installation.
341
 When in 1851 an improved cable 
was laid, soon to be followed by a cable connecting England and Ireland in 1853, 
submarine telegraphy had been brought into existence.      
 
 
2.3.2 Girdling the Globe – the Establishment of a Worldwide System of Electric 
Telegraphy 
In the following years, the Crimean War had an enormous effect on the advancement of 
submarine telegraphy and is considered to have consolidated the link between military 
communication, politicians, journalists and the public.
342
 Unlike before, military 
command could be exercised from afar, and political leaders made ample use of this 
opportunity, sending “bewildering telegrams”343 to their military officers in the field.  
This represented a fundamental change in military strategy and resulted in a tide of 
projects aiming for the establishment of a cable network in the Mediterranean area 
(which should finally reach all the way to India). The first British and French cable-
laying ventures were closely related to their imperial policies.
344
 
To the British, direct telegraphic communication with India was a chance to extend their 
influence and strengthen their position of power. Particularly in the years of the uprising, 
when it would take a letter from Calcutta five to six weeks before it arrived in 
England,
345
 the need for improved communications with the Eastern possessions 
became obvious. As has been mentioned earlier, more than a decade later, the events of 
1857 and 1858 were still drawn upon in order to point out the significance of well-
functioning telegraph connections between Britain and India: 
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If, in 1857, Lord CANNING [sic] had been able to telegraph to England for more troops, 
it is generally agreed that some of the worst horrors of the Mutiny might have been 
prevented.  Even if no such emergency should ever occur again, there are circumstances 
occurring almost every day which render quick and certain communication between 
England and India almost indispensable. It is impossible to calculate how much we 
might have saved by it, for instance, in this Abyssinian expedition. Many conflicting 
orders would have been rendered unnecessary, the authorities East and West would 
have seen their way clear before them, mistakes which have been committed might have 
been avoided.
346
 
In terms of the establishment of cable connections to the subcontinent, though, the years 
between 1856 and 1860 can be referred to as “a time of failures:”347 the cables between 
Corsica, Sardinia, Malta and Corfu, laid in the aftermath of the Crimean War, 
contributed decisively to the reduction of communication times between London and 
Alexandria, and, by extension, also between Britain and India.
348
 The government-
subsidized Red Sea Cable, however, laid in 1859 and 1860 by the Red Sea and India 
Telegraph Company, turned out to be counterproductive: due to the afore-mentioned 
lack of knowledge and experience concerning submarine telegraphy, this attempt 
remained unsuccessful and, owing to the financial burden it involved, the British 
government would refrain from getting involved in future projects too easily. It was 
only in 1865 that telegraphic connections between Great Britain and India were 
established, and even then not by submarine cable, but by means of various landlines: 
one via Southern Europe, via Constantinople, Bagdad, Fao and Karachi to Delhi and 
Calcutta; and an alternative route through Russia, via St. Petersburg, Tbilisi, Dzhulfa, 
Tehran, Bushir and Karachi.
349
 Still, these did not really solve the problem of 
communicating ‘instantly’ with India: the lines were unreliable and messages had to be 
retransmitted several times, which meant they would often arrive with plenty of 
mistakes, if not entirely incomprehensible. It was in particular the Ottoman cable 
network that seemed prone to both technical and non-technical disturbances.
350
 
Furthermore, the British government had to confide messages with more or less 
sensitive content to a variety of people from different states, which did not only cause 
major delays (as local messages of the respective state were always given preference), 
but also rumours of espionage.
351
 All these problems were also discussed in 
contemporary newspapers:  
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We depend largely upon the friendly offices of Russian and other Powers, and, without 
reference to that dread of a Russian advance upon India which a number of our 
countrymen entertain, it is manifestly undesirable that we should not be in a position to 
hold quick intercourse with our Indian Empire except by the tolerance and concurrence 
of a foreign Government. If we were indebted to the French Government for telegraphic 
communication with the United States, every one would feel that it was an arrangement 
which might not only produce great inconvenience, but might also be turned very much 
against us. Russia and other Powers stand to us in that position with regard to India.
352
 
Eventually, a line through Germany and Russia to Tehran, constructed in 1870 by the 
newly founded Indo-European Telegraph Company and operated under a single, unified 
management, solved the problems mentioned above. When it was brought into service 
in November 1870, it reduced transmission time substantially (from 9 days 10 hours 39 
minutes to 1 day 13 hours 10 minutes in 1870 and even further to 3 hours and 9 minutes 
by 1873).
353
 
At around the same time, John Pender, who had been involved in the Atlantic 
Telegraphy Company since 1864, had become interested in constructing a reliable 
submarine line from Britain to India. In the following years, he launched several 
telegraph companies,
354
 which he finally in 1872 merged to the Eastern Telegraph 
Company. He gradually linked Britain with India, by means of a submarine cable via 
Gibraltar, Malta, and Egypt. The submarine cable was entirely under British control, 
and even the short landline between Alexandria and Suez was run by British operators, 
so that “[i]n 1870, at last, Britain and India were linked by an efficient telegraph line 
that regularly conveyed messages in about five hours.”355 
Concerning telegraphic communication with North America, the situation had evolved 
differently with private entrepreneurs, rather than governments, pushing forward the 
laying of the more profitable cables across the Atlantic.
356
 Already in 1845, John Brett 
had sought for state subsidies, but had not been granted any. The American Cyrus Fields 
had also become interested in the construction of a transatlantic connection, and in 1856, 
Fields, Brett and Charles Bright jointly set up the Atlantic Telegraph Company. In the 
years to follow, several attempts were made to link the continents by means of 
submarine cables, but none of them turned out successful: while the first ventures in 
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1857 failed altogether, a second attempt in 1858 was at least temporarily successful, 
with a cable transmitting messages for several weeks in August and September of that 
year, before the connection ceased. After yet another unsuccessful attempt in 1865 (now 
employing the Great Eastern as a cable-laying ship), a breakthrough was finally 
achieved in July 1866, when the first permanently operating cable was laid. Soon 
afterwards, the 1865 cable was lifted and spliced, so that in autumn 1866, two 
submarine cables spanned the Atlantic Ocean.  
In the years to follow, numerous other submarine cables were established, such as 
cables connecting India with Saigon, Hong Kong and Shanghai (from where it went 
further to Java and Port Darwin) (1871), a cable linking Europe with Brazil and 
Argentine (1873), an extension of the Australian cable to New Zealand (1876) and two 
cables linking Europe with West and South Africa (1885). When in 1902 a line from 
British Columbia to New Zealand was completed, finally “all parts of the British 
Empire could (...) communicate by a cable network upon which the sun never set.”357  
From the onset of electric telegraphy and the emergence of a global cable network until 
after the end of the Second World War, Great Britain held an outstanding position as 
regards global communications. In 1892, British telegraph companies owned 257 cables 
comprising a total of more than 96,000 miles of length (that is 63.1 percent of privately 
owned cables). Compared to that, the 77 cables of around 40,000 miles length owned by 
non-British companies seem almost negligible.
358
 Looking at the aggregate of both 
privately owned and government cables, we get a similar picture, with Britain owning 
66.3 percent of the total of cables – Britain had managed to “establish [...] itself securely 
as the information hegemon by the late 1800s at the geographic center of a global 
network of submarine cables.”359 
 
2.4 The Great Exhibition of 1851 – Technological Developments on Display 
The Liverpool Mercury describes the Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of all 
Nations, as it was officially called, as an event which was “testing the progress of 
civilization,”360 and the Observer even went as far as describing it as “[t]he great event 
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of the year – not to say of this age.”361 As Louise Pubrick points out, conventional 
historical accounts of the Exhibition similarly tend to describe it as “a revolution, a 
coronation, the last year of a war or the first of a parliament.”362 She subsequently 
declares that “it was none of these things,”363 and that its historical significance does not 
reside in the amount of objects on display or the number of visitors it attracted.
364
 
Nonetheless, these and related aspects need to be considered briefly if we want to 
examine the ways in which the Exhibition was represented in contemporary media.  
When Queen Victoria officially inaugurated the Exhibition on 1 May, the Crystal Palace 
accommodated 17,000 exhibitors from 94 countries.
365
 More than 100,000 exhibits, 
which had originally been grouped in four different categories (Raw Materials, 
Machinery, Manufacture, Sculpture), were on display and covered a wide spectrum of 
products, ranging from heavy machinery, such as railway engines, to the fine arts, 
jewelry, soaps and toys. Half of the exhibition space at the Crystal Palace had been 
reserved for the products Great Britain and its colonies wished to display. Britain, intent 
on illustrating its industrial products, exhibited, amongst other things, railway coaches, 
machine tools, steamship equipment and agricultural devices, just to name a few. In 
order to display machines in operation and to give visitors a chance to appreciate British 
inventiveness and gain an understanding of Britain’s significance as the ‘workshop of 
the world’, a so-called Machinery Court had been arranged for.366 Moreover, the host 
country was also eager to portray itself as a global player and colonial power: what to 
most nineteenth-century Britons were ‘exotic’ products imported from all over the 
world, such as spices, coffee, tea and tropical wood, were given particular attention. 
Britain’s Eastern colonies, especially India, took center stage and were of extraordinary 
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interest to many visitors. As the Times remarks a few weeks after the opening, “[s]o far 
India and the foreign exhibitors have carried off the lion’s share of public admiration. 
The tide of spectators sets eastward with a far stronger current than towards the 
west.” 367  Visitors were torn between fascination, on the one hand, as the exhibits 
appeared to bear witness to what was perceived of as Oriental magic; and dismay, on 
the other, as they also indicated what to European observers was sheer barbarism.
368
 
(see chapter 7) Following Great Britain as the second-largest exhibitor was France, 
which had held several national industrial exhibitions in the previous half-century. In 
contrast to Britain’s exhibits, the French products on display bore witness to the 
achievements of French small industry and featured primarily high-class consumer 
goods such as vases, clocks and crockery.
369
  
As a “fair-ground of innovation,”370 the Great Exhibition was all the more important as 
it “cut across traditional class boundaries and distinctions”371 and therefore became a 
“forum for discussions of British national identity in the broadest sense.”372 Indeed, the 
Exhibition’s financial success has been attributed to the high number of working-class 
visitors, who, attracted by the low entrance fees on what was referred to as shilling days, 
and the reduced railway tickets for everyone travelling to the Exhibition, flocked to the 
Crystal Palace. During the second week of May, for instance (that is before the 
introduction of shilling days), 128,000 people had visited the Exhibition. Once the 
shilling days had been introduced, there were up to 300,000 people a week coming to 
see the exhibition in the months of June and July. In the weeks immediately before the 
closing of the Exhibition, around half a million people visited the Crystal Palace. When 
it finally closed its doors on 11 October, more than 6 million visitors had come to see 
the first international industrial exhibition.
373
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2.5 Chapter Summary 
The nineteenth century witnessed the formation of the first global transport and 
communication infrastructure. The time it took to transport goods or people and to 
communicate between remote places was thus reduced drastically, and specifically 
global communication reached an entirely new quality with electric telegraphy and the 
dematerialization of information flows it allowed for. For Great Britain, this was of 
paramount importance in terms of both its imperial and commercial relations with India 
and the United States, respectively.  
As has been shown, though, this was by no means a transport and communication 
revolution. Instead, new technologies had been developed gradually over decades, if not 
centuries. Similarly, the establishment of the corresponding infrastructure also required 
decades and was characterized by both multifarious technological challenges and 
unsuccessful attempts, on the one hand, and the multi-layered (and often contrary) 
political and commercial interests of the various parties involved. These aspects have 
been explained in more detail than may be necessary to trace the development of the 
infrastructure as such. Rather, it was necessary to point out the various difficulties and 
conflict situations, as these were taken up in contemporary reporting and informed the 
representations of the technologies involved.  
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3. Technology and Society – Reflections on a Complex Relationship 
For historians attending to technology-related questions, it is indispensable to reflect on 
the conflicting approaches towards technology and its wider role within society. 
Questions concerning agency – that is, if agency is exclusive to humankind, whether it 
can be inherent in technology and who (or what) is eventually to be held responsible for 
the outcome of actions ‘performed’ jointly by humans and objects – take centre stage in 
this connection. Given the research questions of this dissertation, an outline of the key 
characteristics of the various approaches is all the more necessary and provides the 
groundwork for the following chapters.  
This chapter therefore provides a short overview of the different approaches towards the 
relation between technology and society. To start with, I will briefly outline the theories 
of technological determinism and the social determination of technology. Both these 
concepts, however, have long been refuted as approaches by means of which the 
relation between humans and technology could be described and analyzed sufficiently. 
Instead, sociological perspectives focusing on the way individual users actually apply a 
specific technology appear more fruitful and have gained centre stage in recent times. In 
this context, I will also look at relevant aspects of Actor-Network-Theory, which aims 
for the overcoming of the traditional subject-object dichotomy and emphasizes 
processes of hybridization. 
Subsequently, I am going to look at what are widely held to be typical nineteenth-
century approaches towards the relation between technology and society and briefly 
introduce the philosophical and cultural movements into which they were embedded.  
 
3.1 Technological Determinism vs. Social Determination of Technology  
In the introduction to their anthology Does Technology Drive History?, Merritt Roe 
Smith and Leo Marx refer to what they call “mini-fables:” 374  these are simplified 
before-and-after comparisons, in which specific technologies or machines are presented 
as if they inevitably bring about certain social or cultural changes. These mini-fables 
include, inter alia, the account according to which the automobile was responsible for 
the emergence of suburban residential areas, and the notion that the contraceptive pill, 
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introduced in the early 1960s, resulted in the sexual revolution.
375
 These examples help 
us identify one of the key characteristics of technological determinist viewpoints, that is 
the belief that “the advance of technology leads to a situation of inescapable 
necessity.”376 Similarly, Jacques Ellul has earlier pointed out that “[e]xternal necessities 
no longer determine technique. Technique’s own necessities are determinative. 
Technique has become a reality in itself, self-sufficient, with its special laws and its own 
determinations.”377  In plain words, this means that technology is an isolated entity 
(rather than part of society) driven by internal dynamics. Technological change is 
therefore thought to happen for no particular reason and without any external trigger. 
Accordingly, developments in the field of technology occur autonomously and can 
neither be subjugated by human willpower nor reversed. Eventually, this means that 
what we are today is what the steam engine, the automobile, the nuclear bomb, or any 
other technology, for that matter, have made us.
378
  
Until today, the idea that a specific technology, once ‘unleashed’, inevitably leads to a 
certain result or a particular kind of society is a widely held popular belief and finds 
expression in terms such as ‘age of electricity’ or ‘information age’. The popularity of 
such one-sided explanations is in all likelihood related to the material qualities of most 
technological devices, their “thingness” (in contrast to the intangibility of political or 
socio-economic factors, on which one could alternatively draw to explain changing 
patterns).
379
 Two examples of technological determinist analysis espoused by twentieth-
century historians are, firstly, that the emergence of medieval social systems can be 
ascribed to the invention of stirrups and, secondly, that the sixteenth-century Protestant 
Reformation would not have been possible without the invention of the printing 
press.
380
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Unsurprisingly, technological determinist approaches did not spare media of 
communication, information and transportation either, and a multitude of developments 
and phenomena related to them in one way or the other have been explained in a 
monocausal manner.
381
Both Marshall McLuhan’s The Gutenberg Galaxy and 
Understanding Media, in which he elaborates how different technologies shaped society, 
are worthy of mention in this respect. In The Gutenberg Galaxy, McLuhan argues that 
the emergence of nationalist movements and nation states in Europe is to be ascribed to 
the printing press.
382
 In Understanding Media, he considers the ways in which 
successive means of transport impacted on urban development:  
 With the coming of the horse-drawn bus and streetcar, American towns developed 
 housing that was no longer within sight of shop or factory. The railroad next took over 
 the development of the suburbs, with housing kept within walking distance of the 
 railroad stop. Shops and hotels around the railroad gave some concentration and form to 
 the suburb. The automobile, followed by the airplane, dissolved this grouping and ended 
 the pedestrian, or human, scale of the suburb.
383
  
It is, however, precisely technological determinism’s simplistic onesidedness – in other 
words, the disregard of any social or cultural factors – for which it cannot serve as an 
appropriate approach for sociologists or historians enquiring the relationship between 
technology and society: as Williams has pointed out, “if the medium (…) is the cause, 
all other causes, all that men ordinarily see as history, are at once reduced to effects.”384 
From the 1980s onwards, the concept of the social determination of technology gained 
momentum and “[served] as a needed corrective.”385 In their seminal work The Social 
Shaping of Technology (first published in 1985), MacKenzie and Wajcman dismiss 
technological determinism as “at best an oversimplification.”386 Their major point of 
criticism is that, rather than taking into account the social and cultural surroundings in 
which new technologies emerged, technological determinist accounts present them as if 
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they materialized in a vacuum.
387
 They argue that such popular narratives – or myths, as 
Lelia Green calls them
388
 – are no adequate descriptions of the emergence and diffusion 
of new technologies. As Green observes in a mocking tone, “Newton’s flash of insight 
into the principle of gravity had more to do with the time and culture in which he was 
working than with him being bopped by a piece of fruit.” 389 Accordingly, within the 
framework of the social determination of technology, technologies themselves are not 
considered to be endowed with agency; neither are they thought of as isolated entities. 
Instead, they are conceptualized as objects susceptible to social and cultural influences, 
and it is precisely these social and cultural influences that take centre stage.  
An oft-quoted example for the social determination of technology is Langdon Winner’s 
account of the so-called Moses Bridges in New York. The parkways leading to Jones 
Beach State Park, a recreational area located on Long Island, are bridged by numerous 
overpasses. Both the park and the overpasses were designed by Robert Moses (1888 – 
1981). Winner argues that Moses had the overpasses built in a way that cars could pass 
underneath, but busses could not. Accordingly, the poorer (and mostly black) part of the 
population, dependent on public transport, was kept away from Jones Beach, so that the 
white middle- and upper-class visitors could indulge in the recreational area all by 
themselves.  Winner suggests the bridges were from the onset constructed with this aim 
in mind and therefore bear witness to the racial prejudice of their time. In conclusion, 
Winner declares that “[a]rtifacts can have political qualities.”390 
Brian Winston, in turn, addresses questions related to the emergence of communication 
and information media ranging from the telegraph to the internet. He emphasizes the 
“primacy of the social sphere”391 in terms of the ‘invention’ and development of new 
technologies and sets out to examine “the operation of the accelerators and brakes, or 
social necessities and constraints, rather than […] the performance of technology in 
vacuo.”392 One example he provides is the telegraphic device developed by Francis 
Ronalds. In 1816, Ronalds approached the British Admiralty with a fully operational 
electric telegraph. The device was turned down, though: Admiralty officials thought that 
semaphores and the current system of flag signals served them sufficiently well and 
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therefore could not think of any potential use of Ronalds’ device. What Winston calls a 
supervening social necessity for electric telegraphy only emerged with the onset of the 
railway age and the need for instantaneous communication in order to guarantee 
efficient and safe usage of the single-track rails.
393
  
From a twenty-first century perspective, the notion of the social determination of 
technology is probably most easily understood looking at the controversies arising over 
endeavours in genetic engineering. For various reasons – ethical and ecological 
concerns, for instance – such research has been subject of intense public and political 
debate and has therefore been legally narrowed down and restricted. Different countries, 
however, have come to different conclusions, and what is allowed in one state may be 
forbidden in the other. As a general rule, the work a scientist can perform in a laboratory 
or any other research facility is thus not determined by the scientific means and 
technological resources themselves, but by legislation, which is the result of lengthy 
social and political negotiation processes (which, in turn, are dominated by the social 
elite).
394
 In a similar manner, what users can de facto access or view on the internet is 
subject to many factors which usually vary from country to country (just think of 
countries such as China or Syria which have temporarily or permanently banned 
Facebook, Twitter and similar social networking sites).  
As antithetic as these approaches of technological determinism, on the one hand, and 
the social determination of technology, on the other, may be, they do after all have one 
thing in common: They both largely disregard the actual user of the ‘product’. In case of 
the former, this is due to the fact that agency is considered inherent to technology and 
the user is accordingly deemed irrelevant; in case of the latter, because the focus is more 
on the development of technologies and the social factors involved.  
 
3.2 Actors, Artefacts and Actants: Sociological Technology Studies 
To close this gap and to do justice to David Edgerton’s request to study technologies in 
use,
395
 it is worthwhile to have a look at sociological approaches towards technology 
which focus on how specific technologies are actually applied. A fundamental 
assumption in the field of sociological technology studies is the idea that technology is a 
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social process. An artefact by itself (according to Rammert, this is a ‘narrow’ 
understanding of technology) is of no interest to sociologists. This changes, though, as 
soon as the artefact is used and thus becomes part of social actions (so-called broad 
understanding of technology).
396
 Sociological technology studies accordingly focus on 
what Degele refers to as “daily practice of doing things,”397 that is, on the ways and 
extent to which technology is used and how social (inter)actions are changed by it. 
Furthermore, the aspect of knowledge – that is, acquaintance with a certain technology 
and the ways in which to use it, rather than scientific knowledge of the underlying 
structures and principles – is of paramount significance in this context, as it impacts on 
the way users handle a specific technology (and thus on the results they may receive).  
In order to clarify what is at the centre of attention of sociological technology studies, 
Weyer gives the example of a hammer, which – by itself – is nothing more than a piece 
of iron combined with a piece of wood.
398
 To sociologists, the hammer hardly matters 
as long as it is not made use of. However, as soon as someone does use the hammer, it 
becomes part of social action and is thus of paramount interest. At this, Weyer 
specifically refers to the prominent role of previous experience and familiarity with the 
object: as the process of knocking a nail into a wall is “carried out jointly by actor and 
artefact,”399 the individual capabilities of the person using the hammer play a decisive 
role. A child, in all likelihood, will use the hammer far less efficiently than a 
professional craftsman (or any moderately gifted adult, for that matter). Similarly 
important, however, is the fact that handling a hammer can be learnt, either through 
experiments or by means of instruction by other users: most craftsmen were probably 
not able to use a hammer in a competent way when they were children themselves. They 
have gained this expertise over the years or when someone, at some point in time, 
showed them how to use the tool correctly.
400
  
Bruno Latour also deals with the interaction of human actors and the artefacts at their 
disposal, albeit he, in the framework of Actor-Network-Theory, takes it to another level. 
In principle, Latour emphasizes that artefacts also have agency. In so doing, he 
repudiates the traditional sociological understanding of agency, according to which it is 
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intrinsically linked to intentions (and therefore must be one of humankind’s 
prerogatives). For Latour, the traditional juxtaposition of subject and object is obsolete; 
instead, he highlights the merging, or hybridization, as he calls it, of humans, animals 
and artefacts (to all of which he refers as actants).
401
 
A good example of this hybridization of human and artefact is the – admittedly oft-
quoted – example of the gun and the question of who fires the bullet. As mentioned 
before, Weyer points out that the nail is being knocked into the wall jointly by actor and 
artefact. Latour, on the contrary, no longer distinguishes the two as separate entities: 
rather, a person being angry and longing to take revenge, yet unable to do so by means 
of his hands only (Actant 1), and the weapon with its inscribed “‘function’ of shooting” 
(Actant 2) together constitute a third actant, “with a new, translated program: the killing 
of the person against whom one wants to take revenge.”402 The question of who fired 
the bullet is thus no longer meaningful, as person and gun operate as “a citizen-gun, a 
gun-citizen.”403 What is more, each weapon has a certain script or potential inscribed – 
“who, with a knife in her hand, has not wanted at some time to stab someone or 
something?”404 – but nonetheless human and weapon act collectively, and alternative 
applications of the weapon are therefore possible: the gun, as Degele points out, could 
be used as a hammer, for instance.
405
 Admittedly, most of us would never use a gun in 
order to knock in a nail, but there are many other occasions where we make use of an 
artefact in a way that does not correspond with the inscribed script, for instance when 
using a lighter in order to open a beer bottle. 
A further example provided by Latour, illustrating how human behaviour can be shaped 
by technology, is that of the door closer.
406
 An automatic door-closer imposes a certain 
behaviour on everyone passing the door (or, at least, suggests it). For instance, one 
should not follow the person in front too closely, as one runs the risk of being hit by the 
slamming door. Everyone passing this particular door on a regular basis is well 
acquainted with its idiosyncrasies. Accordingly, what Schulz-Schaeffer calls “local 
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cultures of usage” develop.407 To make sure that people who are not familiar with the 
door and the workings of the door-closer can nonetheless pass it without being injured, 
it seems reasonable to install a hydraulic device, thereby making sure the door closes 
slowly. This, in turn, means that the door may be more difficult to open, which is why 
children and elderly people might only be able to do so making a considerable effort. 
Consequently, one needs to find new solutions to this problem. This simple example 
thus illustrates in what ways non-humans can have repercussions on human behaviour 
(albeit they do not single-handedly determine it).  
Sociological technology studies therefore help us understand that the relation between 
technology and society is by no means a unidirectional one; instead, it is a web of co-
dependencies and interrelations in which a concoction of various factors –  such as the 
individual user’s expertise, previous experience and intentions – play a most significant 
part.  
 
3.3 Of Progress and Anxiety – Victorian Thought and Technological 
Determinism  
In the introduction to The Invention of Progress, Bowler points out that  
 [t]he nineteenth century saw an unprecedented acceleration in the development of 
 material civilization. As the century began, Britain had just begun its industrialization. 
 By the time Victoria came to the throne in 1837 the railways had begun to spread across 
 the landscape. By the end of the century Europe and America were centres of massive 
 industrialization with the power to dominate the world – and the world was girdled by a 
 network of railways, steamship lines and telegraph cables that allowed vast empires to 
 be administered.
408
 
In addition to these profound material transformations, there were other spheres that 
witnessed equally far-reaching shifts. Darwin’s theory of evolution challenged 
knowledge about the past and the origins of humankind, which people had previously 
taken for granted, and in the wake of the process of industrialization, large parts of the 
population faced deplorable conditions both at their workplace and in their homes. The 
nineteenth century is therefore widely considered a transitional period, in which 
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traditional values gradually lost validity – a process “that was often painful and that 
opened up massive uncertainties as to what modern values should be.”409 It was in these 
circumstances that the idea of progress – that is “a belief in the steady, cumulative and 
inevitable expansion of human awareness and power – material, intellectual, 
spiritual,” 410  – gained momentum and, as Bowler points out, “became central to 
[Victorian] thinking (…) because it offered the hope that current changes might be part 
of a meaningful historical pattern.”411  
As alluded to above, material developments were of paramount importance in the 
context of nineteenth-century transformations, and it is therefore hardly surprising that, 
in retrospect, it is often assumed that the “belief that in some fundamental sense 
technological developments determine the course of human events [had] become dogma 
by the end of the century.”412  Usually, we are given two different versions of this 
account according to which Victorian contemporaries thought that society was directly 
shaped by technology. 
On the one hand (and inextricably linked to the idea of steady progress), there was the 
optimistic belief that technology would inevitably improve the human condition. It was 
the scientific revolution with the development of modern scientific concepts and the 
Age of Enlightenment and the then emerging “belief in the power of human reason to 
change society,” which was “backed up by a world view increasingly validated by 
science rather than by religion or tradition,”413 that prepared the grounds for this point 
of view. The notion of nature being dangerous, mysterious and beyond human control 
was gradually superseded by the idea that it should rather be the object of scientific 
investigation. Francis Bacon, one of the pioneers of modern scientific enquiry, is of 
peculiar importance in this context: He developed the idea that man, by means of 
scientific methods, should uncover the previously secret laws of nature and 
subsequently employ this newly gained knowledge for the benefit of humankind. The 
subjugation of nature is therefore an integral part of Bacon’s concept. This becomes 
particularly obvious when he compares scientific work to torture, pointing out that “like 
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as a man’s disposition is never well known or proved till he be crossed, nor Proteus ever 
changed shapes till he was straitened and held fast; so nature exhibits herself more 
clearly under the trials and vexations of art than when left to herself.”414 He furthermore 
points out that humankind should “recover that right over nature which belongs to it by 
divine bequest.”415 With his request to acquire knowledge and, in so doing, subjugate 
nature, Bacon thus stands in the Christian tradition of human dominion over both the 
environment and the animal world.
416
  
Bacon’s principles were seized upon by both contemporary and successive scientists 
and philosophers (most famously by Descartes, Glanvill, Voltaire and Montesquieu).
417
 
It was only in the age of industrialization, though, that these ideas gained stronger 
foothold and that technologies were given what Leo Marx calls a “heroic role”418 in that 
they helped improving mankind’s living conditions. At the end of the nineteenth century, 
mankind’s subordination of nature by means of scientific enquiry and technological 
devices was widely considered one of the most significant human achievements of the 
time,
419
 and, given the fact that it was embedded in Christian tradition and was thought 
of as part of the divine scheme, helped alleviate the tensions and uncertainties 
mentioned above.    
This becomes all the more understandable when we look at the broad range of scientific 
findings and technological inventions which directly or indirectly changed nineteenth-
century contemporaries’ lives for the better (or promised to do so in the near future). 
Hygienic conditions, for instance, had improved tremendously: sewerage systems were 
constructed, which helped eradicate cholera and typhus. With the introduction of 
chloroform and ether as anesthetics, medical surgery was also crucially transformed: 
Physicians performing an operation could now take the time they needed to treat the 
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wound properly. Owing to new methods of disinfection, chances of surviving major 
surgery had also risen.
420
  
Developments in the field of transport and production technologies also impacted on 
various spheres of activity: Steam-powered agricultural machines allowed for better 
crops, which, in turn, could be more easily distributed throughout the country by rail.
421
 
These new technological and scientific developments were accordingly put on a level 
with the improvement of standards of living, triumph over both diseases and physical 
disabilities, and the victory over poverty. They were therefore thought to enable the 
“general advance towards greater happiness, justice and liberty.”422  
As indicated above, this heroic role attributed to technology and the technological 
determinist idea of agency being inherent to it also featured in the context of new media 
of transport and communication. This is aptly illustrated in publications such as 
Triumphs and Wonders of the Nineteenth Century, where it is among other things 
assumed that “navies (…) have moulded human destiny and shaped the world’s 
progress”423 and are therefore considered to be of “cardinal importance.”424 Likewise, 
the telegraph is thought of as “stimulat[ing] to improvement and new invention and 
discovery.”425 In these examples, the particular technology is depicted as the crucial 
initiator of certain developments, whereas other factors are neglected.  
Closely interwoven with the idea that science and technology (and the supremacy over 
nature they seemed to render possible) would inevitably improve the human condition is 
the notion of the technological sublime. David Nye defines the sublime as the “repeated 
experience of awe and wonder, often tinged with an element of terror, which people 
have had when confronted with particular natural sites, architectural forms, and 
technological achievements.” 426  As he points out, what was considered ‘sublime’ 
changed over time. From the early eighteenth century onwards, the notion of the 
sublime was drawn upon in order to describe natural phenomena, such as volcanic 
eruptions or thunderstorms, which were deemed both highly aesthetic and frightening at 
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the same time – or, as Burke expressed it in his Philosophical Enquiry, first published in 
1756, were considered “delightful horror.”427  With an increasing number of natural 
phenomena being explained scientifically, though, this ‘version’ of the sublime was 
from the early nineteenth century onwards superseded by what Leo Marx calls the 
“rhetoric of the technological sublime.”428  This notion of the technological sublime 
resulted from the “intoxicated feeling of unlimited possibility:” 429  contemporary 
engineers, writers and the wider public alike credited machines with mystical or 
metaphysical properties, treating them as if they were “part animal, part machine, part 
god.”430 A quintessential characteristic of the technological sublime is thus the quasi-
religious feeling arising upon confrontation with machinery. At this point, though, we 
can distinguish several ‘sub-categories’ of the technological sublime: there is, for 
instance, the mechanical sublime, in which steam engines and the resulting means of 
transportation were praised for their seemingly inherent capabilities of networking a 
country (thereby enhancing not only commerce, but also mutual understanding, 
democracy and peace). This was later superseded by the enthusiasm for electricity and 
the corresponding “rhetoric of the electrical sublime.”431 With the actual process of 
transmitting messages being invisible, electric telegraphy was considered mystical and 
scary, and thus all the more fascinating.
432
  
The notion of the technological sublime, however, also alludes to the fact that the 
picture of an enthusiastic reception of technology is only one side of the coin. 
Concerning the introduction of the electric telegraph in the United States, for instance, 
Czitrom declares that it was indeed “greeted (…) with a combination of pride, 
excitement and sheer wonder,” but that there were also “plenty of expressions of doubt, 
incredulity, and superstitious fear. Not infrequently, observers recorded an uneasy 
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mixture of these feelings.” 433  Not all of the tensions and fears evoked by the 
developments nineteenth-century contemporaries witnessed could be alleviated by the 
idea of progress. As a result, we are nowadays also presented a gloomy and pessimistic 
account of how contemporaries thought technology would shape society and impact on 
individual’s lives. Indeed, there were technosceptic, if not technophobic, notions of how 
technology would harm humankind and social life, rather than ushering in an era of 
peace, liberty and welfare. The reasons for such feelings of skepticism and fear are 
manifold and there was never a coherent group unified by a single agenda, but various 
rationales. Along with Enlightenment thinkers’ faith in human competence to uncover 
the secrets of nature through scientific enquiry, for instance, a romantic counterculture 
had emerged. Its adherents opposed the proceeding rationalization; instead, they relied 
on imagination and intuition.
434
 In this connection, Linda Simon
435
 refers to Samuel 
Coleridge, one of the central figures of English Romanticism, who waspishly remarked 
that genuine enlightenment was to be found reading Shakespeare or Milton – what 
scientists, in turn, had to offer, he declared condescendingly, was mere knowledge.
436
  
Others criticized the dehumanizing effects resulting from the mechanization of work 
processes – which was also feared to render qualified craftsmen unnecessary and thus 
cause large-scale unemployment – and pointed to the devastating effects on the 
workers’ physical and mental health or their alienation from the final product. 437 
Moreover, contemporaries were anxious about the physical ramifications of certain 
technologies: it was, for instance, assumed that noise, speed and vibrations one had to 
endure during a train journey were to leave their mark of passengers’ health, and that 
electricity would cause apoplectic strokes.
438
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3.4 Chapter Summary  
This chapter has served a dual purpose. To start with, it has considered various 
approaches towards the relationship between society and technology. It has first of all 
taken a closer look at the theories of technological determinism, on the one hand, and 
the social determination of technology, on the other, neither of which is deemed 
adequate any longer as they do not take into consideration technologies as they are 
actually used. They have thus been superseded by sociological theories focusing their 
attention on the actual application of technologies. In so doing, these theories stress the 
importance of the human actors’ intentions, their acquaintance with the ‘tool’ they are 
using and the reciprocity between humans and technology.  
Further, the chapter has defined what can best be described as ‘conventional’ accounts 
of Victorian attitudes towards science and technology. According to these accounts, 
contemporaries viewed these two areas as primary agents of change, which would either 
inevitably improve the human condition (a view embedded in the rationale of the 
Enlightenment) or cause social hardships and physical harm without contributing to 
what adherents of the Romantic movement deemed ‘worthy knowledge’. This chapter 
has thus provided a basic analytical framework for the subsequent chapters. 
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     “…she liked being the mistress who put the  
      demon of steam into harness.”439 
4. Transport and Communication Technologies in Context(s) – 
Notions of Progress, Subordinating Nature and the Technological 
Sublime 
The fundamental relevance of the idea of progress having been elaborated, it is hardly 
surprising that this Victorian belief in steady, ongoing improvement, the subjugation of 
nature and the ‘technological sublime’ appear frequently in reporting on nineteenth-
century scientific and technological developments. It also features eminently in 
coverage on contemporary transport and communication technologies. This chapter is 
an overview and analysis of the various contexts in which the notions of progress, the 
subjugation of nature and the technological sublime are referred to in connection with 
transport and communication technologies. Along the lines of Hempstead’s research on 
the representation of transatlantic telegraph cables, the chapter is going to illustrate how 
these technologies were embedded into social history and existing cultural frameworks.  
 
4.1 Transport and Communication Technologies: A Tale of Progress 
Contemporaries were well aware of the staggering number of scientific and 
technological developments unfolding in the nineteenth century and often depicted them 
as defining features of the period. With regard to the opening of the Great Exhibition, 
for instance, the Illustrated London News points out that  
 if (…) we take any space of a hundred years – or even of two hundred years – in our 
 own history, or in that of any other people in the ancient or modern world, we shall not 
 find, within either of those periods, the records of such progress in all the arts which 
 elevate and adorn humanity, and extend its power for good, as we do in the twenty years 
 which have elapsed since 1830. The ball of improvement has rolled with 
 accelerated velocity, increasing its impetus as it went.
440
 
Similarly, in the Visitor’s Guide to the Great Eastern, the readers are reminded that 
[i]t is indeed an extraordinary age, – an age of unparalleled enterprise, of surprising 
discoveries and inventions, of herculean constructions and scientific revolutions, – an 
age that has given birth to truly unique and unparagoned productions, – an age of 
enlightenment and inquisitiveness, – an age of engineering achievements which a 
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century ago, had they been possible, would have marked an epoch, – an age, in which 
the circle of universal knowledge is rapidly expanding, – an age in which the starting 
discoveries of the secrets of nature are going on under the scrutinizing researches of 
experimental philosophy, – an age distinguished beyond any other in our history by a 
number of great men, famous in different ways, and whose names will go down to 
posterity with unfading honours.
441
 
In this connection, it is deemed particularly noteworthy that these discoveries and 
inventions do not “come upon us (…) singly, but in troops, – not in gentle showers and 
meandering streams, but with the rapidity, the copiousness, and the force of an 
inundation.”442 Ten years later, the Manchester Guardian reprints an article from the 
Spectator, which takes the same line, pointing out that 
 [f]ew phenomena are more remarkable, yet few have been less remarked, than the 
 degree in which material civilisation – the progress of mankind in all those contrivances 
 which oil the wheels and promote the comfort of daily life – has been concentrated into 
 the last  half-century. It is not too much to say that in these respects more has been 
 done, richer and more prolific discoveries have been made, grander achievements have 
 been realised, in the course of the 50 years of our own lifetime than in all the previous 
 lifetime of the race, since states, nations, and politics, such as history makes us 
 acquainted with, have had their being.
443
 
All of these passages refer to the concentration of scientific and technological 
developments in the course of the past decades and make no mention of a specific 
innovation. Elsewhere, however, we find the importance of improved means of 
transport and communication or one particular technology being emphasized. In the 
Exhibition Supplement to the Illustrated London News, it is pointed out that “the first 
successful application of Electricity to the wants of man will ever distinguish the 
present reign as an important era in scientific history.”444 The article outlines various 
fields of application – among other things, electric telegraphy – and concludes that 
“[t]he first practical appliances of electricity will render the reign of Queen Victoria 
famous in scientific history.” 445 In the Visitor’s Guide to the Great Eastern, it is 
similarly declared that the “last half century (…) is the most remarkable period in the 
history of the world,” primarily because of the  
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 almost universal application of steam to the processes of manufactories and agriculture. 
 Of this energy and progress, railroads and the electric telegraph are at once the most 
 prominent and fittest symbols.
446
 
Similarly, the Observer, reporting the laying of the 1858 transatlantic cable, generally 
asserts that the “nineteenth century has been so pregnant with great scientific results, 
that (…) it seems hardly credible that all the vast improvements that have been effected 
are really the products of man’s ingenuity and thought:”447 steam-powered ships and 
railways are mentioned as illustrations of these improvements, but the electric telegraph 
is considered particularly significant in this context: 
 [T]he advance that has been made in this all-powerful [sic] auxiliary to man’s industry 
 sinks comparatively into insignificance when placed in juxtaposition to the wonders 
 wrought by electricity, the power of which, moreover, must yet be regarded as in its 
 infancy. As science has again and again achieved some great triumph, it has been 
 customary to class the last production as the greatest, and at the present time the men of 
 science and intellect are congratulating one another on the success of the greatest work 
 that certainly has hitherto yet been completed. The connection of the old and new 
 worlds by means of electricity is, in truth, such a marvel that if one had predicted it only 
 some ten years since it would have qualified him to have been thought worthy of a 
 residence in Bedlam.
448
 
In the previously quoted article originally published in the Spectator and reprinted in the 
Manchester Guardian (and aptly titled “Concentrated Progress of the World”), 
gunpowder and printing are suggested as “two of the most remarkable inventions of all 
time,” one being “four, the other five, centuries old.”449 It is pointed out, though, that 
throughout the centuries, they were not changed significantly: in fact, major 
improvements were not made until the beginning of the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, 
other developments are considered even more important: 
 [I]t is in the three momentous matters of light, locomotion, and communication that the
 progress effected in this generation contrasts most surprisingly with the aggregate of
 the progress effected in all previous generations put together since the earliest dawn of
 authentic history.
450
 
In The Mont Cenis Tunnel Construction, readers are told that it is  
 a fine boast of our age that of having initiated and completed the greatest work which 
 can honour the genius of man, such as are the junctions of two continents by means of 
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 the trans-atlantic [sic] cable, the canal of Suez, the railway of the Pacific, the piercing 
 of the Cozian Alps.
451
 
Similarly, the Illustrated London News describes the Mont Cenis Tunnel as “a 
characteristic achievement of the nineteenth century.” 452  Generally speaking, it is 
therefore safe to assume that the new transport and communication technologies are 
considered to epitomize the progressiveness of the era.  
What is important to note in this context is that it is not only the sheer quantity of 
scientific findings and technological innovations – specifically of transport and 
communication technologies – that differentiates the nineteenth century from previous 
centuries. It is their utilitarian aspect in combination with the fact that an increasing 
number of people from all strata of society have access to and benefit from these 
emerging technologies that distinguishes the era. In contrast to technologies of previous 
centuries (and of other nations, as will be seen in chapter 7), which were only accessible 
to a social elite, contemporary means of transport and communication are considered to 
be at the general public’s disposal. In an article covering the opening of the Great 
Exhibition, the Illustrated London News therefore anticipates   
 that the blessings of civilisation – both moral and physical – will extend to and 
 thoroughly permeate a far more numerous class than those which are now familiar with 
 them. There is a lower and larger substratum to be reached, which has already begun to 
 feel the benigner influences. 
453
 
A similar idea is conveyed in the same magazine’s reporting on the Crystal Palace. Here, 
it is first of all pointed out that   
 [t]he Building itself – the fitting shrine for the objects of mingled beauty and utility 
 which it encloses – is as original and novel as the occasion; and if the ancient peoples 
 had advanced far enough in civilisation, and had possessed wisdom enough to conceive 
 such a project as this friendly rivalry of the industrious workers of all climes and races, 
 the Building would have been commemorated by the history and tradition of three 
 thousand years, in the songs of barbs and in the proverbs of the people, as a wonder of 
 the world, worthy to rank with the Pyramids, or with the gates and walls of Thebes or 
 Palmyra for its greatness, and with the Colossus that bestrode Rhodes harbour for its 
 beauty.
454
  
Subsequently, however, it is emphasized that   
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 the Crystal Palace has the merit of surpassing all these in the true nobility of the 
 purposes for which it was erected. It is no vast monument of a still vaster pride and 
 vanity, like the Pyramids; it is not, like the gates and walls of the ancient cities of the 
 east, a bulwark against the encroachments of vindictive and rapacious enemies; nor, like 
 the Rhodian Colossus, a useless, although splendid, ornament of a great capital. 
 Different from and more excellent than these, it is sanctified by a high purpose, the 
 highest, indeed, known to that practical religion, which, including all objects of human 
 interest, preaches not simply love to God, but good-will to men.
455
  
In a speech given at the annual congress of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers (and 
subsequently printed in the Manchester Guardian), Sir William Armstrong points out 
that one is “naturally led to compare [the Suez Canal] to the great neighbouring relics of 
Egyptian antiquity,” and comes to the conclusion that “[i]n its moral and intellectual 
aspect [the canal] is immeasurably superior.”456 This is assumed to be due to the fact 
that “the modern work will bear witness to the practical science and utilitarian spirit of 
our better times,” whereas the Pyramids are considered “a useless monument of the idle 
vanity of a tyrant.” 457  Similarly, in The Mont Cenis Tunnel, it is pointed out that 
“ancient works (…) commonly aimed only at gratifying the ambition of some potentate, 
or if they aimed at general utility, statecraft, egotism and distrust held them fettered in 
limits too small and narrow of the nation which had raised them.”458 Also referring to 
the Mont Cenis Tunnel, Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper notes that “[t]he triumphs that 
intelligent Labour is seeking are those which shall make all men participators, in just 
degrees, in the benefits of [the tunnel].”459 [my italics] 
As previously indicated, transport and communication technologies are embedded into 
multi-layered historical, social and cultural frames of reference. These are used for 
various purposes, which, prima facie, may appear contradictory: on the one hand, such 
references are made to emphasize the contrast between contemporary technologies and 
previous ones (be they ‘real’ historical predecessors or belonging to the realm of myths 
and literature), stressing the unidirectional course of history and the progressiveness and 
superiority of the latest developments. On the other hand, though, by referring to ancient 
accomplishments, current technological achievements are depicted as following in the 
steps of bygone advanced civilizations. What is more, as Hempstead has argued, these 
references served the purpose of familiarizing the public with these new technologies. 
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At this point, it is therefore first of all worthwhile to look at the astonishingly wide 
spectrum of references made in nineteenth-century newspapers and periodicals, aptly 
illustrated in the following passages. Given the fact that there is a wide variety of means 
of transportation on display at the Great Exhibition – “carriages, cabs, locomotive 
engines, and other means of conveyance”460 – the Illustrated London News argues that 
man “might be appropriately distinguished from the brute creation by the definition of a 
coach-building animal.”461 In this connection, it is further emphasized that  
 [f]rom the days of the charioteer John, who, we are told in Scripture, ‘drove furiously;’ 
 from the days of the old Assyrians, Ninevites, and Babylonians, of whom we have the 
 sculptured representations as they appeared in their chariots of war; from the days of the 
 Olympic chariot races; from the days of the ancient Britons, who, Cæsar tells us, 
 garnished their coach-wheels with scythes, down to the present time, when fast men 
 drive about in Hansom cabs; when hard-worked mechanics take a shilling trip by 
 railway into the green fields; and when even the poorest occasionally indulge in a 
 threepenny omnibus to Camden-Town, or other suburban retreats – we have continued 
 evidence of other means of locomotion than the two legs with which nature has 
 endowed us. 
462
 
Here, transport technologies are described as an achievement by means of which 
humankind could be distinguished from the animal world. Further, present-day 
technologies of transport are described as a natural result of a lengthy evolutionary 
process.  
The Manchester Guardian, on the other hand, juxtaposes the most recent developments 
in the field of transport and communication technologies to historical forerunners: 
 Nimrod and Noah travelled just in the same way, and just at the same rate, as Thomas 
 Assheton Smith and Mr. Coke of Norfolk. The chariots of the Olympic Games went just 
 as fast as the chariots that conveyed our nobles to the Derby, ‘in our own hot youth, 
 when George [Third was king.’ [sic] When Abraham wanted to send a message to Lot 
 he despatched a man on horseback, who galloped 12 miles an hour. When our fathers 
 wanted to send a message to their nephews, they could do no better, and go no quicker. 
 When we were young, if we wished to travel from London to Edinburgh, we thought 
 ourselves lucky if we could average eight miles an hour – just as Robert Bruce might 
 have done. Now, in our old age, we feel ourselves aggrieved if we do not average 40 
 miles. (…) The same at sea. Probably, when the wind was favourable, Ulysses, who was 
 a bold and skilful navigator, sailed as fast as a Dutch merchantman of the year 1800, 
 nearly as fast at times as an American yacht or clipper of our fathers’ day. Now, we 
 steam 12 and 15 miles an hour with wonderful regularity, whether wind and tide be 
 favourable or not; nor is it likely that we shall ever be able to go much faster.
463
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The developments in the field of communication, though, are considered to be even 
more outstanding:  
 But the progress in the means of communication is the most remarkable of all. In this 
 respect Mr. Pitt was no better off than Pericles or Agamemnon. If Ruth had wished to 
 write to Naomi, or David to send a word of love to Jonathan when he was a 
 hundred miles away, they could not possibly have done it under 12 hours. Nor could 
 we to our friends 30 years ago. In 1867 the humblest citizen of Great Britain can send 
 such a message, not a hundred miles, but a thousand, in 12 minutes.
464
 
These brief extracts thus contain a noteworthy potpourri of historical, social and cultural 
references, ranging from biblical figures and various ancient civilizations to Greek 
antiquity and mythology and notable historical figures such as Robert Bruce (King of 
Scots in the early fourteenth century) and “Mr. Coke of Norfolk.”465 In particular the 
passage from the Manchester Guardian already provides a clue as to how juxtaposing 
and comparing previous modes of conveyance and communication could underline the 
claim that the past fifty years have experienced outstanding technological developments.  
As Hempstead has illustrated and as the passage from the Manchester Guardian has 
shown, it was biblical imagery that was particularly often drawn upon in reporting on 
electric telegraphy. Similarly, biblical motifs were also employed in the context of the 
Great Eastern steamship, Noah’s ark not surprisingly being the most common. The 
Times, for instance, suggests that  
 [w]hoever wants to feed this natural passion for size in the primitive way, and to see a 
 true giant in its own line, must visit the bank of the Thames at Millwall. But before he 
 goes we recommend him, unless he is very well versed in the Book of Genesis, to turn 
 to the 6
th
 chapter, and refresh his memory as to the dimension of NOAH’S Ark [sic] and 
 the ‘fashion’ of its making: ‘The length of the Ark shall be 300 cubits, the breadth of it 
 50 cubits, and the height of it 30 cubits.’ So, reckoning the cubits at a foot and a half, 
 we have a ship 450 feet long, 75 feet broad and 45 feet high.
466
 
Accordingly, the conclusion is drawn that “to [the Great Eastern] even NOAH’s Ark 
must yield precedence.”467 Two days later, the Times publishes a letter in which a reader 
pursues this comparison between the ark and the Great Eastern and elaborates further 
on their respective length and tonnage.
468
 A similar comparison can also be found in the 
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Great Eastern Steam Ship
469
 and in the Illustrated London News, where it is briefly 
remarked that the Great Eastern is “larger than the ark itself.”470  As these passages 
aptly demonstrate, the Bible remained a most powerful and significant cultural reference 
and was drawn upon in order to illustrate the magnitude of the Great Eastern steamship.  
As has been seen, Greek mythology is likewise plundered in order to illustrate the 
impressive scale of contemporary technological systems. In his publication on The Suez 
Maritime Canal, Stoess describes how the construction of the canal could only be 
carried out in such a relatively short space of time owing to the “colossal creations of 
modern mechanics.” According to him, the “largest conception of power which the 
ancients were able to form: Hercules, and even Briareus with his hundred arms appear 
(...) as pigmies” when compared to these modern devices.471 
The Times draws upon Scandinavian mythology in order to illustrate the dimension of 
the first transatlantic cable of 1857, comparing it to the Jörmungandr serpent, which, 
according to Norse legend, circles the globe:  
 There in a comparatively small compass, coil over coil, till the eye is pained and 
 dazzled in attempts to follow it, lies the monstrous cable, like the endless snake of the 
 Scandinavian mythology, which was said to encircle the world.
472
  
Reporting the Mont Cenis Tunnel, the Liverpool Mercury in turn refers to Hannibal’s 
crossing of the Alps:  
 The passage of the Alps, by the army of Hannibal, at no great distance from the line 
 through these mountains which has just been opened, was considered one of the most 
 wonderful exploits of ancient times; but it sinks into insignificance in comparison with 
 the skill and the patience which have been displayed in constructing a passage through 
 these mountains, which is likely to remain open through all succeeding time, and for the 
 use of all the nations of the world.
473
  
It should be hardly surprising contemporary writers frequently compared the Suez Canal 
with the great constructions of ancient Egypt, most notably the pyramids. In his speech, 
Armstrong points out that in terms of “quantity of the material moved, the Suez Canal is 
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far more vast than the great Pyramid.”474 Referring to ancient canal constructions, the 
Scotsman notes that  
 [w]onderful is the difference between the mechanical means at the command of the 
 ancients and the moderns respectively, enabling a French engineer to accomplish a 
 work four times greater in one-tenth of the time compared with the utmost efforts of the 
 Pharaohs and all their hosts.
475
 
On the very day of inauguration, the Times solemnly declares that the   
enterprise at which the PHARAOHS and the PTOLEMIES [sic], with other Sovereigns 
of the intervening dynasties, laboured at different periods and with various success 
throughout the centuries of remote antiquity is now announced as virtually achieved.
476
 
What is noteworthy is that these ancient canal constructions are not only alluded to in 
order to point up the superiority of contemporary technological skills. Instead, they are 
also identified as the predecessors of one of the great contemporary engineering feats. In 
his publication on The Suez Canal, the Eastern Question, and Abyssinia, for instance, 
Fitzgerald points out that “[c]anal communication is supposed to have existed from sea 
to sea, at all events since the time of Abraham, throughout the greater part of the 
eventful history of Egypt” 477  (thus also referring to a biblical figure). A primary 
example for this is also to be found in the above-quoted article published in the 
Scotsman, in which the difference between ancient and modern mechanical devices is 
emphasized and the superiority of the latter championed; following the passage cited 
above, however, the article continues as follows:   
 But more wonderful still is the thought that, thousands of years before steam or almost 
 any other of our great mechanical agencies had existence, such a work as the ancient 
 canal between the Nile and the Red Sea could have been accomplished or, even 
 conceived.
478
 
Moreover, attention is called to the fact that the  
 ancient canal was in use for many centuries, and is supposed to have been 
 destroyed in the end only by barbaric violence. It seems indeed also to be true that, 
 several times before its obstruction or abandonment, it was sanded up; but (…)
 whenever there was internal tranquility, with moderately vigorous rulers, little difficulty 
 appears to have been experienced in restoring it to use. If the ancients, with their 
 imperfect knowledge and comparatively contemptible means, could thus keep their 
 canal from being permanently filled up by the drifting sands, can there be imminent 
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 danger from that and similar quarters to a work in charge of those possessing both 
 experience and power so far transcending?
479 
At this point, it becomes startlingly clear that the seeming contradictory depictions – the 
contrasting juxtaposition of ancient and modern constructions and the highlighting of 
the superiority of the latter, on the one hand, and their portrayal as following in the 
footsteps of past high cultures, on the other – are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
These different ways of representing progress can actually be complementary. By 
referring to ancient predecessors, contemporary technology can be depicted as a 
continuation and conclusion of a lengthy development process. In so doing, Western 
civilization (bear in mind that the Suez Canal was a French project) is portrayed as 
being on a par with advanced civilizations of the past; the superiority of these current 
technologies, in turn, characterizes them as typical nineteenth-century achievements and 
bears witness to the progress which has been achieved in the most recent past.  
Allusions to ancient Egyptian structures are not confined to the Suez Canal, though. 
Reporting the construction of the Mont Cenis Tunnel, the Illustrated London News 
declares that “[o]nce done, it will be done for ever; it will endure with the Alps 
themselves and rank among those noble works of antiquity, the Pyramids of Egypt and 
the Roman roads and aqueducts, which appear to defy the wasting power of time.”480 
The Great Eastern steamship is repeatedly compared with the Seven Wonders of the 
World (the Great Pyramid of Giza being one), for instance when it is pointed out in The 
Great Eastern Steam Ship “that we can rationally regard that huge vessel as the latest 
wonder of the world. The ancients had their seven wonders, but never such a wonder as 
this.”481 The Illustrated London News takes the same line, at the same time emphasizing 
the utilitarian aspect of nineteenth-century achievements:  
 What compared to her, either for physical beauty and grandeur, or for a great and 
 civilising purpose, were any of the ‘seven wonders of the world’ that so charmed the 
 imagination of the ancients? The Pyramids of Egypt, the Sepulchre of Mausolus, the 
 Colossus of Rhodes, and the Statue of Jupiter were but monuments of extravagant folly 
 and vanity, without the least purpose of utility. The Palace of Cyprus, the Temple of 
 Diana, and the Walls of Babylon were beautiful and costly; but even in their beauty and 
 cost they are rivalled, and in their usefulness they are exceeded, by this noble vessel.
482
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Besides the accomplishments of the ancient civilizations of Greece and Egypt, those of 
British origin are also used by means of comparison. The Great Eastern is, for instance, 
compared to the prehistoric structure of Stonehenge. Concerning her launch, the 
Illustrated London News anticipates that   
 [i]f such a mass of iron and wood, weighing thousands of tons, could be precipitated 
 into the water with comparative ease and facility, the launch would constitute as 
 remarkable an event as any in the calendar of human invention. Some of the stupendous 
 erections of the ancients, which have puzzled the disciples of modern science, would 
 cease to be perplexities, and Stonehenge would no longer be invested with fabulous 
 attributes.
483
 
Moreover, the Visitor’s Guide to the Great Eastern refers to the naval architectural 
achievements of the various peoples which dominated the British Isles between late 
antiquity and the early modern period: 
 Our Saxon forefathers were proud of our ships, and Alfred the Great constructed vessels 
 of an entirely new plan; the Anglo-Normans made considerable improvement on the 
 Saxon vessels, and their (…) ships, which bore Richard and the Crusaders to the Holy 
 Land, excited universal admiration. Henry V. maintained our national supremacy on the 
 sea, and humbled all the maritime powers of Europe.
484
 
In so doing, the Great Eastern is seen in a long-standing seafaring tradition, represented 
as a defining feature of British national identity (see also chapter 7). Furthermore, the 
nineteenth century’s superiority is emphasized by comparison between the Great 
Eastern’s size and tonnage and that of the fleets of Henry VII and Elizabeth I, which, 
according to the Visitors’s Guide, “were (…) utterly insignificant when compared with 
those of our own times.”485 
As Hempstead has noted, Shakespeare’s plays, specifically A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream, were plundered in order to emphasize the speed with which information 
travelled along the transatlantic submarine cable. As early as 1851, the Illustrated 
London News, describing contemporary scientific developments, makes reference to A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream: 
 The present is said to be an age of great ideas; and, without flattering the age unduly, it 
 must be admitted that, in some respects, it deserves the appellation. The splendid 
 achievements of modern science – which allows the man of the nineteenth century to 
 see as much of the world in a day as his forefathers could see in a fortnight, and which 
 promises, by means of electricity, to ‘put a girdle round about the earth’ in much less 
 than ‘forty minutes,’ and thus outdo in sober reality what the Puck of the poet’s fancy 
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 suggested as within the power of the fairies, but not of men to perform – accustom the 
 popular mind to the reception of great ideas.
486
 
 
Twenty years later, the Liverpool Mercury reprints an article from the Daily News in 
which the various options as to a cable connecting the Pacific Coast of North America 
with either Russia or Japan are being discussed. Considering the “rapid development of 
submarine telegraphy (…) one of the chief marvels of our age,”487 it is pointed out that  
 [a]s soon as either of the routes, which we have been able authoritatively to describe, is 
 completed, the earth will be belted with telegraphic cables. When ‘Puck’s girdle’ has 
 spanned the Pacific, it will be easy enough to send a message round the globe in ’40 
 minutes’ – a sufficiently near realisation of the great dramatist’s oft-quoted line to make 
 his fancy appear prophetic.
488
 
Hempstead has also shown that “[t]he vision of the telegraph engineer as a pioneer 
moving into unknown, intellectual territory was powerful,”489 and that the expeditions 
of Columbus and other explorers were evoked to describe the cable-laying missions of 
the 1850s and 1860s. Medieval and early modern explorations are also drawn upon in 
the publications under scrutiny, stressing the seeming resemblance of nineteenth-
century technological achievements and these earlier undertakings. The Times, reporting 
the laying of the 1858 transatlantic cable, calls attention to how everyone had 
“wondered at the smallness of the craft in which COLUMBUS, DRAKE, MAGELLAN, 
[sic] and other discoverers plunged into the darkness of other seas and worlds”490 and 
emphasizes the exceptional courage these men displayed, as they “penetrat[ed] distant 
seas for the first time in undecked vessels, so small that they could sit on the gunwale 
and bathe their feet in the tranquil seas.”491 Subsequently, it is then pointed out that “it is 
quite clear that the Agamemnon was as utterly unequal to her stupendous freight as the 
galliots and barks of our early discoverers.”492 The Liverpool Mercury also refers to 
Columbus (and, once again, to Shakespeare), reminding its readers that  
 [t]he contemporaries of Columbus but faintly appreciated the significance of his tidings 
 of a new world beyond the setting sun; and we of this day can only imperfectly realise 
 all that is summed up in the proved possibility of putting a girdle round the earth and 
 linking the old world and the new in instantaneous communication.
493
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With regard to the opening of the Suez Canal, the Illustrated London News highlights its 
future significance, anticipating that it will introduce “a new, and for the present 
incalculable, factor (…) into the traffic of the world;” therefore it declares that a 
“grander fact, or one more likely to affect the material condition of mankind, has not 
occurred since the discovery of America by Columbus.”494 In the same manner, the 
Scotsman refers to Vasco da Gama, claiming that the Canal “may be to the world at 
large almost as great a boon as the discovery of the road to India by the Cape of Good 
Hope.”495  
As has been pointed out previously, the passages cited would seem to point to the 
conclusion that the transport and communication technologies in question were 
frequently drawn upon as symbols of the progressiveness and decisive superiority of the 
nineteenth century. This was done either by juxtaposing them to traditional myths, 
literary visions and technological achievements of earlier times, or by describing them 
as the fruits of lengthy development processes initiated by great civilizations, or by a 
combination of both.  
Beyond that, however, it was also speculated about the developments these technologies 
might entail in future times. In the publications under review, it is widely assumed they 
would have positive effects, although it is frequently stressed that one could not 
determine how exactly these were to manifest themselves. Accordingly, the relevant 
passages often remain rather vague. The Illustrated London News, for instance, referring 
to the cable of 1858, declares that “[n]o one can presume to calculate the results of this 
scientific victory,”496 and the Scotsman similarly points out that the laying of the cable 
is “altogether a wonderful and admirable triumph of modern science, ingenuity, and 
enterprise – one which we can yet scarcely comprehend in its fulness, far less over-
rate.”497 [sic] 
As to the laying of the 1866 transatlantic cable, the Times remarks that “[h]uman 
interest very naturally fixes upon those great and bold efforts the aim of which is to 
raise mankind from one step to another, to give it a grander unity or a stronger hold on 
this material creation;” 498  [my italics] the Observer likewise declares that “[i]t is 
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impossible to over-estimate [sic] the value of this means of communication between 
England and America, or to forecaste [sic] the benefits which it will confer upon the two 
people who are now so intimately connected together.”499  In a similar manner, the 
Illustrated London News again makes clear that “[w]e cannot foretell, we cannot, 
perhaps, conceive, the precise forms in which the amelioration will appear, or in what 
manner or in what proportion it will affect the material, the political, the moral, or the 
spiritual good of mankind.”500 In addition to that, it is pointed out that “[w]e have cast 
the net, but we know not yet all that it incloses; and, amongst many takes, some of them 
will answer our anticipations, and some unquestionably will surprise us.”501  
About eight months prior to the inauguration of the Suez Canal, the same magazine 
assumes that the canal “may tell with beneficent power upon the conditions of nations, 
East and West, for ages yet to come.”502 Pointing out that “[it] is not given to us to 
foresee all the indirect and collateral benefits which, assuming its perpetuity, it will 
confer upon the two great branches of the family of man,”503  the article sets forth 
speculations:  
 But who can pretend to foresee the vast variety of moral influences which will take their 
 origin from this apparently slight geographical change; in what manner they will act and 
 react upon nations even the most remote from each other; what will be their effect upon 
 social customs, modes of thought, and habits of life; or in what degree or with what 
 result they will modify the philosophies or the religious beliefs of men coming fully 
 within their range? The ceremony of Thursday week tempts imagination to a bolder 
 flight into the region of the unknown than is usual in these prosaic times; and, happily, 
 the glimpse thereby obtained of the likelihoods and possibilities which grow out of it 
 harmonises with the confidence we place in the laws which govern human destinies, and 
 encourages us to anticipate from it a vast preponderance of good over evil.
504
  
The case of the Mont Cenis Tunnel is especially interesting, as it is depicted as having 
particularly beneficial effects on the future on Italy. Firstly, the economic backwardness 
of the newly united kingdom is described. There is an overwhelming consensus that 
Italy, due to its geographical location south of the Alps and the resulting seclusion, has 
previously not been able to keep up with developments in other European countries. The 
Scotsman, for instance, points out how “until now the land of the vine has been almost 
Extra-European. She has been of us, but not among us; the disabilities imposed upon her 
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by nature have been of such a kind that she could not be considered a unit among the 
Great Powers.”505 In The Mont Cenis Tunnel, it is similarly described how the  
 ranges of the Alps have always been more or less a barrier to the intercourse of Italy 
 with the Northern countries of Europe. Several centuries ago this barrier or impediment 
 was unimportant; but as the Northern countries advanced in civilization, the effect of 
 this mountain-barrier was to cut off Italy from participation in their growing prosperity, 
 and to reduce it to a state of comparative isolation.
506
 
The Times also depicts how communication between France and Italy was at times 
seriously disturbed during wintertime, when “the mountain roads are sometimes 
impassable, often dangerous, and always difficult and inconvenient;”507 therefore, “until 
the completion of [the tunnel] it could not be said that the two countries had that power 
of constant and unrestricted intercourse which we have learnt to look upon as essential 
to nations.”508  
All this, it is assumed, is to change with the opening of the tunnel, by means of which 
intercourse with Italy will be facilitated enormously. The Scotsman therefore expects 
that, once “that disability passes away,” Italy will assume “the position for which the 
genius of her people has in all times eminently qualified her, and which in the historic 
ages she took in spite of those natural obstacles which the enterprise of her sons has 
now overcome.”509 In The Mont Cenis Tunnel, it is also pointed out how the tunnel 
makes it possible “to supersede those steep and circuitous mountain roads (…) by a new 
mode of entering Italy from the North which might be practicable at all seasons.”510 
This, it is assumed, “must be useful to Italy.”511 In a similar manner, the Illustrated 
London News refers to the Count of Cavour (who was the first Prime Minister of the 
United Kingdom of Italy) and Sir James Hudson (British ambassador to Turin in the 
mid-nineteenth century), both of whom were convinced that “the project of a railway 
tunnel through the Alpine barrier which shuts out Italy from the rest of the Continent 
[was] the surest way to solve the problem of Italian commercial and industrial 
regeneration.”512 
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The Times, moreover, is convinced that Spain had previously profited from intensified 
French influence made possible by means of a new railway line. Contemplating the 
future effects of the Mont Cenis Tunnel on Italy, the readers’ attention is therefore first 
of all drawn to the positive effects French impact has had on Spain:   
 French genius and energy have been the means of awakening [the Spanish] from the 
 torpor which has lain on them for generations. Spain is reviving intellectually under that 
 influence, and her material prosperity has advanced wonderfully since her capital and 
 the greater part of her large towns have been brought into easy communication with 
 Paris.
513
 
Accordingly, it is therefore assumed that the Mont Cenis Tunnel, facilitating access to 
the Italian peninsula, will initiate a similar process and that therefore, “Italy, long 
divided, and with a population almost equally unprogressive, [will be] similarly 
transformed.”514 These passages make clear that the Mont Cenis Tunnel is ascribed an 
enormous transformative power: once Italy’s geographic isolation is overcome – which, 
according to the passages cited, was the only reason for the country’s backwardness – 
by means of the railway tunnel, Italy will prosper. 
In the passages cited previously, the popular technologically determinist belief that 
technological developments and the improvement of humankind’s living condition are 
inextricably linked, is reflected. There appears to be an overwhelming consensus that 
modern transport and communication technologies will result in improvements in the 
various spheres of human activity. 
In contrast to such favourable comments, however, there are also critical voices, which 
do not only question the positive effects such modern channels of transport and 
communication would seemingly inevitably bring about, but also indicate that the 
nineteenth century was perhaps less progressive than modern technological 
achievements suggest. The Manchester Guardian points out that 
 [i]n speculative philosophy, in poetry, in the arts of sculpture and painting, in the 
 perfection and niceties of language, we can scarcely be said to have made any advance 
 for upwards of 2,000 years. Probably no instrument of thought and expression has 
 been or ever will be more perfect than Greek or Sanscrit: no poet will surpass Homer or 
 Sophocles; no thinker dive deeper than Plato or Phythagoras; no sculptor produce more 
 glorious marble conceptions than Phidias or Praxiteles. It may well be that David, and 
 Confucius, and Pericles were clothed as richly and comfortably as George III. or Louis 
 XVIII. and far more becomingly. There is every reason to believe that the dwellings of 
 the rich and great among the Romans, Greeks, and Babylonians were as luxurious and 
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 well appointed as our own, as well as incomparably more gorgeous and enduring. It is 
 certain that the palaces belonging to the nobles and monarchs of the Middle Ages – to 
 say nothing of abbeys, minsters, and temples – were in nearly all respect equal to those 
 erected in the present day, and in some important points far superior.
515
 
Admittedly, it is subsequently noted that in “many other equally significant and 
valuable particulars (…) the progress of the world [has] been not only concentrated into 
these latter days, but singularly spasmodic in its previous march;”516 nonetheless, the 
passage quoted before corresponds to Coleridge’ critique, according to which 
technological developments should not be the only gauge by which progress is 
measured.  
With reference to the Suez Canal, the Scotsman points out that 
 [a] work the same in object, though on a different scale, was executed by the ancients 
 about 2500 years ago, and existed for fifteen centuries. This brings the reflection that, 
 even in things material and mechanical, the progress of modern times and Western 
 countries has not been so enormous, compared with ancient times and with the East, as 
 is perhaps too universally and complacently assumed. Nor is there much comfort in the 
 knowledge that the work of the ancients went to ruin a thousand years ago, apparently 
 through the agency of human violence; for that, like many other things in the history of 
 the East, admonishes us that mankind may retrograde.
517
 
In this passage, too, the idea of steady progress and the superiority of the nineteenth-
century over previous eras is questioned. 
 
4.2 Playing God? Triumphs over Nature, Christian Beliefs and Human 
Omnipotence  
Along with these statements on the idea of progress and its manifestations in form of 
transport and communication technologies, the conviction that the subjugation of nature 
and the conquest of wilderness are fundamental preconditions for this found expression. 
Nature is frequently described as wild, dangerous and unpredictable. In an account of 
the laying of the 1858 cable, the Scotsman notes that  
 [t]he elements were adverse, and every freak of the winds, every lurch of the waves, 
 gave new cause of anxiety; monsters of the deep seemed ready to snap asunder by a flap 
 of fin or tail the slender wire with which man was so strangely invading their haunts.
518
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The Illustrated London News describes the Atlantic Ocean as “awe-inspiring”519 and 
considers the Alps to be a “sublime mountain scenery of aerial peaks and precipitous 
chasms, of roaring torrents and silent upper fields of snow.”520  
By means of scientific methods and technological devices, it is pointed out, this 
wilderness and the underlying principles could first be explored and understood, and 
subsequently restricted and harnessed. The Illustrated London News, reporting the 
opening of the Great Exhibition, remarks that in the course of the previous decades, 
“science [had begun] to feel her strength – to discover new worlds in nature for the 
exercise of her power and ingenuity.”521 Concerning the laying of the 1866 transatlantic 
cable, the same magazine depicts scientific exploration and technological innovations as 
tools at mankind’s disposal, by means of which nature is tamed: 
 We are dumb with amazement at the extent to which the most secret laws of nature 
 have been made available to man’s intelligence for man’s progress; and, looking at the 
 mastery which has been obtained within the last half century over her most mysterious 
 and invisible powers, and at the beneficent uses to which they have been made 
 subservient, we are much more disposed to wonder over the past than to be incredulous 
 about the future.
522
 
Accordingly, both the construction and launch of the various transport and 
communication technologies, on the one hand, and the scientific findings informing 
them, on the other, are considered to be victories gained by mankind and are described 
correspondingly: in relation to the Great Eastern, it is noted that “[t]he very elements 
and powers of nature seem to have revolted against her only to be conquered and 
brought into subjection.”523 The laying of the transatlantic cables of 1858 and 1866, 
respectively, and the Indian submarine cable are referred to as “scientific victory,”524 
“triumph of energy and science,”525 “scientific and commercial triumph,”526 “the most 
marvellous triumph of mind over matter, of man over nature,”527 “the most wonderful 
achievement of this victorious century”528 and “one of the greatest of man’s triumphs 
                                                          
519
 “The Anglo-American Telegraph,” Illustrated London News, 4 August 1866, 101.  
520
 “The New Overland Route and the Railway Tunnel of the Alps,” Illustrated London News, 13 
February 1869, 166. 
521
 “The Great Exhibition,” Illustrated London News, 3 May 1851, 343. 
522
 “The Anglo-American Telegraph,” Illustrated London News, 4 August 1866, 101.  
523
 “The ‘Great Eastern’,” Illustrated London News, 17 September 1859, 263.  
524
 “The Whole Civilised World,” Illustrated London News, 7 August 1858, 124. 
525
 “The Enthusiastic Manner,” Illustrated London News, 28 August 1858, 193.  
526
 “The Atlantic Cable,” Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, 5 August 1866, 1.  
527
 “The Atlantic Telegraph,” Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, 7 October 1866, 2.  
528
 “The Success of the Atlantic Cable,” The Times, 30 July 1866, 8. 
114 
 
over the forces of nature.”529 The procedure of laying out the 1866 cable is accordingly 
styled a “battle (…) fairly won.”530 The Liverpool Mercury considers it “refreshing to 
turn from the turmoil of European wars and domestic strife to the calm and majestic 
triumphs which science achieves in the common interest of humanity and 
civilisation.”531 Around two months later, it is pointed out that  
 [t]he completion of the Atlantic Telegraph will ever be remembered as one of the very 
 greatest triumphs that scientific enterprise has achieved even in an age fruitful beyond 
 all example in victories of mind over material nature. The difficulties to be surmounted,
 if not absolutely new in kind, were altogether unprecedented in magnitude, and might 
 well have seemed hopelessly insuperable to the most daring of scientific innovators. 
532
 
It is further emphasized that  
 there is a two-fold victory to celebrate. The successful laying down of the new cable 
 is even a less marvellous exploit than the second and more difficult half of the 
 enterprise (…). The picking up of the old line from the depths of the ocean, whence no 
 treasure-trove was ever rescued before, and the completion of the work which was last 
 year arrested by a seemingly irretrievable casualty, will always rank among the most 
 astonishing triumphs of human skill and perseverance under difficulties.
533 
What is particularly important is that the laying of the transatlantic cable is a “pacific 
victory over material obstacles”534 [my italics] and thus stands in stark contrast to other 
contemporary events:  
 And there is no drawback to the satisfaction with which we celebrate such conquests as 
 these. When Berlin welcomed home the victors of Sadowa, the festivities of jubilant 
 patriotism must have been a little marred by the thought of devastated fields and ruined 
 cities, and the terrible lists of killed and wounded, and the widows and orphans to whom 
 public rejoicing means private mourning. But the triumphs of science over nature are 
 pure and unmixed. There was no skeleton at Monday’s banquet. In this campaign the 
 gain of one is the gain of all, and the victors are free to enjoy their victory without any 
 disturbing thoughts of the price which humanity has paid for it. 
535
 
In a similar manner as the various telegraph cables, the Mont Cenis Tunnel is referred to 
as an “abiding conquest of human intelligence and energy over the stupendous natural 
obstacles,” 536  “great victory (…) gained by science,” 537  “triumph of science over 
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difficulties”538 and “even a subjugation of the elements, inasmuch as the waters of the 
Alps were utilized for the purpose of compressing the air, and the air thus compressed 
was made available for blasting the rock.”539 The role of science and technology as tools 
for the subjugation of nature and the animal world is also illustrated in the following 
master-servant-analogy. Reporting the exhibits Britain presents at the Crystal Palace, it 
is remarked “how, with steam as her handmaid, she (…) navigates the ocean, and 
outruns the swiftest animals in her course.”540 Besides, the Great Exhibition is depicted 
as display of “triumphs of human skill.”541 
Furthermore, in this context it becomes apparent how attempts were made to reconcile 
contemporary scientific insights with established Christian belief. This was done by 
pointing out that these accomplishments or ‘triumphs’, to use the language of the time, 
were evidence of mankind fulfilling its divine predestination. The Times, with regard to 
potential critics of the Great Eastern, who might argue “that the sea was a providential 
appointment” and that “[man] had no right to unite what GOD [sic] had separated, and 
connect land with land when the Divine power had inserted water between,” 542 
accordingly notes that  
 [w]e have long seen the weakness of this argument, and arrived at a much better 
 doctrine of final causes than this. But, if any one wants to see a good finishing blow 
 given to the Horatian argument (…) he may see it given by the Great Eastern. That 
 mighty fabric indeed does not talk, but it acts, - its act being a months’ voyage to India 
 or to Australia. That act, while it is a speechless, is at the same time the most powerful 
 answer, that the religious scruples (…) could receive. A reflecting mind will see in such 
 a voyage a much more natural, proper, wise, and obedient fulfillment of the designs of 
 PROVIDENCE [sic] than any timid self-confinement and servile deference to a barrier 
 of nature would have been. It will appear that the sea was made to alternate with the dry 
 land, not that continents might be disconnected, but that man should have the 
 opportunity of exerting  his skill and invention in connecting them.
543
 
Concerning the laying of the transatlantic cable of 1866, the Times takes a similar line 
and directly refers to Genesis 1:28,
544
 declaring that the transatlantic cable “cannot fail 
to lead to a great advance in the development of human dominion over nature. It may be 
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expected to prove an important step in that work of ‘replenishing the earth and subduing 
it’ which remains, as it has always been, the great task of mankind.”545 
Similarly, in Poles, Wires, and Cables, a book-length publication in which the author 
engages with what he himself calls the ‘Christian Aspects’ of electric telegraphy, the 
electric telegraph is described as a “special means which, under Providence, is afforded 
us by science.”546  
This emphasis on divine providence, due to which man was enabled, if not even obliged, 
to subdue nature, however, was only one way to intertwine the seemingly contradictory 
tendencies; moreover, Christian world views were also embraced by highlighting the 
role God was assumed to have played in the development and implementation of these 
technologies. In the Visitor’s Guide to the Great Eastern, the fact that the construction 
of such a ship could not be accomplished by means of the knowledge and capability of a 
single person is alluded to repeatedly; instead, as is pointed out several times, a work of 
such magnitude rests upon the research that has previously been carried out by a 
multitude of scientists, and the joint expertise of numerous engineers. Accordingly, it is 
argued that “it seems to be a law of God’s Providence that no great invention is to be the 
work of one man.” Contemplating the reasons for this, the readers are told that  
 whether He would have us learn how essentially gregarious he has made us, – how 
 absolutely dependant every one upon every other for whatever we enjoy, or whether He 
 does not think it good that any one man should appropriate the whole merit, lest in our 
 gratitude to him we forget the real Giver of the blessing in question, – Him who giveth 
 us power to get wealth.
547
 
The Illustrated London News, relating to the laying of the transatlantic cable of 1866, 
emphasizes that  
 [g]ratitude quickly follows astonishment. We are thankful to the Supreme for having 
 kept under control countless possibilities latent in that vast region much of which lies 
 beyond the ken, and all of which is beyond the dominion of human science, whereby, at 
 any moment, the enterprise might have been baffled.
548
   
In a similar manner, Lloyds Weekly Newspaper, reporting the inauguration of the Mont 
Cenis Tunnel, points to the speech held by the French minister, in which he had 
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declared that the “success of the work was due in the first degree to God, who inspired 
men with the thoughts out of which such undertakings sprung.”549 
Along with passages seeking to establish a relationship between traditional Christian 
beliefs and recent technological developments, there are those where scientific and 
technological innovations are depicted as proof of human omnipotence. In this respect, 
the following extract from the Scotsman is particularly interesting. With regard to the 
Suez Canal, it is declared that  
 [in] this enterprise, sea has been made land – and land has been made sea. The 
 arrangements of nature have been reversed; man has said to the sea, Thus far shalt thou 
 come, and thus far shalt thou go back – and for once he has been obeyed.550 
This is nothing less than a celebration of the creative power of man, who, by means of 
his scientific and technological expertise, is able to modify landscape and shape it in a 
seemingly arbitrary manner: sea can be made land and vice versa. The subsequent 
phrase “Thus far shalt thou come”, in turn, is a reference to the Book of Job: Job was a 
righteous and affluent man, until he lost all his possessions, his children and his 
physical health. Contrary to his wife’s request, however, Job neither denounced God nor 
accused Him of injustice, but merely asked for an explanation. Finally, God spoke to 
Job and declared that Creation was a divine prerogative. Chapter 38, vs. 8 – 11 read as 
follows:  
 Or who shut in the sea with doors when it burst out from the womb, when I made 
 clouds its garment and thick darkness its swaddling band, and prescribed limits for it 
 and set bars and doors, and said, ‘Thus far shall you come, and no farther, and here shall 
 your proud waves be stayed.’551 
On the one hand, the Bible passage referred to in the Scotsman is yet another indication 
of the extent to which the Scripture was common cultural currency to the Victorians.
552
 
Here, however, it is not only man’s special role in Creation that is stressed in order to 
justify the subordination of nature; rather, by means of this reference to the Book of Job, 
man himself is ascribed a godlike status on the basis of his ability to transform his 
environment by means of technology. The uncovering of nature’s ‘secrets‘ and the 
expertise to conceive, build, and operate a technological work the size of the Suez Canal 
is presented as the acquisition of seemingly unlimited power over nature.   
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In a similar manner, the Illustrated London News, reporting the preparations for the 
Great Eastern’s maiden voyage and referring to the ship’s enormous size, remarks that 
“it was as if [the spectators] were looking for an illustration of the miracle to be 
performed by the man with a mustard-seed of faith, that he should say unto the 
mountain ‘Be removed into the sea,’ and that it should be so.”553 Man’s ability to exert 
control over a ship the size of the Great Eastern is emphasized by reference to a passage 
from the Bible (in this case, Matthew 17:20).
554
 
Even though there is no reference to the subjugation of nature, a similar text passage in 
the Visitor’s Guide to the Great Eastern is worthy of mention. Here – in contrast to the 
passage from the book cited earlier, in which the role of divine providence for the 
development of the ship has been pointed out – the godlike status man achieves by 
means of technology is illustrated: “[g]azing on the colossal monuments of skill which 
meet the eye in every direction (…), we are almost led to think ‘the gods are come down 
to us in the likeness of men‘.” Furthermore, it is claimed that “[t]his is an age of 
admiration, when Gods walk the earth, or beings more than men.”555  
Such notions of the subordination of nature and the primacy of science and technology 
do not always go unchallenged. After the explosions aboard the Great Eastern, the 
Illustrated London News remarks that “the docile and obedient Steam – an admirable 
slave, but a fearful master – was outraged in the laws of its existence by (…) neglect or 
ignorance.”556 Reporting the “trial trip of the Great Eastern”557 a few weeks later, the 
same magazine notices that despite its enormous size, the ship is, after all, subject to the 
whims of the sea:  
 Those persons who have indulged the notion that the vessel will be as free from pitching 
 and rolling as a railway upon the solid ground have somewhat underrated the power of a 
 vast body of water in motion. If the ship were ten times her present size, so long as she 
 floats, she must obey the rise and fall of the water. She may defy the smaller ripples 
 upon the surface which may toss a wherry; but there are ‘Great Easterns’ among the 
 waters of the Channel and the Atlantic which will compel the biggest ship to dip her 
 head and own their superior power.
558
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Similarly, an article on the Mont Cenis Tunnel published in the Scotsman questions the 
seeming omnipotence and permanence of technology: It is assumed that the tunnel is 
going to be very useful for the time being and in the near future, but certainly not 
forever: “Months, nay years, may roll on; the East may for all our time communicate 
with the West through the tunnel;”559 subsequently, the readers are warned for potential 
‘retaliation’ that will take place at some undetermined point in the future: 
 [B]ut some day or other an avalanche will laugh at all precautions, a slip of rock will
 destroy the results of all this great labour for a time, and human beings and rolling stock 
 will be hurled thousands of feet into ravines to see which is to become dizzy.
560
  
Despite such objections, enthusiasm for the technologies in question predominates the 
items under consideration. Accordingly, aspects of the technological sublime are 
touched upon. Concerning the Great Exhibition, the Times asserts that “[it] was natural 
that such an event should be regarded by all who witnessed it with no ordinary degree of 
emotion.”561 The Great Eastern is described as an “epic of iron, a sublime embodiment 
of the might and majesty of England.”562 Similarly, the Illustrated London News notes 
that “[t]here is an epic sublimity in all that relates to her,”563 and further remarks that 
spectators on shore are feeling “a throbbing and an anxious interest in the career of the 
vessel.”564 In relation to the soon to be opened Suez Canal, the Illustrated London News 
claims in March 1869 that  
 [i]t is impossible to contemplate this magnificent achievement without emotion. Not 
 only does it excite our sense of admiration, but it suggests thoughts and stirs feelings, 
 and awakens hopes, all of which carry us into the far future, and connect themselves 
 with the progressive development of the human race.
565
 
In these passages, it is first and foremost positive feelings of hope and admiration that 
are being evoked. The Visitor’s Guide to the Great Eastern, by contrast, also alludes to 
the way in which technology could be intimidating: 
 You are struck with amazement when, for the first time, you obtain a view of it; it is 
 impossible to measure the astonishment that overwhelms you as you look upon its 
 immensity. Gazing upon this unrivalled triumph of science, one feels as by a magic 
 hand rivetted and enchained to the spot, - the heart beats, the bosom heaves, a thrilling 
 sensation steals over the frame; her enormous proportions gradually fill the eye, which 
 brightens with excitement, and we feel an overwhelming sense of man’s corporeal 
 insignificancy, mingled with a proud consciousness of his mental powers, such as we 
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 experienced when we for the first time stood and wonderingly looked upon that 
 magnificent structure – The Britannia Tubular Bridge which spans the Mighty Straits. 
 Whatever different tastes may have prevailed in determining the character of this 
 metallic monster, all writers have been unanimous in their admiration.
566
 
Again, the first feelings being described are ones of amazement, astonishment and 
excitement, yet it is also pointed out that the Great Eastern, despite being a “human 
enterprise,”567 illustrates man’s “corporeal insignificancy.”568 Setting foot on the ship, 
the feelings of fear and intimidation are, according to the article, intensified, as that is 
when one becomes aware of its enormous dimensions:  
 The bulwarks rise breast high all round the ship, and the skylights enable the spectator 
 to look down into the engine-room, and see the greatest mechanical power in the world 
 in easy experimental motion. Looking down her shafts you are looking as it were down 
 a mine. The workmen engaged at the furnaces below are dwarfed to the size of children. 
 The engines (…) seem as if they could never be set in motion, or if set in motion, like 
 Frankenstein’s Demon could never be stopped.569 
In comparison to the size and performance of the Great Eastern, man is depicted as 
insignificant and childlike. Moreover, the allusion to Frankenstein’s monster and the 
apprehension that once started, the ship cannot be brought under control again, indicate 
that contemporaries felt there was some threat emanating from the ship.  
Subsequently, however, it is pointed out that no such threat emanates from the Great 
Eastern, for “so finely wrought and balanced are [the engines] that the machinery works 
with the same ease and precision, and can be moved or stopped with the same facility, 
as that of the smallest of our river boats.”570 Despite its frightening dimensions, the ship 
is, after all, subject to human control.  
 
4.3 Chapter Summary  
This chapter set out to examine the extent to which nineteenth-century transport and 
communication technologies were considered to epitomize progress and human 
subjugation of nature. It also aimed at pointing up the ways in which these technologies 
were embedded in historical, social and cultural contexts and the reasons for this.  
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Generally speaking, in line with the optimistic view that science and technology would 
improve humankind’s living conditions, contemporary transport and communication 
technologies were mostly evaluated positively. They were described as symbols of the 
progressiveness of the nineteenth century, on the one hand, and were considered to be 
an epitome of human power over nature and, accordingly, a paradigm of man’s special 
position within divine creation, on the other. For this purpose, and in order to acquaint 
the public with them, they were juxtaposed and compared to a wide spectrum of 
references, including, among other things, biblical imagery, achievements of the 
advanced civilizations of ancient Egypt and Greece, or the expeditions of Columbus and 
other explorers. In doing so, it was possible to represent them as conclusion of long-
lasting processes of development and point up their specific superiority at the same time.  
Despite this seemingly widespread consensus, though, there are critical voices to be 
found very occasionally which draw attention to the fact that technological 
developments should not be the only benchmark to judge society and call into question 
the seeming omnipotence.  
In the following chapter, I will look into the notion of the annihilation of time and space, 
which I argue is to be seen in the context of the alleged human omnipotence.   
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    “Space-time was like butter, she thought, driving fast, 
     and this car the warm knife slicing through it.”571 
 
5. The Annihilation of Time and Space? Changing Perceptions of 
Time, Space and Distance 
In 2009, the Norwegian shipping company Colorline introduced what it called 
superspeed ferry boats shuttling between Denmark and Norway; these ships being faster 
than ordinary ferry boats, the duration of the passage was reduced drastically. The 
Norwegian tourist information Visit Norway therefore advertised that “Norway is 
moving closer.”572 
In January 2012, the German daily newspaper taz published an article on the 
construction of a high-speed railway line connecting London with the north of the 
country which had just been approved by the British government. The article was titled 
“Leeds is moving closer to Paris.”573 
And with regard to the French high-speed trains TGV, Eurail, the company selling 
European rail tickets, remarked on its homepage that “[t]he Northern high-speed line 
has brought Northern France and Europe closer to the rest of France.”574 
All of these statements allude to the degree to which in the early twenty-first century, 
our perceptions of space and distance are informed and shaped by means of the 
respective media and channels of transportation at hand, be it a ferryboat, a train, or a 
car. They all suggest that, with the right means of travel at one’s disposal, faraway 
places move closer, distances shrink and spaces can thus be remodelled according to our 
needs and desires.  
It is hardly surprising that this is not solely a twenty-first century phenomenon: As has 
been pointed out in the introductory chapter, the ways in which nineteenth-century 
technologies “created distinctive new modes of thinking about and experiencing time 
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and space”575 has received persistent scholarly attention. One of these new modes of 
thinking, summarized under the slogan ‘annihilation of time and space’, 576  can be 
attributed to the newly introduced transport and communication technologies. The 
notion that one could annihilate either time or space is nonsensical
577
 (particularly given 
the fact that the worldwide telegraph network necessitated the establishment of 
standardized time zones on a global level),
578
 but the idea nonetheless vividly illustrates 
the fact that, with improving means of transport and communication at hand (in other 
words, media which are either faster or more reliable than the previous ones, or of an 
entirely different quality), the significance of geographic space and distance as a 
variable within the communication function previously mentioned decreases.  
In this chapter I will therefore examine the interconnection between nineteenth-century 
transport and communication technologies, on the one hand, and contemporaries’ 
perceptions of time, space and distance, and their supposed annihilation, on the other. I 
will illustrate that the catchphrase of the annihilation of time and space can be highly 
misleading, in the sense that it implies a naive and simplistic way of thinking about this 
relation. I maintain it can best be understood if regarded as a hyperbole that tells us 
more about contemporaries’ determination to subjugate nature and their “almost 
unlimited will to power and transcendence over [her] limitations,”579  than about an 
incomprehension of changing spatiotemporal arrangements on their part. A critical 
reading of relevant reporting will demonstrate that new transport and communication 
technologies did indeed influence contemporaries’ perceptions of time and space; it will 
also be seen, however, that there was a deeper understanding of such phenomena, which 
went beyond the claim that time and space had been abolished and can be said to 
anticipate present-day analyses.  
Firstly, however, it is necessary to appraise various conceptions of space and distance, 
respectively, and to look at the interplay between technologies of transport and 
communication, and perceptions of time, space and distance. 
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5.1 Of Coexisting Spaces and Distance Paradoxes 
In everyday usage, space is usually considered a given fact, a datum one takes for 
granted and thus hardly ever examines or questions. Similarly, as the idea of space used 
to be routinely ascribed to the discipline of geography, on the one hand, and was 
deemed immobile, if not ‘dead’, and thus hardly of any interest anyway,580 on the other, 
most social sciences and humanities have for long neglected space as an analytical 
category (a circumstance usually referred to as ‘space blindness’581).  
In recent times, this has dramatically changed: in line with Foucault’s assumption that 
the present epoch may “above all [be] the epoch of space,”582 space-related questions 
are now attracting attention in a multitude of social sciences and humanities 
disciplines,
583
 a phenomenon contained within the expression ‘spatial turn’. 584  The 
emergence of mobile communication devices and the spread of the internet from the 
mid-1990s onwards, both making place, to borrow Giddens’ words, “increasingly 
phantasmagoric,” 585  have certainly promoted scholarly interest in space-related 
questions: in the age of mobile telephony, for instance, it is no longer necessary to know 
a person’s whereabouts in order to reach him or her on the phone.586 Social networking 
sites make it possible to share thoughts, pictures and other content with family and 
friends (almost) irrespective of their location. And programs such as Google Earth with 
its various functions (Google Street View, for instance), enable users to ‘look around’ 
and familiarize themselves with places at the other end of the world.  
Accordingly, Stanley Brunn and Thomas Leinbach point out that someone’s actual 
geographic location is no longer of primary importance; it is the connectivity or the 
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relative location – that is, “how far one is from other places in time not in absolute 
distance, and how much one is connected with other places” 587  – that has become 
increasingly significant and has inspired researchers from different disciplines to 
develop new concepts to embrace this. One of these new concepts are Manuel Castells’ 
elaborations on what he calls the space of flows and the space of places, respectively. 
The term space of flows denotes “the material organization of simultaneous social 
interaction at a distance by networking communication, with the technological support 
of telecommunications, interactive communication systems, and fast transportation 
technologies.”588 This space of flows stands in contrast to the so-called space of places: 
the tangible reality surrounding people in their everyday life, which has traditionally 
been the primary form of spatial organization.
589
 What is important to note here is that 
space of flows and space of places coexist. Castells emphasizes that the space of flows is 
the dominant spatial logic of information society; he makes also clear, though, that it is 
not the only one, for “people do still live in places.”590 [my italics] This coexistence of 
spaces must be the starting point if we want to unravel the interconnection between 
transport and communication technologies and perceptions of space and distance.  
To this end, Martina Löw’s relational model of space as set out in her monograph on the 
sociology of space is worthy of attention. It can help us understand that the phenomenon 
of coexisting spaces is not intrinsically related to the information and communication 
technologies spreading from the late twentieth century onwards, but has had its 
historical predecessors (it does not, in fact, have to be related to technologies of 
transport, communication or information at all). To begin with, Löw points to traditional, 
historically-rooted models of space.
591
 She dwells on the notion of absolute space, that 
is the idea of space as a container or a box, which can be traced back to ancient Greek 
philosophy and was drawn upon by Newton in his definition of absolute space as “in its 
own nature, without relation to anything external, (…) always similar and 
immovable.”592 Here, space is regarded as a container which encloses objects and within 
which social processes unfold. It is thus considered a stage which would still exist even 
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if devoid of any elements within. Our everyday understanding of space is still to a large 
extent shaped by this idea of absolute space, but, as Löw points out, it is not particularly 
useful for sociological analysis as space is considered to exist independent of any social 
activity.
593
 Leibniz, on the other hand, opposed this idea of space existing independently 
of any objects, instead considering it to be “the abstract order of coexisting things.”594 
Space is thus understood to be nothing but the relative connection between objects.  
Contrary to the models of space mentioned above, Löw holds the opinion that, from a 
sociological point of view, space can neither be reduced to the status of a container nor 
to a purely relative order of things. In her attempt to develop a new sociological 
understanding of space, she therefore defines space as “relational ordering of social 
goods and people.”595 Löw assumes a duality of space, the fundamental idea of which is 
that space does not simply ‘exist’, but is constructed by means of actions, which, in turn, 
are either facilitated or confined by spatial structures. As concerns the construction of 
space, she distinguishes two procedures: spacing, that is the “situating of social goods 
and people and/or the positioning of primarily symbolic markings in order to render 
ensembles of goods and people recognizable as such,” and synthesis, which means the 
creation of connections between such goods and people through “processes of 
perception, ideation, or recall.”596  
At this point, the coexistence of many different spaces comes into play: if space is 
defined as the abovementioned relational arrangement of (human) beings and social 
goods, it is obvious that there cannot only be one space, but that, according to the 
specific interest, concern or question at hand, a variety of spaces can be constituted. In 
this context, Wenzlhuemer points out that, while geographic space – a spatial 
conception in which the relationship among objects is determined by geographic 
distance only – has traditionally played a most critical role with regard to how we 
perceive and handle our environment, there have always been complementary concepts, 
such as (what he refers to as) communication space, transport space or telephone cost 
space.
597
 These spaces have always been informed and shaped by the respective 
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interests and questions of the observer. In the case of so-called communication space, 
for instance, the crucial question is how much time is needed in order to communicate 
between two objects.
598
 With present-day information and communication media at 
hand, geographic distance is no longer of primary explanatory power in this context, 
and other factors, such as network access, have become more important. Wenzlhuemer 
therefore recommends we think of space “as a theoretically infinite number of 
spaces.”599  
As “[o]ur sense of space and time is closely linked to our sense of distance, of what is 
near and what is far away,” 600  [italics in original] it is worthwhile to look at this 
phenomenon of the plurality of spaces from a slightly different vantage point, namely 
that of distance. Comparable to the coexistence of a multitude of various spaces, defined 
by the observer’s particular interests, there are also several forms of distance, which are 
similarly informed by the motives at stake. Dissatisfied with previous definitions of 
absolute and relative distances, which they consider “ambiguous and imprecise,”601 Falk 
and Abler seek to integrate the alterations of distance generated by intercommunications 
media into geographical thinking. For this purpose, they propose a different terminology 
and distinguish between three different types of distance: firstly, globe distances, that is 
“the number of abstract units of length between places;”602 secondly, effort distances, 
being the “number of effort units consumed in moving from one place to another,”603 
and thirdly, metaphorical distances, measuring the number of contacts between 
particular places in a specific period.
604
 They assert that  
[v]arious relationships among globe, effort, and metaphorical distances create many 
distance paradoxes. Whereas two places may be in close proximity in globe distance, 
they may be far apart in terms of effort or metaphorical distances.
605
 [italics in original] 
A vivid example of this is the city of Berlin during the Cold War, East and West Berlin 
being very near to one another in terms of globe distance, but much further apart when 
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it comes to effort or metaphorical distance.
606
 It seems obvious then, that this can also 
be reversed – places that are comparatively far apart in terms of globe distance can be 
much closer as regards effort or metaphorical distances (for instance, as pointed to 
above, if they are sufficiently integrated into transport and communication networks). 
Another example illustrating the shifting relations between globe and effort distances is 
the time it takes to travel from the East to the West Coast of the United States of 
America, depending on what means of travel there are at one’s disposal. Whereas one 
will need around 8 months to cross the continent on horseback, it takes only two and a 
half days by car and a mere 5 hours by airplane
607
 – the globe distance remains the same, 
yet the effort distance is changing.  
One can therefore conclude that not only are our notions of space and distance linked, 
but also that “our sense of distance is shaped profoundly by the means at our disposal to 
move through space and time.”608  Falk and Abler assert that indeed all movement 
technologies, as they call them, in one way or another have an impact on effective 
distances among places, as they all modify the effort it takes to transfer things, (human) 
beings and information between these places; communication technologies, however, 
are considered to be of paramount importance in this context as they “have altered the 
frictions of distance more radically than any other technology.”609  
At this point, it is therefore worthwhile to have a closer look at the electric telegraph: As 
described earlier, the electric telegraph and the dematerialization of information flows it 
brought about confounded the previously valid communication equation to such an 
extent that geographic distance was no longer the most important variable. Accordingly, 
with the emergence of electric telegraphy “a new, virtual space in which established 
distances and limitations of time were suspended [had been created].” 610  So-called 
global communication space was “partially compressed,”611 [italics in original] whereas 
the structure of geographic space remained unchanged. Using the example of the 
development of the global telegraph network throughout the second half of the 
nineteenth century, it will become clear how this impacted on changing perceptions of 
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time, space and distance.
612
 Whereas in 1850, “global communication space [was] still 
closely related to geographic space,”613 [italics in original] by 1870 the situation had 
changed already. By then the telegraphic connections to both North America and South 
Asia had been put into place, and as a result communication space between these 
regions and Europe had been partially compressed, or, to put it differently, effort and 
metaphorical distance had decreased decisively. Other regions, on the contrary, such as 
South America and Africa, had not been integrated into the network to the same extent; 
Despite the fact that their absolute communication times had diminished, neither had 
communication space been compressed significantly nor had effort or metaphorical 
distance been reduced decisively. The improvements that had been made were not 
sufficient to change the structure of communication space or to impact on the relation 
between globe and effort distance. Again thirty years later, in 1900, with an even more 
comprehensive network, the antipodes of Australia and New Zealand were integrated to 
such a degree that, in terms of effort and metaphorical distance, they were closer to 
London than – strictly geographically-speaking – more proximate places in North 
America or Europe. Wenzlhuemer consequently concludes that “communication space 
had detached itself almost completely from geographic space.”614 [italics in original] 
Availing oneself of the electric telegraph for the purpose of long-distance 
communication, one could now ‘skip’ geographic space, as Ahrens, referring to the 
virtual space created by the internet, aptly calls it.
615
 
As mentioned, Falk and Abler consider communication technologies to be of paramount 
importance, but they point out that all technologies of movement play a role in this 
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context. As regards railways, this is mostly due to their sheer speed. Similar to 
communication space, transport space had been partially compressed, even if not to the 
same extent: clearly, there was no equivalent to the dematerialization of information 
flows, for ‘real’ people still travelled in ‘real’ (that is, geographic) space, which could 
not be ‘skipped’ by means of transport technologies to the same degree as by electric 
communication technologies. Nonetheless, the relation between globe, effort and 
metaphorical distance was transformed. What is more, the speed with which people 
themselves (rather than messages they sent) travelled on railways allowed for new ways 
of experiencing the environment and landscapes they were riding through; as a result, 
they could at least get the impression that the space which used to separate places, had 
ceased to exist.
616
  
In a nutshell, changing perceptions of time, space and distance can be traced to the 
divergence of various coexisting spaces, shaped and informed by different parameters, 
and shifting relations between different types of distances. In this context, nineteenth-
century transport and communication technologies played a most important role.  
What is more, the more pronounced such discrepancies between various spaces and 
distances turn out, the more challenging it is to accommodate them with previously 
valid notions. Löw accordingly points to metaphors such as ‘data highway’ and ‘global 
village’, which attempt to reconcile present-day distance paradoxes with familiar spatial 
concepts.
617
 The following analysis of relevant coverage will thus illustrate how 
contemporaries made sense of and voiced the shifting relations between time and space, 
which imagery they employed and what role the slogan of the ‘annihilation of time and 
space’ played in this context. 
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5.2 Less Than No Time – Representations of Spatiotemporal Transformations 
in the Victorian Press 
In the course of three weeks towards the end of the year 1869, the Times publishes 
several correlating articles and letters to the editor, all of which address the integration 
of Australia into the global telegraph network. Starting point of this intensive 
examination is an article published in late November 1869 – that is three years after the 
transatlantic submarine cable had become operational, yet still three years before a 
telegraphic connection to Australia would be established – which first and foremost 
addresses the potential formation of a remount service between Australia and India. The 
article dwells on the benefits this would bring to the Indian army, and in this connection 
points out that “Australia is now, owing to recent exploration and settlement, some 
1,800 miles nearer to India than it was ten years ago, and before long the two countries 
will be in direct telegraphic communication.”618 Two weeks later, the Times publishes a 
letter in which a reader, referring to this article, takes up the subject of the establishment 
of a telegraphic cable to the Antipodes; he declares that  
 [a]mong the many plans submitted to the public for knitting closer the connexion 
 [sic] between the Mother Country and the Australian dependencies I know none 
 so likely to accomplish the end as telegraphic communication; for then the 
 misconceptions which distance  and time now only exaggerate will be few and far 
 between, and, to use a modern phrase, be preventible. 
619
 
The reader then contemplates why British emigrants preferred the United States over 
Australia as a country of settlement. He comes to the conclusion that the reason for this 
is to be found in the better developed means of communication between Europe and 
North America, as therefore “the United States, apparently, are close at hand, and 
Australia, apparently, is far away.” 620  He consequently argues that “[t]he great 
drawback to emigration to Australia and New Zealand has been the idea of distance.”621 
Dwelling on the effects the establishment of telegraphic communication with Australia 
might have, he asserts that  
 as soon as (…) the mind of the nation can be brought into frequent contact with their 
 fellow countrymen in the antipodes by reading in the newspapers every morning the 
 telegraphic summary of occurrences in those colonies, this idea of distance will,  
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 little by little, melt away until at last a voyage to Australia will be thought as trifling 
 as a trip to the Channel Islands.
622
 
He assumes that, as a result, an increasing number of British emigrants would choose 
Australia rather than the United States as their country of settlement.   
The following day, in an editorial addressing precisely this letter, the author agrees with 
the sender in that the distance between the United States and Great Britain seems to 
have diminished since the transatlantic submarine cable was established.  
 When we placed before the public the Message of President GRANT [sic] within a few 
 hours of its delivery, it was a natural reflection that the Old and New Worlds could 
 no longer be regarded as two thousand miles apart, and we have since published a 
 remarkable appeal, based upon impressions exactly similar.
623
 
He further remarks that “[a]s things now stand, Australia is, so to speak, like a town 
beyond reach of railways,” (thus illustrating the extent to which by then a place’s 
integration into existing railway infrastructure had become an important gauge) and 
points to the    
 considerable reality about this distinction [between the United States and 
 Australia]. It is one thing to run across the Atlantic, and another to set sail for the 
 Antipodes. One thing is done every week, and in little more than the week; the other 
 still implies a troublesome and protracted voyage. 
624
 
The author comes back to the sender’s argument that “all this is matter less of fact than 
of impression, and that if we could but report Australian news as we reported the 
PRESIDENT’S [sic] Message one country would soon come to be thought of as near as 
the other.”625 Here, he particularly emphasizes   
 the singular stress laid on the effect of telegraphic communication. The thousands 
 of miles of sea which even by the new routes must still separate England from 
 Australia will (…) disappear altogether as soon as correspondence between the two
 countries is made a matter of hours and minutes. So forcible will be the impression 
 produced that the Antipodes will seem close at hand, and emigrants will seek the shores 
 of Australia instead of the backwoods of the United  States.
626
 
In conclusion, he demands to   
 [c]all Australia into use, and you will gain a new world. It can be done by the mere 
 machinery of a submarine cable. That line will effectually connect England with the 
 Antipodes, will annihilate distance, and, to crown the whole, will do much to prevent 
 misconception between Great Britain and her Colonies.
627
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Indeed, in globe distance North America is much closer to Europe than the Antipodes, 
and, generally speaking, the journey across the Atlantic Ocean is even today far less 
troublesome and time-consuming than that to Australia and New Zealand. As has been 
pointed out in the passages above, however, with submarine cables between North 
America and Europe now being operational, whereas those to Australia had not yet been 
laid, the North American continent appears to have moved even closer. This example 
therefore aptly illustrates how reduced effort and metaphorical distances impact on the 
perception of globe distance. At the same time, these passages also illustrate that both 
reader and author were fully aware of such distance paradoxes brought about by electric 
telegraphy and contemplated how one could make use of them: as is pointed out, the 
“idea of distance will (…) melt away” [my italics] as soon as submarine cables 
connecting Australia with the global telegraph network will be laid, making the 
Antipodes a more attractive destination for emigrants.  
Admittedly, the annihilation of distance is made mention of (just as the “thousands of 
miles of sea” are said to “disappear”). Given the fact that the passages quoted above 
display a good understanding for distance paradoxes brought about by electric 
telegraphy, it would seem that the slogan of the annihilation of distance is only drawn 
upon in order to summarize the previous considerations brought forward by reader and 
reporter. Here, the use of the term annihilation therefore does not indicate a lack of 
understanding or insight; instead, it seems to be employed in the same way that today’s 
spatial metaphors (such as that of the global village) are used, that is, in order to make 
the spatial transformations brought about by transport and communication technologies 
more easily understandable.  
The following text passages similarly suggest that the phrase of the annihilation of time 
and space does not necessarily imply a lack of understanding concerning spatial 
transformations, but rather illustrate that it was used as a hyperbole, pinpointing the 
significance of the various technological achievements. Reporting the arrival of the 
Sirius and the Great Western in New York in April 1838, for instance, the Manchester 
Guardian observes that 
 [t]he day seems to have been quite a gala to the citizens; and the papers are filled with 
 facts, speculations, and ‘guesses,’ arising out of the event, which one of them 
 describes as ‘The beginning of the new age in steam power – the broad Atlantic  bridged 
 at last – annihilation of space and time.’628 
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Similarly, early in 1857, when the first expedition to lay a transatlantic submarine cable 
slowly took shape, the Times enthusiastically asserts that  
 it will always be a pleasant thought that we are able to annihilate distance, and make 
 Time, who flies so fast, a dull laggard. That imaginary period, which in our jokes 
 we have styled ‘less than no time’ will become an actual fact.629 
With regard to the temporarily working transatlantic cable of 1858, the Illustrated 
London News claims in the aftermath of its inauguration that “thousands of miles are as 
nothing to its speed, its continuity, and its completeness,”630 and even publishes a poem 
on the occasion, the beginning of which reads: “Distance, dim tradition of the past / 
Worn out idea, too absurd to last / Shall bar no more the enterprise of man, / Nor Time 
compress his efforts to a span.”631 The Liverpool Mercury asserts that by means of the 
1858 cable, “[w]e have already annihilated half the distance that severs us from our 
newest colony beyond the Rocky Mountains.”632 
However, it was not only abstract categories of time and space that were thought of as 
having been annihilated, but also concrete objects. Once more with regard to the 1858 
transatlantic cable, the Illustrated London News refers to Louis XIV’s comment “the 
Pyreness are no more” (allegedly made with reference to his wedding to Maria Theresa 
of Spain
633
) and asserts that  
 [i]t was a great, though unfounded, boast of the French Monarch when he said there 
 were no longer any Pyrenees. Greater and better founded will be the boast of
 Englishmen and Americans that there is no longer an Atlantic.
634
  
A decade later, in anticipation of the completion of the Mont Cenis Tunnel, the 
Illustrated London News borrows the same phrase again: 
 ‘Henceforth, there are no Alps!’ may then indeed be said, with reference to the benefits 
 of mutual intercourse between the most enlightened nations of Europe, as a French 
 monarch, who had intrigued for a Spanish succession, is said to have exclaimed, 
 ‘Henceforth there are no Pyrenees!’635 
Two years later, shortly after the Mont Cenis Tunnel has been opened for traffic, the 
Times similarly remarks that it “will actually strike the Alps of the traveller’s path.”636 
In another article published on the same day, the Times – although at first announcing 
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that it was “not quite on a par” with the Suez Canal – eventually declares that it 
nonetheless “belongs to that heroic class, for it has removed a mountain and brought 
together two great realms.” 637  The Manchester Guardian’s special correspondent 
reporting the opening of the Suez Canal describes how invited guests arrive in Egypt, all 
of whom are awaiting  
 the fulfilment of M. De Lesseps’s promise that he will efface Africa from the 
 mariner’s map of the world next Tuesday, and make the navigation between Europe and 
 Asia as direct and easy as if the ill-fated continent assigned to the children of Ham had 
 never existed.
638
 
Given the fact that the vast majority of these articles were published immediately before 
or after the inauguration or opening of a particular transport or communication 
technology, it is hardly surprising that, after years of what occasionally must have 
appeared to be rather hopeless efforts (the construction of the Suez Canal took ten, that 
of the Mont Cenis Tunnel 14 years), they were written in an enthusiastic, festive and 
somewhat complacent tone. What is more, they all suggest that the particular 
technology at hand would usher in a new era (“the new age in steam power,” the 
“imaginary period” becoming an “actual fact,” “the fulfilment of M. De Lesseps’s 
promise”). Viewed from this angle, it appears that the phrase of the annihilation of time 
and space is resorted to in order to emphasize the radical changes that were expected to 
accrue from these new technologies and to triumphantly highlight the importance of the 
respective achievement.  
What is more, the fact that not only the annihilation of abstract time and space, but also 
of mountains, oceans and an entire continent is suggested, is highly interesting. In June 
1870, the Times remarks in an article on the soon to be built St. Gothard railway that 
“[g]eographical facts are among the most stubborn in the world.”639  The claim that one 
had not only managed to subdue nature, but was also able to annihilate some of these 
‘most stubborn facts’, on the one hand, and the abstract categories of time and space in 
general, on the other, may therefore be seen as the ultimate reassurance of the power 
humankind was able to exert in relation to its natural surroundings. This view is further 
supported by the following passages: reporting the opening of the Great Exhibition, the 
Illustrated London News points out that the “workers of the world [show] each other (..) 
what ingenious and mighty machinery to defy space and time they can construct, what 
                                                          
637
 “It is Only a Small Proportion,” The Times, 20 September 1871, 7.  
638
 “The Opening of the Suez Canal,” Manchester Guardian, 24 November 1869, 6.   
639
 “The Great Enterprise of a Railway,” The Times, 15 June 1870, 9.   
136 
 
secrets of nature they discover and turn to account for the service of humanity.”640 
Reporting the 1858 cable, the Liverpool Mercury describes it as a “magnificent triumph 
now achieved by science and enterprise over time and space.”641 In its coverage of the 
following attempt to establish permanent transatlantic telegraphic communication in 
1865, the 1858 cable is again referred to as “a victory achieved by human intellect over 
time and space.” 642  Viewed from this angle, statements as the above-quoted ones 
concerning the annihilation of space and time appear to tell us more about the 
Victorians’ complex relationship to nature and environment, their eagerness to prevail 
over them and the related fantasies of omnipotence and power mentioned earlier, than 
about new ways of experiencing time and space.  
In contrast to the passages quoted above, though, there is a plethora of articles which, 
similar to the reporting on Australia’s integration into the global telegraph network, 
illustrate not only how the implementation of these new technologies has impacted on 
perceptions of distance and space; they also demonstrate to what extent contemporaries 
were aware of this interconnection and reflected on it. At this point it is worthwhile to 
return to the gentleman who urgently needed to send a telegram to Calcutta (see page 
41f) but had difficulty finding a telegraph office where his request could be fulfilled. In 
his account of his night-time tour through London, during which he was “sent from 
pillar to post,”643 he relates the following incident, taking place at the telegraph office at 
the City of London:  
 I asked [the clerk] the price of a telegram to Calcutta. “Calcutta!” he said, and looked 
 very much as if I had asked to telegraph to Fernando Po. (…) Now, Sir, Calcutta is
 not an unknown place. I thought it was the capital of British India, and that it was in 
 close and constant communication with the City of London.
644
 
As Wenzlhuemer points out, what is striking here is that Fernando Po, an island off the 
West coast of Africa (today part of Equatorial Guinea and known as Bioko), is as a 
matter of fact several thousand miles closer to London than Calcutta. What is more, in 
the past any ship en route to British India along the Cape route would pass closely by 
Fernando Po – clearly, the island was not as far-off as the gentleman implied. 
Nonetheless, due to the well-developed communication channels between London and 
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Calcutta and the resulting distance paradoxes (reduced effort and metaphorical distance), 
he seems to perceive Calcutta as being much closer than the African island.
645
  
Already with regard to the introduction of Atlantic steamship services, one can find 
articles referring to this phenomenon. The Manchester Guardian, for instance, declares 
that  
 [t]his great saving of time, amounting on the voyage to America to more than a third, 
 and on that from America to Europe to more than a fourth, cannot fail to 
 produce an immense effect on the intercourse between the two continents, if the 
 experiment should prove profitable, and regular lines of steam packets should be 
 established. For all purposes of business and communication, the two countries will 
 be brought more than 1,000 miles nearer to each other than they have ever yet been, and 
 the utmost degree of regularity will be produced in the intercourse.
646
 
This is interesting in many respects: firstly, the distance between the two continents is 
considered to have shrunk by 1,000 miles only for “all purposes of business and 
communication;” secondly, it is indicated that it could be further reduced in the future 
(“as they have ever yet been”); and thirdly, it also touches upon the fact that it is not 
only the alleged shortening of the distance between the two continents, but also the 
regularity and reliability steamships would introduce that would play a role in this 
context. Similarly, prior to the Great Western’s Atlantic passage, the Scotsman also 
points out that “when it does succeed, we may fairly say that America, morally speaking, 
has been brought two times nearer to Europe than it is at present, and four times nearer 
than it was thirty years ago, before the sailing packets were established.” 647  In the 
autumn of 1839, the Scotsman reprints an article from the New York Herald in which it 
is declared that “[t]he whole world will, in a short time, be brought within the compass 
of a few thousand miles, figuratively speaking.”648 Rather than resorting to the phrase of 
the annihilation of time, space and distance, all of these samples depict how distances 
seemed to shrink when new vehicles of transport were introduced. They also illustrate 
how contemporaries verbalized what Falk and Abler refer to as distance paradoxes by 
means of adverbials (“for all purposes of business and communication”; “morally 
speaking”; “figuratively speaking”) and how reductions in effort or metaphorical 
distance were thus ‘translated’ to globe distance. These passages therefore illustrate that 
contemporaries had a good understanding of the interplay between the vehicles at one’s 
disposal and their impact on perceptions of distance. This becomes particularly obvious 
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in the Scotsman’s reference to the introduction of sailing packets in the early nineteenth 
century and the gradual reduction of distance between Europe and America.  
As has been pointed out before, Falk and Abler consider telecommunication 
technologies particularly important in this context. It is therefore hardly surprising that 
it is in the reporting on the various cable ventures carried out in the 1850s and 1860s 
changing perceptions of time, space and distance surface most frequently. With regard 
to the 1858 transatlantic cable, the Illustrated London News remarks that “New Orleans 
will be brought as near to London as to its own suburbs, or as it already is to Charleston, 
or any other town and city in the United States or Canada.”649 Further it is pointed out 
that “[Europe and America] are practically as near as next-door neighbours;” but, 
interestingly enough, though, it is pointed out that this is only valid in terms of “any 
peaceful purpose. For fighting they are as far off as ever.”650 (see also chapter 6) A few 
months after the 1858 transatlantic cable had ceased functioning, Lloyd’s Weekly 
Newspaper notes that the cable “[had drawn] London within an hour’s call of New 
York.”651  
As regards the transatlantic cable of 1866, the Times declares a few days before it was 
finally completed that “England and the United States (…) are now, for some of the 
most important purposes of intelligent intercourse, as closely connected as England and 
France” and draws the conclusion that “[f]or the purposes of mutual intercourse the 
whole world is fast becoming one vast city. It was built on two sides of a deep river, but 
these are now united, and the city is one.”652  The Illustrated London News in this 
context points out that the transatlantic cable is “sufficient to neutralise, to a very 
comforting extent, the sense of distance.”653 Interestingly, it is the sense of distance 
(rather than distance itself) that is thought of as being affected; moreover, it is described 
as being reduced “to a very comforting extent” only, instead of being annihilated. In a 
similar manner, the Illustrated London News remarks a few years later in the context of 
the inauguration of the Suez Canal that “[t]he steam-engine and the electric telegraph 
are yearly shortening the distance between the mother country and the colonies, 
scattered though they be.” 654 Again, the distance between Britain and her overseas 
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possessions is referred to as being shortened by means of electric telegraphy and steam-
powered media of transportation, rather than being annihilated. In these articles and 
commentaries on the various transatlantic cables, reductions in effort and metaphorical 
distances are again described as alterations in globe distances, yet one can again find 
specifying phrases, such as “for the purpose of mutual intercourse”, that illustrate 
contemporaries were aware of what Falk and Abler call distance paradoxes.  
These passages therefore aptly illustrate how, with expanding transport and 
communication infrastructure, certain places in North America are described as if they 
have moved closer in geographic space. What is more, in order to illustrate this, these 
articles draw on the metaphor of a city and urban living together (vast city, suburbs, 
neighbours) and, in so doing, would seem to anticipate the imagery of the global village. 
The effects telegraphic communication between Britain and India would have were also 
contemplated. Already in 1851, the Illustrated London News points out that “[r]ailroads 
have commenced there, and before long a double railway route through Europe, with 
the electric telegraph, will make Calcutta nearer to us in time than Berlin was a century 
ago.”655 Again, a faraway place, in this case the capital of British India, is described as 
moving closer with the introduction of new transport and communication technologies, 
but “in time” only. Drawing a comparison between well-integrated cities in North 
America and the Indian subcontinent prior to the laying of the British submarine 
telegraph cable, the following passage further illustrates the extent to which integration 
into transport and communication infrastructure, specifically the telegraph network, 
could impact on perceptions of distance. With regard to the soon-to-be laid telegraph 
cable, it is asserted that “[t]he 3600 miles of cable which will be laid by [the Great 
Eastern] and her consorts in the Red and Indian Seas (…) will by April next bring 
Bombay as close to our doors as New York and Philadelphia now are.”656 Taking into 
consideration that the linear distance between London and both New York and 
Philadelphia amounts to around 3,500 miles, and that between London and Bombay to 
approximately 4,470 miles, it may appear perplexing that one is considered close, and 
the other far away. As we have seen before, however, even New Orleans, whose linear 
distance to London amounts to more than 4,600 miles and which is thus even further 
away from the British capital than Bombay, is considered “as near to London as to its 
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own suburb.” Clearly, the uneven development of telegraphic infrastructure has left its 
mark on contemporaries’ perceptions of distance.  
As has also been seen previously, in connection with transatlantic telegraph cables the 
image of the globe being scaled down to the size of a city was drawn upon repeatedly. 
The same imagery was also used with regard to other technologies. Reporting the 
opening of the Great Exhibition in 1851, the Illustrated London News highlights that it 
was only by means of the consolidation and extension of global communication and 
transport networks that an event of this dimension could be realized. In this context, it is 
pointed out that  
 [r]ailways were established, of which the speedy effect was to make this country 
 one large metropolis to itself, and to make of Europe one large country, of which 
 no part was more distant from another, if measured by time, than London and 
 Edinburgh had been a generation previously. Steam upon the ocean lent its aid to 
 the great work; the electric telegraph carried it a step further.
657
 
We can thus once more observe how compressions in transport and communication 
space are represented as changes in geographic space; however, this statement is again 
qualified by the comment “if measured by time.”  
Furthermore, pointing out that scientists and engineers, by means of their findings and 
innovations, “leave in our hands the means of ubiquity,”658 the Visitors’s Guide to the 
Great Eastern alludes to the fact that a person’s absolute location in geographic space is 
becoming less important than his or her relative location.  
The above-mentioned passages therefore illustrate how transport and communication 
technologies impacted on nineteenth-century contemporaries’ perception of time, space 
and distance; at the same time, however, the also show how contemporaries gave 
expression to these new experiences without resorting to the notion of the annihilation 
of time and space. As has been pinpointed in the samples on submarine cables to 
Australia, contemporaries were well aware of the effects new transport and 
communication technologies would have. It is therefore hardly surprising that they also 
reflected upon this on a meta-level. Dwelling on the effects the Great Eastern might 
have, the Times accordingly emphasizes that “[t]he result of this great experiment in 
shipbuilding (…) will be a consolidation of the British Empire such as we have not yet 
seen”659 and subsequently explains why this is going to be the case:  
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 Half of the space which separates the various sections of it from the mother country and 
 from each other will be annihilated. Our colonies will be brought comparatively close to 
 us, and, what is almost of as much importance as the actual vicinity gained, they will be 
 more than twice as near to us in imagination. The difference between a month’s voyage 
 and two or three months is all the difference to the imagination. We think of a place as 
 within reach, and within a home distance, it if is only ‘a month off.’ The whole Empire 
 is thus brought into a home compass, and obtains the addiction of strength which so 
 much greater union gives. We shall find ourselves paying visits to and receiving visits 
 from India and Australia. Our friend will come over for the summer with return tickets, 
 and the  British Empire will become, in virtual compass, a province.
660
 
Not only are distant dependencies thought of as being moved into the vicinity by means 
of the Great Eastern and the faster and more reliable passage it promises. It is also 
stressed how these improved connections will contribute to the integration of the British 
Empire. Concerning the 1858 transatlantic cable, the Times similarly expresses the hope 
“that before this generation has passed away England and the New World may in the 
opinion of their inhabitants be but one country.”661 In this context, it is pointed out that  
 [i]t has been observed with truth that the United States, though continually 
 extending their territory, have been yearly becoming for all purposes of intercourse
 smaller than they were. The increase of space to be travelled over is more than 
 counterbalanced by the decrease of the time necessary for traversing a given distance. 
 When the Union extended only from Massachusetts to Georgia a journey between the 
 two extreme points took longer than a journey at the present day from the Atlantic to 
 Kansas or Minnesota.
662
 
Subsequently, the role communication technologies are going to play in the future is 
highlighted:  
 It may be hoped that in a few years less time will be necessary to pass from 
 England to California than is now occupied by the voyage from England to Halifax; and 
 it is found that facility of communication, and, above all, that saving of time increases 
 travelling in a ratio almost incredible.
663
 
 
5.3 Chapter Summary 
In the past as well as in the present, technologies of movement, be it of transport, 
communication or information, have a profound influence on the way we perceive time, 
space and distance and on which places we consider to be close or far away. Various 
models, approaching and conceptualizing this phenomenon from different angles, can 
help us contemplate related questions. Wenzlhuemer, for instance, concentrates on 
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different spaces that are configured by the particular interest of the observer and points 
out how, with improving technologies of movement, the structure of what he refers to as 
communication or transport space is changed. As a result, these spaces can be 
compressed and the resultant divergence from geographic space brings about the notion 
that a certain place has moved closer.
664
 Falk and Abler, on the other hand, focus on 
different types of distances and so-called distance paradoxes in order to explain this 
phenomenon: They illustrate how changing relations between what they call globe, 
effort and metaphorical distance impinge on our conception of what is close or far 
away.
665
  
A close examination of the various Victorian print publications reveals that 
contemporaries’ understanding of such circumstances extended beyond the naive 
assertion that time and space had been annihilated. Indeed, it appears that the slogan has 
little explanatory power as to changing perceptions of time and space after all, and is 
instead to be viewed in the context of dominion over nature. It cannot be denied that 
contemporaries’ perceptions of what is near and what is far were influenced by new 
transport and communication technologies. It has also been seen, however, that the 
interconnection between a place’s integration into the global communication and 
transport network, on the one hand, and the idea of it being closer (particularly in 
comparison to other areas that are integrated to a lesser extent), on the other, was well 
understood and alluded to repeatedly. Hardly surprisingly, it is particularly in the 
context of the electric telegraph and the new virtual space it brought about that such 
reflections are expressed. In the same way that the metaphor of the global village has 
become commonplace to describe the structural changes taking place from the later 
twentieth century onwards, the metaphor of a city and related imagery (suburb, 
neighbourhood) is drawn upon repeatedly in order to condense these new experiences. 
What is more, it is also pointed to the consequences such changing spatial perceptions 
might entail and how one might therefore actively avail oneself of this phenomenon.  
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“For this reason, the Internet can be considered the first weapon of  
mass construction, which we can deploy to destroy hate and  
conflict and to propagate peace and democracy.”666 
 
 
6. Heal the World? Transport and Communication Technologies as 
Tools of Peace 
In November 2009, the Italian edition of the US technology magazine Wired launched 
the project ‘Internet for Peace’. The project proposed the internet for the Nobel Peace 
Prize of 2010 on the grounds that  
 [w]ith its increased diffusion and accessibility, the Internet has clearly shown to be not 
 only a network of computers connected together across the world or a container for web
 pages accessible to users, but a precious and powerful tool for global communication,
 capable to overcome walls and distances imposed by political and military constraints. 
 The basic idea is that, being available to everyone and conveying messages of sympathy 
 and humanity, the Internet really is a great tool for democracy.
667
 
Chris Anderson, editor in chief of Wired’s US edition, further points out that “[p]eople 
want peace, and when given a voice, they'll work tirelessly for it. In the short term, a 
Twitter account may be no match for an AK-47, but in the long term the keyboard is 
mightier than the sword.”668 On the project’s webpage, digital culture in general is 
presented as fostering “dialogue, debate and consensus through communication” and 
spreading “seeds of non-violence.”669  
In fact, we have been here before, and the notion that new means of communication will 
inevitably lead to better understanding among peoples from different parts of the world 
and therefore result in world peace is not new. With regard to transport and 
communication technologies of the time, Ferdinand de Lesseps, for instance, remarked 
that “[a]ll these enterprises of universal interest – some already completed, others under 
construction or projected – have an identical goal: drawing peoples together, and 
thereby bringing about an era in which men, by knowing one another, will finally cease 
fighting.”670  
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These views, however, do not go unchallenged: As Larry Magid points out in an article 
published in the Huffington Post, there are a number of “not-so-peaceful” purposes the 
worldwide web may be employed for,
671
 and even supporters of the Internet for Peace 
initiative point to the double-edged role it can play.
672
 Moreover, recent developments, 
such as the revelation of mass internet and mobile phone surveillance programs, have 
not only shown how governments can employ modern information and communication 
technology in order to spy on their own and foreign citizens (which certainly is not part 
of the “new kind of society” the proponents of Wired’s project envisage673). They have 
also created international tension and diplomatic crises between the states involved. 
Clearly, the internet of itself is not going to usher in an era of universal peace.  
With the benefit of hindsight, Headrick similarly points out how Ferdinand de Lesseps 
would have been astonished had he witnessed the technological innovations of the 
twentieth century and their many harmful repercussions, and concludes that “[i]f we 
have learned anything in the past century, it is that technology confers power, but that 
the consequences of that power are anything but predictable.”674   
This chapter investigates the expectations associated with nineteenth-century transport 
and communication technologies in terms of the improvement of international relations 
and the onset of an era of world peace. The comments by both the proponents of 
‘Internet for Peace’ and by Ferdinand de Lesseps refer primarily to how the mutual 
understanding of nations could be improved, and both parties assume that peoples who 
were more familiar with each other and able to exchange messages of sympathy were 
less likely to go to war. As will be seen, this perspective is repeatedly highlighted in the 
various publications under scrutiny.  
Moreover, the extent to which these new media impacted on the conduct of international 
relations and in what ways governments and their representatives availed themselves of 
them is scrutinized. As Headrick has suggested, the ramifications of these technologies 
for interstate relations are by no means as clear-cut as might be assumed at first glance. 
This will be illustrated on the basis of various historical case studies, before 
contemporaries’ expectations as expressed in press coverage will be examined.  
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Speedy railway connections and steamship services certainly figured prominently in this 
context; nevertheless, it was electric telegraphy that “did more to change the practice of 
international diplomacy than any other innovation in modern history.”675 Accordingly, it 
will receive primary attention in the following pages.  
 
6.1 Information, Communication and the Conduct of International Relations in 
the Nineteenth Century  
In The Invisible Weapon, Headrick emphasizes that  
 a timely flow of information is a vital instrument of power. Even the earliest rulers 
 needed to know what was happening in their provinces and on their frontiers. In turn, 
 they issued commands to their agents and subjects, hoping thereby to control events.
676
 
As previously mentioned, information transmission times had been reduced 
considerably in the decades before the electric telegraph was introduced. Nonetheless, 
“[m]easured by the speed of communication, the world was still quite big in the early 
1820s,”677 and ‘timely flows of information’ were often – at least on a global scale – a 
matter of luck and favourable conditions, rather than reliable infrastructure. From a 
British vantage point, Paris, Brussels or The Hague and the surrounding areas were 
comparatively easy to reach and exchanges of letters could take place in a matter of 
days. Communicating with anyone located in Central or Eastern Europe, though, could 
be a cumbersome affair, with insufficient road infrastructure and seasonal hardships 
adversely affecting the travelling speed of coaches and messengers. A despatch from 
London to Constantinople, for instance, would in the 1840s still require several weeks. 
Corresponding with anyone outside of Europe would accordingly require even longer 
(as pointed out before, early nineteenth-century sailing ships took on average a month to 
travel between Britain and the US; in the 1860s, correspondence to South America or 
Japan would still take several months by surface mail).
678
  
One consequence of these protracted journeys was that “the information given [could be] 
dangerously out of date by the time it was received.”679  Circumstances could have 
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changed decisively in either (or both) of the localities and the directions provided or 
questions posed were no longer up to date. This could even mean that major battles 
were fought after peace had been declared – with the slow speed of transport and 
communication, the news of a declaration of peace simply did not reach the battlefields 
in time.
680
  
Looking at the events taking place in the run-up to the Anglo-American War of 1812, 
Nickles provides a vivid example of how these long transmission times and the resulting 
lack of ‘timely flows of information’ could bring about interstate hostilities and military 
conflicts.
681
 There had, for some time, been a state of diplomatic tension between the 
US and Great Britain. There were several reasons for this, one being the so-called 
Orders in Council, a set of trade restrictions Great Britain had imposed in the course of 
the Napoleonic Wars. The orders sought to prevent neutral states from trading directly 
with France, and as a result, American merchants wanting to do business with 
continental trade partners had to ask for British permission and pay a charge before they 
could do so. The United States considered this to be an unacceptable interference with 
their national sovereignty. President Madison therefore issued a war message on 1 June 
1812. Both houses of Congress supported Madison’s measure, and war against Britain 
was declared on 18 June.  
Meanwhile, the situation in Great Britain had greatly changed. Prime Minister Perceval, 
the initiator of the Orders in Council, had been murdered in May 1812 and was 
succeeded by Robert Jenkins. Given the fact that a growing percentage of the British 
population was dissatisfied with their government’s commercial policy (which they 
thought aggravated the economic situation), the opposition submitted a motion 
demanding the repeal of the Orders on 16 June. The new government accepted the 
motion, but unfortunately, the despatch carrying the news of the revocation of the 
Orders, which in all likelihood would have appeased the US government, did not reach 
Washington until war had been declared. Withdrawing their declaration of war would 
have made the US government seem weak and vacillatory and was not something it was 
prepared to do. It was, therefore, the “disparity (…) between the relative speeds of 
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international and domestic politics” 682  which resulted in the Anglo-American War. 
Nickles thus argues that  
 the crisis of June 1812 reveals an asymmetry between the speed of political 
 decisionmaking and the speed of transatlantic communication. (…) This 
 asymmetry resulted from the close relationship between distance and communication 
 speed that existed before the mid-nineteenth century.
683
 
It seems reasonable to argue that war could have been avoided, had there been 
transatlantic submarine cables in 1812, allowing heads of government to defuse a tense 
situation by communicating instantly: in so doing, information gaps could have been 
closed and the asymmetry Nickles mentions would have been counteracted.  
However, Nickles strongly advises against such oversimplified speculations. He stresses 
that the telegraph’s influence on intergovernmental communication and international 
relations was more ambiguous than might be assumed. In the past, he points out, the 
slow and erratic communication processes between the United States and Great Britain 
had several times helped averting war.
684
 Moreover, even when telegraphic 
communication between two countries was established, there was no guarantee 
statesmen and decision-makers would avail themselves of this speedy channel of 
communication. There were, in fact, a variety of factors why they would refrain from 
using it, instead relying on ‘old-fashioned’ postal communication. 
One of these factors was the high cost of both telegraphic communication in general, 
and that via submarine cables, in particular. At the outset, transatlantic messages were 
charged at a rate of $ 10 per word. For most governments, it was a matter of major 
importance to restrain their diplomatic representatives from sending exceedingly long or 
unnecessary telegrams. This attitude was particularly pronounced in the United States, 
and as a result, US ambassadors were permitted to send telegrams only in case of 
emergency. If the State Department subsequently deemed the telegram to be 
unnecessary, the diplomat involved was required to cover the expense. US diplomats 
would therefore give serious thought before wiring a message. It was for precisely this 
reason that Washburne, the American ambassador to France from 1869 onwards, 
decided to inform his superiors about the growing tensions between France and Prussia 
in 1870 by means of a despatch borne by steamship (which reached Washington after 
the onset of the Franco-Prussian War). Despite such obvious difficulties, the US 
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administration adhered to these rules and repeatedly brought them to the attention of its 
ambassadors. It was hardly surprising then, that in 1914, the news about the escalating 
tension between Austria-Hungary and Serbia was also forwarded to Washington by 
letter, and only reached the US government on the eve of the declaration of war and the 
onset of the First World War.
685
  
European governments issued similar instructions to their personnel: like their 
American counterparts, French diplomats had to cover the expenses for telegrams that 
were deemed unnecessary or too long;
686
 in a similar manner, Great Britain and 
Germany also asked their diplomatic staff only to use telegrams in cases of emergency 
and extreme importance.
687
 Occasionally, such instructions caused confusion among 
diplomatic envoys, who were no longer certain when sending a telegram was deemed 
essential and when they should avail themselves of traditional communication channels. 
Similarly, attempts to keep wired messages as concise as possible in order to reduce 
costs could create confusion, as intelligibility would be the victim of these austerity 
measures.  
Another factor was the – admittedly justified – fear of espionage. Previously, the 
cabinet noir – the institution responsible for the interception of letters, related to the 
host country’s post office – could be circumvented by sending messages of a highly 
sensitive content via special messengers, making use of diplomatic bags or sophisticated 
seals. With electric communication, however, sensitive information became more easily 
interceptable than ever before: As most national telegraph networks were state-
controlled, the respective governments could effortlessly access the information 
exchanged between a rival state’s government and its diplomatic outpost. 688  
Moreover, messages were regularly transmitted incorrectly, due to technical failure, 
human error (the Morse Code being extremely vulnerable to even the smallest 
inaccuracies in operating the telegraphic devices), illegible handwriting or the 
transmission of messages in foreign languages not spoken or understood by the 
particular operator. Encrypted messages, which were thought to circumvent the risk of 
espionage mentioned above, were similarly devoid of meaning to the operators, and 
therefore particularly susceptible to error. Many diplomats were aware of these 
problems, and, in order to make sure they had understood the instructions correctly, 
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would often wait for the message to be confirmed by letter, thus – ironically – losing 
any time that had been saved in using the electric telegraph.
689
  
There were other reasons why the establishment of more speedy channels of 
communication would not necessarily alter the way intergovernmental relations were 
conducted, such as lack of economic or political interest. This was particularly true in 
the relationship between Great Britain and Japan. From a British perspective, Japan was 
comparatively insignificant and mattered little on a political level or as a trading partner. 
Even Foreign Office staff posted to Japan knew relatively little about the country’s 
culture, language and traditions, and the Foreign Secretary at home was concerned with 
other, at the time more relevant, outposts. Accordingly, the laying of a submarine cable 
between Nagasaki and Shanghai in 1871, by means of which Japan was connected to 
the steadily growing international telegraph network, had hardly any impact on official 
communication between the two countries.
690
  
Another set of problems can be subsumed under Nickles’ (admittedly relatively vague) 
umbrella term ‘cultural inertia’. On the one hand, this refers to the fact that 
instantaneous communication was hardly compatible with the traditional lifestyle and 
working method of diplomats, who, at the time, mostly came from an aristocratic 
background. As has been pointed out by Hayne, “[i]n the late nineteenth century, 
diplomacy was still something of a leisurely hobby and was related to literary pursuits, 
horse-riding, hunting, and the establishment of fine literary and musical studios.”691 The 
stricter routine that instantaneous communication imposed upon them as well as the fact 
that messages could be sent and received at any time of the day did not suit diplomats’ 
leisure-oriented lifestyle and was thus accepted only reluctantly.
692
 What is more, 
diplomats’ feared they would lose the autonomy they had enjoyed previously, as the 
telegraph enabled governments to keep a close eye on their diplomatic envoys and 
interfere in their daily business.
693
 
In this context, the general question arises as to what extent a speedy technology of 
communication, such as the electric telegraph, was compatible with the way 
international relations were conducted at that time. Governments had usually exchanged 
information by letter, in which the parties involved would suggest compromises and 
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solutions. The long transmission times of such letters gave them sufficient time to think 
through their positions and to prepare a measured response after some initial irritation 
and antagonism. Moreover, private conversations between diplomats and government 
representatives of the respective host country were part of the routine and allowed for an 
elaborate explanation of their particular point of view. In so doing, misunderstandings 
could be resolved more easily. This modus operandi could help to defuse critical 
situations and therefore avert possible military conflict. By contrast, the possibility of 
immediate communication could lead to a vicious circle in which an overhasty action 
could trigger a similarly impulsive reply, the result being that all parties involved were 
“forced (…) to make rushed decisions.”694 This situation was often made worse by the 
fact that the press also availed itself of the telegraph, which meant, in turn, that the 
public was well-informed about current events and public opinion inflamed to the extent 
that tough action would be expected and demanded from the government.  
Two examples help illustrate why the electric telegraph was not necessarily the most 
expedient tool for international crisis management. Firstly, the Trent Affair of 1861: 
This crisis between the United States and Great Britain was caused by the US 
government’s arrest of two Confederation commissioners who were on their way to 
Southampton aboard a British packet ship. The incident, which caused the British 
government to give an ultimatum to the United States, took place before transatlantic 
communication by telegraph had been established, and accordingly several weeks 
elapsed between the diplomats’ arrest, the arrival of the news in Britain and the 
ultimatum being issued. In hindsight, as Nickles points out, “the Trent affair seemed to 
occur in slow motion.”695 [italics in original] This turned out to be beneficial in several 
respects: As mentioned before, statesmen had the opportunity to reconsider their point 
of view and could, if they felt there was need to do so, make amendments or changes to 
previously drafted letters and other documents. The British ultimatum, for instance, was 
toned down in the days prior to its despatch. Similarly, the public in Britain and the 
United States had become agitated in the immediate aftermath of the incident. In the 
weeks to follow, however, they had time to calm down and were therefore less 
bellicoset than at the outset. In this case, the lack of speedy communication by telegraph 
had positive effects and the Trent Affair is seen as a primary example of how “the use 
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of the telegraph in diplomacy, by eliminating periods of delay, would have created more 
problems than it solved.”696   
The second example is the July Crisis of 1914 and the resulting outbreak of the First 
World War. There can be no doubt that there was a variety of reasons leading to the 
outbreak of war, but  
 [t]here is abundant evidence that one cause of World War I was a failure of 
 diplomacy, and one of the causes of that failure was that diplomats could not cope 
 with the volume and speed of electronic communication. Most of the aristocrats and 
 gentlemen who made up the diplomatic corps in 1914 were of the old school in many 
 respects, as wary of new technology as some generals were wary of newfangled 
 weapons and strategies.
697
 
Confirming the leisurely routine Kern refers to as old school diplomacy, the majority of 
the major European powers’ diplomatic representatives would go on summer holidays 
at around the time of Franz Ferdinand’s assassination. It was only one month later, at 
the time when Austria-Hungary gave Serbia the ultimatum, that they realized how 
serious the situation had become. Had they been at their respective outposts earlier, they 
could have provided important information (such as Russia’s willingness to go to war in 
case of a military conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia). Once the diplomats 
were aware of the explosive situation, they communicated mostly via telegrams and 
press releases. By the outbreak of war, five ultimatums had been exchanged, each of 
them asking for an immediate reply. In so doing, the vicious circle mentioned above 
was set in motion. Nickles furthermore highlights that Austro-Hungarian decision-
makers, eager to go to war, “exploited the telegraph’s potential to accelerate the crisis, 
and thereby deprived Entente diplomats of the time they needed to resolve the conflict 
peacefully.”698 This development finally culminated in Austria-Hungary declaring war 
on Serbia on 28 July (the declaration of war being, ironically, sent via telegraph). 
Nickles therefore draws the conclusion that “[d]uring the July Crisis the telegraph 
accelerated events in a way that, on the whole, served the cause of peace less well than 
it facilitated the march to battle.”699 
As has been shown, the electric telegraph in principle had great potential with regard to 
the improvement of interstate relations. By means of timely flows of information, 
misunderstandings and disputes could be eliminated more easily and military conflict 
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avoided. If one complies with Edgerton’s request to study technology in use, however, 
one will come to the conclusion that the situation was decidedly more complicated. An 
extremely unpredictable concoction of factors could result in the parties involved using 
the electric telegraph inappropriately or not at all. Therefore, in critical situations, 
telegraphic communication could potentially worsen the state of affairs decisively. In 
what follows, the extent to which nineteenth-century contemporaries’ were aware of this 
will be demonstrated.  
 
6.2 Messengers of Peace? The Role of Transport and Communication 
Technologies for International Relations as Presented in the Victorian Press  
As explained, the conduct of interstate relations was decisively transformed by the 
electric telegraph and the instant communication it promised. It is hardly surprising 
therefore that most evaluations of the seemingly peace-making qualities of new 
technologies can be found in the reporting on various submarine cables. Nonetheless, 
they also feature in connection with other technologies. In an article covering the 
inauguration of the Great Exhibition, the Illustrated London News points out that the 
organization and implementation of an event of this dimension has only been made 
possible by the speedy global transport networks which have recently been established.  
Here, it is highlighted how the railway network fostered mutual understanding by 
allowing for more frequent exchanges between European states: 
 But the intercourse of nations, caused by the practical annihilation of space and time 
 which we owe to the railway system, has removed a whole world of difficulties. It has 
 made us all understand one another better than we did before; broken down the ancient 
 barriers of jealousy and exclusiveness; obliterated the rancourous remembrances of 
 bygone wars; softened the lingering asperities of traditional hatreds, and convinced the 
 people of Europe of the great and useful fact, which is never too late to learn, that, if 
 they had known as much of each other fifty or sixty years ago as they do now, there 
 would, in all likelihood, have been no battles of the Nile, the Baltic, or Trafalgar, and no 
 carnage of Aboukir, Marengo, Jena, Leipsic [sic], Moscow, Saragossa, or Waterloo.
700
 
The same article also points to the role steamships could play in the context of 
transcontinental communication and the permanent prevention of military conflict and 
engages in speculations about the effects they might have had in the past: 
 Who shall say, if we had had a railroad system pervading Europe in 1780, and steam-
 ships plying between New York and Liverpool at the same period, whether 
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 Napoleon Bonaparte might not have become a great sculptor or a great cotton-spinner 
 in 1810? whether [sic] Wellington, the mighty Captain, might not thirty years ago have 
 been a philosopher greater and more genial than Botham, or Lord Chancellor more 
 potent and profound than Eldon? whether [sic] a thousand battles would not have 
 remained unfought? and [sic] whether the millions of men that perished in them might 
 not have helped to adorn and improve a world which they were solely engaged in 
 ravaging?
701
 
Reporting the launch of the Great Eastern steamship, the Illustrated London News also 
points to the influence the ship will have on both international commerce and relations:  
 How much economy of time, how much saving of waste and depreciation of goods, will 
 be comprehended in the vast carrying capabilities of such a vessel! How much will be 
 gained by such a ready competition of conveyance with demand and production, and
 how large a share will such a ship not contribute to the interchange of feeling, habits,
 tastes, and sympathies, to which, in spite of recent experiences, most of us still look as 
 the true means for realising the best interests of mankind – peace and good-will among 
 the nations of the world!
702  
Concerning the breakthrough at the Mont Cenis Tunnel, the Times points out that “[in] 
the midst of a desolating [Franco-Prussian] war, and at a time when its horrors are 
deepening under the rigour of the season, we are cheered by the news that one of the 
greatest of the works of peace has been brought to a conclusion.”703 Juxtaposing the 
Alpine tunnel with the Franco-Prussian War, its peace-making qualities are all the more 
underlined. Once completed, it is further remarked, the tunnel will allow for “constant 
and unrestricted intercourse which we have learnt to look upon as essential to 
nations.”704 
Nonetheless, it is the electric telegraph that received particular attention in this context. 
The first messages to be transmitted via the 1858 submarine cable already bear witness 
to the peculiarly high hopes and expectations pinned to the telegraph. Soon after the 
cable had begun operation, “[a]n interchange of courtesies between the city dignitaries 
of New York and London was (…) commenced.”705 The Mayor of New York solemnly 
declares that “[i]t is a triumph of science and energy over time and space, uniting more 
closely the bonds of peace and commercial prosperity, introducing an era in the world’s 
history pregnant with results beyond the conception of the finite mind,”706 to which his 
London counterpart replies that he hopes the cable “may be the means of cementing 
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those kindly feelings which now exist between the two countries.”707 Admittedly, such 
ornate language was part of the etiquette of official correspondence of the time.
708
 It 
was not only dignitaries, though, waxing lyrical about the first functional transatlantic 
cable in their congratulatory messages. Prior to the laying of the cable, the Manchester 
Guardian predicts that  
 languid commerce will revive at the prospect of immediate connection between the two 
 worlds, and the pledge which this Atlantic telegraph will give of the continuance to all 
 time of uninterrupted amity between England and the United States.
709
 
The Illustrated London News similarly declares that “Europe and America are (…) for 
trading, negotiation, and the interchange of communications of amity and good will (…) 
practically as near as next-door neighbours in a London street”710 and further points out 
“[i]t seems, indeed, absurd and next to impossible to imagine that Great Britain and the 
United States of America should interchange by that medium any messages of hate, 
rancour, or hostility, or any communications but those of commerce, diplomatic 
courtesies, or combined movement for the good of mankind, and the preservation of the 
peace of the world.”711 The Times points out that “the effect of bringing the three 
Kingdoms and the United States into instantaneous communication with each other will 
be to render hostilities between the two nations almost impossible for the future.”712 
Subsequently, the effects telegraphic communication might have had concerning the 
“three last instances of difference between ourselves and our Transatlantic cousins”713 is 
considered and its significance as a tool for crisis management is emphasized:  
These have been – first, as to the right of visiting vessels with the view of ascertaining 
their nationality; secondly, the question of the fisheries; and, thirdly, that of the 
enlistments during the Russian War. Now, it is not too much to say that the most fiery 
politician in the States, who might have been desirous of making a little political capital 
out of these notable heads of quarrel, would have been fairly checkmated if the English 
Government had possessed the power of undeceiving the American public before the 
sparks had been fanned into flame. There ought not between two nations whose interests 
are clearly identical to be any points of difference which honest Ministers on either side 
could not just adjust in a few hours by the help of the Atlantic Telegraph.
714
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Moreover, it is remarked that the speedy communication between the United States and 
Great Britain allows for improved coordination between the two countries, and that 
therefore other states would not dare to wage war against them:  
 It is scarcely too much to suppose that if the two great Anglo-Saxon states remain 
 firmly united – fused together, as they now are, by this electric agency – he would be a 
 bold continental statesman who should venture to try conclusions with them in a warlike 
 way. United, we are masters wherever there is salt water enough to float a ship’s boat. 
 There can be no stronger guarantee for the peace of the world.
715
 
Admittedly, it also alludes to the role telegraphy could play in a military conflict – 
Britain and the United States being able to outmanoeuvre other states by means of the 
electric telegraph – yet this aspect is not dwelt on any further at this point and the 
principal assumption is that the newly laid cable will guarantee world peace. Therefore 
the article concludes with the words: “May the triumph be as lasting as it is glorious, 
and bring forth fruit in the form of perpetual amity and goodwill between the great 
Anglo-Saxon communities!”716 
Around one month later – that is after the 1858 cable ceased functioning – the Times 
once more stresses the significance of electric telegraphy in general for the conduct of 
intergovernmental relations. The readers are informed that, as soon as submarine cables 
have been installed,   
 we may indeed look forward to a future widely different from anything that the world 
 has yet seen. As Lord NAPIER [sic] observes with justice, ‘Something may be detracted 
 from the functions of diplomacy, but much will undoubtedly be gained for the peace of 
 nations.’717 
The article thus relates to the idea that diplomats’ independence would be curtailed and 
their status diminished with the advent of these improved means of communication.
718
 It 
also points out that the electric telegraph and the direct communication between 
political decision-makers of different states it allows for will inevitably be conducive to 
universal peace. The Times further declares that it is “from this increased acquaintance 
with each other that we anticipate harmony in the relations of England and America, 
and that concert in action which may become necessary at some conjunctures.”719 
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Consequently hopes and expectations were raised high when another attempt to lay a 
transatlantic cable was undertaken in 1865. Public figures, such as John Pender, 
“expressed [the] belief and hope that the cable would be successfully laid, and that it 
would promote the happiness, the communion, and the peace of Great Britain and the 
United States.”720 When the fourth attempt to lay this cable was successful, its peace-
making qualities were again emphasized. The Illustrated London News, for instance, 
declares that  
 [i]nternationally, Governments and peoples brought into the presence of each other will 
 be less liable to misconception, less unconcerned about each other’s doings, less likely 
 to brood over fancied offences, less exposed to many of the causes which lead to war. If 
 no other results should follow than those we have just stated, and which are rather 
 certain than speculative in their character, humanity would yet have abundant reason to 
 bless the day which witnessed the completion of the Anglo-American Telegraph. 
721
 
The Times similarly declares that  
 [t]he prospect opened to the world by this achievement is so marvellous that any 
 attempt to describe it must give only a faint and feeble picture. The two most active and 
 energetic nations of the globe are placed in hourly communication. The Governments of 
 England and the United States will be able to converse rapidly and freely, removing 
 misconceptions should they arise, and transacting their affairs without the delay of a 
 voyage during which the face of events may be changed.
722
  
These passages therefore point to what was assumed to be two major improvements 
inherent to the instantaneous communication brought about by electric telegraphy: on 
the one hand, misunderstandings could be eliminated more easily and could therefore no 
longer be regarded as a potential reason for military conflict; on the other, that the 
problem of information being outdated and obsolete once it reached its destination after 
several weeks could be remedied. Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper therefore draws the 
conclusion that this “connecting link between the continents will silently bind the two 
nations together, add to the prosperity of both, and furnish an ever-growing guarantee 
for harmony and peace.”723  
A few months earlier, at around the time of the cable’s inauguration, Lloyd’s Weekly 
Newspaper had drawn a vivid comparison which contrasted the peace-making qualities 
of electric telegraphy with the Austro-Prussian War, which was fought at approximately 
the same time.  
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 While the great armies of Austria and Prussia were staining the fatherland with blood, 
 that wonderful monument of English enterprise and skill, the Great Eastern, was 
 steadily bearing across the broad waters the thin cord that is destined in time to work 
 suppression of armies, and the destruction of armour-clads and turret-ships. 
724
 
It is furthermore pointed out that the “thin cord that is presently to girdle the earth, 
albeit thinner than a baby’s wrist, has a power in it which armies in the full pomp and 
tide of war have not.”725 In future, it is assumed, there will be no more war or conflict 
between the United States and Great Britain, for the cable is  
 a thread of gold to bind the friendly hands of the two great Anglo-Saxon races 
 together. The heart of Brother Jonathan can vibrate through this frail wire to that of his 
 kinsman, John Bull. Mutual explanations can be made in a few hours instead of a 
 month.
726
  
In this context, reference is also made to previous conflicts, such as the Trent Affair, 
and it is suggested that this incident could have been avoided if only there had been a 
transatlantic telegraph cable at that time: “The Americans would have known at once 
what the feelings of Englishmen were with regard to that unfortunate matter, and so 
much ill-blood would have been spared on both sides.”727 In conclusion, it is asserted 
that   
 a scientific and commercial triumph has been added to the page of our country’s history 
 that will be set by future generations in glorious contrast with that of wrong and of 
 bloodshed, which was enacting in Germany, while the Great Eastern was slowly and 
 grandly bearing her messenger of peace and goodwill from the east to the west. 
728
 
According to the article, there can be no doubt about the transatlantic cable’s 
peacemaking qualities; rather, by directly contrasting the cable-laying procedure with 
the Austro-Prussian War and by means of an appropriate choice of words (baby’s wrist, 
thread of gold, friendly, triumph, vs. staining the fatherland with blood, bloodshed, 
wrong) the electric telegraph’s contribution to the maintenance of good inter-
governmental relations is emphasized.   
All told, the passages quoted above bear witness to a technologically determinist 
perspective: in retrospect, it is assumed that certain conflicts and battles could have been 
averted if only railways and steamships had existed back then, allowing for speedier 
transmission of information and giving peoples the opportunity to get to know each 
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other better. Similarly, the mere fact that a telegraph cable has been put in place and is 
at the disposal of government officials and other policymakers is deemed to usher in an 
era of peace and goodwill. Other factors, which might work against this development, 
are not taken into consideration. 
This is only one side of the coin, though. There are also articles which challenge such 
biased representations of the electric telegraph and raise doubts as to its peacemaking 
qualities. Already in connection with the first attempt of laying a transatlantic cable in 
1857, the Times reprints an article (originally published in the New York Times), in 
which the cable’s effects are questioned:  
 It is impossible to comprehend the far-reaching results of this wonderful adventure. It is 
 the marriage of the two hemispheres of the globe, but whether the marriage is to be for 
 the better or for the worse who shall say? The gulf of waters by which nature has 
 separated hostile continents is bridged by the electric chain of thought; and people of 
 diverse  languages and uncongenial habits are made immediate neighbours. But too  
 much familiarity with our antipodes may beget a dangerous contempt, and it is possible
 that we shall be led to entertain less friendly feelings for our far-fetched neighbours than 
 we have now, while the ocean separates us from them. 
729
 
This is interesting in several respects. To start with, this article, challenging the view 
that the submarine cable and the instantaneous communication it allows for will 
necessarily have a positive influence on transatlantic relations, was originally published 
in an American newspaper. This obviously raises the question to what extent British and 
American opinions diverge on this topic, that is, whether the enthusiasm with which the 
opportunity of instant transatlantic communication was hailed was a specifically British 
perspective. What is more, one might easily get the impression that the former British 
colony was not especially keen on being able to communicate instantly with any of the 
European countries. British publications, as has been pointed out, repeatedly 
emphasized the close relationship between Britain and the US. By contrast, this article 
describes the relations between Old and New World as distant, if not hostile, without 
mentioning any particular country.  
However, articles challenging the effect instantaneous communication was going to 
have on Anglo-American relations were also printed in British newspapers. Despite 
pointing out that “the facilities for prompt intercourse between nation and nation must 
be, in the main, increasingly favourable to peace and goodwill,” the Liverpool Mercury 
suggests that it is “possible (…) to exaggerate the peace-making virtues of the Atlantic 
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telegraph.”730 The reason for this is the circumstance that “[t]he friendly or unfriendly 
purport of the messages which may hereafter be borne to us under the ocean will depend, 
not on the rapidity with which they are conveyed, but on the temper and character of 
those who send them.”731 All in all, though, the article is rather optimistic as to the 
effects of telegraphic communication on international relations:  
It is something, however, to know that ‘misunderstandings,’ properly so called – and 
most international differences originate in a want of mutual understanding – will 
naturally be less frequent and less protracted in proportion to the promptitude with 
which explanations can be given and received. We willingly hope that with the 
progressive development of the telegraph system we may have fewer and fewer of those 
irritating disputes with the United States which have too long periodically embittered 
our relations with them.
732
 
Around two weeks later, the Liverpool Mercury once more reports on the newly 
inaugurated transatlantic cable, pointing out that  
 [i]t is impossible to think of the communication so happily established between the Old 
 and New Worlds without being encouraged to hope that the telegraphic union of two 
 kindred nations may prove at once the symbol and promoter of another and a better sort 
 of union, and that the material link existing between them may link them for ever [sic]
 in the mutual friendship and brotherhood which would so greatly conduce to the highest 
 interests of both.
733
  
Similar to the article published around a fortnight earlier, though, it is subsequently 
declared, that “the peace-making virtues of the cable will depend, not on the rapidity 
with which it transmits the messages entrusted to it, but on the temper of the 
senders.” 734  Nonetheless it emphasizes “the cordial international feeling which its 
successful completion has elicited both among ourselves and our Transatlantic 
kinsmen,” for which it “anticipate[s] that the very existence of facilities for 
instantaneous communication will of itself produce new sentiments of friendliness and 
goodwill.” 735 
Concerning the attempted cable-laying of 1865, the Times similarly observes that the 
“establishment of telegraphic communication with America […] on the whole […] 
cannot fail to prove of advantage to the two nations” and therefore demands that “GOD 
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[sic] speed the Atlantic telegraph.”736 Previously, though, it has been made clear that 
communication via the electric telegraph alone is not going to solve interstate conflicts:  
 The mechanical triumph of uniting the two Continents together, whenever it is 
 accomplished, will justly be deemed enormous, but it is, perhaps, possible to overrate 
 the importance of the feat as a step in the progress of civilization. At best, the means of 
 communication is of less importance than the thing communicated.
737
 
At this point, it is also highlighted that   
 telegraphic despatches are, at the best, hasty and imperfect. Our information comes 
 more quickly, but it is less complete. This is of slight importance when the intelligence 
 only serves to excite our curiosity, but there are occasions when the transmission of  
 imperfect telegrams might produce serious embarrassment.
738
 
In this connection, the article also refers to the Trent Affair and the fact that it took 
place at a point in time when there was no transatlantic telegraphic communication 
possible. Concerning the assumption that this crisis could have been avoided or at least 
eliminated most speedily by means of electric telegraphy, it is pointed out that  
 [t]his is very doubtful. It seems more probable that the exultation of the American 
 public at the capture of the obnoxious Commissioners would have been known in 
 England, and the resentment of our own people at the want of respect to the national 
 flag would have been known in America, long before the voice of reason could have 
 been heard, and the exasperation of both nations would have been increased. The rulers
 would have found it impossible to control the passions of the ruled, and the happy 
 settlement of the dispute which did take place would have been impossible. It is 
 unnecessary to multiply instances, which are only too apparent, of the dangers of half-
 knowledge. Every one [sic] will hope that we may escape such dangers, but we can only 
 do so by remembering the imperfections of telegraphic news, and by withholding our 
 judgment in the exercise of a large charity until we are furnished with ampler details.
739
  
Similar comments can be found in an article published a few weeks later in the 
Liverpool Mercury. Here, it is first of all emphasized that  
while it would be far more foolish to expect nothing than to expect too much, we are not 
at all sure that in point of fact the immediate results of a successful laying of the 
Atlantic cable might not have been more or less disappointing to those who looked to it 
as an inauguration of a kind of political millennium of peace and goodwill. After all, a 
friendly feeling between two nations does not depend so much on rapidity of 
communication as on the nature of the matter to be communicated.
740
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In contrast to what has been assumed in 1858, it is pointed out that the mere 
establishment of speedy channels of communication will contribute little to the 
improvement of the relations between the two countries:  
If England and America do not entertain sentiments of amity and kindliness towards 
each other, these would certainly not be instantaneously created by the mere fact that an 
instrument existed for the speedy transmission of messages between the two countries. 
It would be a terrible mistake to regard an electric wire bringing London and 
Washington, Liverpool and New York, within speaking distance of each other, as a 
talisman for peace which should render superfluous all mutual endeavours to cultivate 
amicable relations – a mistake which, if it was made, would probably soon exhibit the 
telegraph in a character very unlike that of a peacemaker and friendly mediator.
741
 
Subsequently, it is also commented on the Trent affair and the way telegraphic 
communication between the countries involved could have influenced the incident: 
The power of giving instant expression to the feelings of the moment is one which, 
between nations as between individuals, needs to be accompanied with much caution 
and forbearance if it is not to be rather a cause of quarrels than a preventive. For our 
own part we cannot regard it as nearly so certain as it is sometimes said to be that an 
Atlantic telegraph, had it existed at the time of the Trent outrage, would have operated 
as an absolute security against all risk of war. We are afraid it might be maintained with 
at least equal plausibility that an apparatus which would have admitted of the exchange 
of manifestoes before the first feelings of exasperation on both sides had had time to 
cool might have appreciably increased rather than diminished the danger of a rupture.
742
  
Moreover, it is highlighted how technical failure in the transmission of telegrams might 
cause conflict and discord:  
Nor must it be forgotten that telegraphy itself may occasionally be responsible for 
creating a misunderstanding, quite irrespectively of any faults of temper or discretion on 
the part of those who avail themselves of its services. A telegram blunder in the 
transmission has not unfrequently been a cause of considerable diplomatic uneasiness 
and popular irritation; and curiously enough it so happened that one of the very few 
messages carried by the first Atlantic cable – that from the Queen to President 
Buchanan – was so mutilated in the delivery that in the form in which it first reached 
America it was productive, if not of actual soreness, at least of considerable 
disappointment.
743
  
In the summer of 1866, the Liverpool Mercury again dwells on the effects a transatlantic 
telegraph cable is going to have on the relation between the countries involved and 
remarks that the “moral and political advantages of telegraphic intercourse between 
England and America have perhaps sometimes been spoken of too unconditionally, as if 
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mere physical propinquity were in itself an absolute guarantee for mutual goodwill.”744 
It is furthermore pointed out that “[i]t its certain that, where unfriendly feeling exists, 
new facilities for its rapid expression may be a loss rather than a gain.”745 Nonetheless, 
it is assumed that by means of the cable, tensions and conflicts can be prevented, for  
it is equally certain that unfriendly feeling between communities, as between individuals, 
is frequently engendered or prolonged by mutual ignorance, and that a nearer and more 
constant intercourse may dissipate jealousies which isolation would perpetuate. We may 
at least assure ourselves that that very large class of international quarrels which may be 
described with literal accuracy as ‘misunderstandings’ will become less and less 
possible in proportion as impediments to intercourse are broken down and boundary 
lines effaced.
746
 
In October the same year, Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper refers to an article from the Daily 
News, which also voices doubts concerning the peacemaking qualities seemingly 
inherent in the submarine cable. In this connection, Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper points 
out that the previously installed European network of landlines can by no means be said 
to have eliminated military conflicts:  
 The European telegraph system is tolerably complete, and yet the nations whom it 
 unites are not beating their swords into ploughshares, but converting their rifles into 
 breechloaders. It is gratuitous to attribute to ocean telegraphy pacific effects which 
 overland telegraphy does not possess.
747
 
Moreover, the general question of the agency of technology is contemplated. On the one 
hand, it is highlighted that “[t]he telegraph is a machine for the conveyance of news, 
thoughts, and feelings. It transmits them, good or bad, but it does not change them from 
bad to good.”748 Nonetheless, though, it is emphasized that  
 it would be erroneous to divest it of all moral effects whatsoever. The printing press is 
 as neutral between good and evil as the telegraph. Truth and error, an honest and a 
 malevolent purpose, use it alike. Yet who can deny that it is a powerful agent of 
 morality and civilisation? It seems to be a law that equal facilities strengthen more the 
 naturally stronger power.
749
 
It is therefore pointed out that “if what is good in human nature is on the whole 
preponderant over what is evil, it is not Quixotic to look for moral progress from the 
telegraph.” 750  Consequently, the conclusion is drawn that the “enthusiasts who 
anticipate a millennium from the Atlantic cable, and the sceptics who say that it will 
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leave the balance of good and evil just as before, both see only half, or some smaller 
fraction, of the truth.”751 
In the reporting on transatlantic telegraph cables quoted above, various factors, 
suggesting that electric telegraphy would not necessarily turn out to be the promised 
peacemaker, are taken into consideration. It is repeatedly pointed out that it is the 
factual content and tone of a correspondence, rather than its transmission time, that is 
most important. It is furthermore emphasized that lack of detailed information and the 
garbled state in which telegrams at times arrived could also aggravate, rather than ease a 
given situation. Moreover, it is suggested that in case of the Trent Affair, speedy means 
of communication would not necessarily have had positive effects; instead, there is the 
suggestion that exasperated politicians, under pressure from an inflamed populace, 
could have worsened the situation by means of instantaneous telegraphic 
communication. Contrary to the coverage quoted previously, displaying a strictly 
technologically determinist perspective, these articles therefore illustrate that there was 
an awareness and understanding of the fact that it is the practical employment of any 
new technology that needs to be examined when trying to predict and understand its 
effect.   
The opening of the Suez Canal a few years later again fueled speculations about its 
potential effects. The canal being built under French control and against the will of the 
British government, it is hardly surprising that reporting in the British media is marked 
by a touch of scepticism. The Times, for instance, declares a few months before the 
inauguration that “[i]t is quite impossible to say what political or commercial results 
may not flow from the opening of the Suez Canal if that waterway should actually come 
into use as its promoters anticipate.”752 Around two weeks after the official opening, the 
Observer addresses the question whether the canal would usher in an era of universal 
peace. In this connection, it is highlighted that similar hopes and expectations have been 
pinned to previous technologies of transport and communication.  
 It is an invariable custom to predict for the completion of great and important works the 
 commencement of some new era of progress, and some fresh advance in the cause of 
 civilisation, or the promotion of the blessings of peace – to regard it, in fact, as 
 ‘something accomplished, something done,’ in the great cause of the world’s 
 civilisation.
753
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It is subsequently pointed out, though, that “[experience] has shown that in almost every 
case the predictions are falsified by events, and that in spite of all the obstacles that are 
overcome, human nature remains much about the same, and its tendencies in the 
direction of strife are practically unchanged.” Examples given include the Great 
Exhibition, “which was to usher in the dawn of universal peace and brotherhood,” but 
which “had scarcely been dispersed before Europe was involved in the Crimean war,” 
and the “Italian war [following] close upon the similar display of the world’s products at 
Paris.”754 It is further remarked that “[w]ere we disposed to indulge in a philosophical 
dream on the subject we might point to many occasions of a similar kind when the most 
sanguine hopes for the future were doomed to serious disappointment.”755 Again, it is 
pointed out that the mere inauguration of yet another channel of transport and 
communication is not going to prevent any interstate conflict; rather, it is once more 
emphasized, that non-technological factors, such as ‘human nature’, figure prominently 
in this context. Concerning the Suez Canal, it is therefore pointed out that “[i]t would 
appear that M. LESSEPS’ [sic] great work of the Suez Canal is likely to supply another 
illustration of the vanity of human wishes.”756 
Three weeks later, the Observer once more elaborates on the expectations pinned to the 
opening of the Suez Canal, this time in an article on the political situation prevailing in 
Europe and potential disarmament of the various countries’ troops.  
 [T]he completion of the Suez Canal, when representatives of all nations stood on 
 its banks and saw the waters of the two seas mingle together, like the opening of our
 Great Exhibition of 1851, promised the inauguration of a reign of universal peace, and 
 an immediate conversion of the swords into ploughshares, and the bayonets into 
 reaping hooks.
757
  
Subsequently, the question is raised “whether Europe now is, or, indeed, ever will be, 
sufficiently ripe for disarming on the appeal of any of the existing powers,” the answer 
to which is given immediately:  
 [S]o long as mutual suspicion, national vanity and jealousy, the memory of 
 decisive victories, and the desire for further aggrandisement rankle in the mind of 
 European rulers and statesmen, it will be vain to expect (…) that they will reduce their 
 military establishments.
758
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In similar fashion to the article published earlier the same month, it again alludes to 
various other, highly significant parameters – such as mutual distrust among the Great 
Powers, exaggerated nationalism, and collective memory of past triumphs – that play a 
decisive role when it comes to the conduct of international relations.  
 
6.3 Chapter Summary 
In the past as well as in the present, technologies of transport, communication and 
information have, in popular belief, frequently been credited with peacemaking virtues. 
The underlying idea is that the mere existence of speedy channels of communication 
and exchange allows for a deeper acquaintance with other cultures and thus fosters 
mutual understanding. What is more, it has been assumed that, availing oneself of tools 
of instantaneous communication, misunderstandings and wrong conclusions could be 
smoothed out easily and would thus not result in military conflict. Clearly, this is 
technological determinism in its purest form: this rationale does not take into account 
any non-technical factors, such as the motives or the behaviour of the actors involved. 
As regards the electric telegraph, however, there is a broad spectrum of factors (such as 
expense, fear of espionage, technical failure or reservations on the part of the parties 
involved) which would deter actors from making full use of it. Even when they did avail 
themselves of telegraphic communication, there was no guarantee this would ease the 
situation. Quite the contrary: sometimes, the rapid exchange of messages would 
intensify critical situations.  
Indeed, in the material under examination in this study, we can find evidence that 
transport and communication technologies – specifically the telegraph – were credited 
with peacemaking qualities. In accordance with the technologically determinist view 
that a particular technology would necessarily bring about a certain result, it was 
assumed that the mere fact that it was possible to communicate within hours or minutes, 
rather than weeks, would help eliminate misunderstandings between government 
officials and other policymakers and therefore render military conflicts unnecessary, if 
not downright impossible. What is more, the telegraph, railways and steamships were 
credited for giving contemporaries the opportunity of getting to know other cultures 
better, which, it was thought, would prevent war and conflict.  
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Besides such oversimplified views, however, we can also find articles which suggest 
that contemporaries were well aware of the ambiguous role the electric telegraph could 
play in the context of intergovernmental communication and crisis management. They 
contemplated, on the one hand, the problems and misunderstandings that could result 
either from the concise style in which telegrams were written or from error during 
transmission. Moreover, it is repeatedly claimed that it is the actors involved (that is, 
both sender and receiver of a message) and their intentions and perceptions that are 
most important, rather than the sheer speed of electric telegraphy. In compliance with 
approaches that study technologies as they are actually used, it is thus emphasized that 
one has to contemplate the interplay of the various factors, rather than studying the 
telegraph in isolation. In line with this, previous events and technological achievements, 
which failed to fulfil contemporaries’ high expectations, are drawn upon in order to 
illustrate that such one-sided analyses cannot provide any useful results concerning 
transport and communication technologies’ ramifications on interstate relations.   
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 “India, she had found out, was a place of political intrigue and economic 
  corruption, a place occupied by real people with their incessantly human 
 needs, desires, ambitions, and aspirations, and not the exotic, spiritual, 
mysterious entity that was a creation of the Western imagination.”759 
 
7. Technology and the Other: Transport and Communication 
Technologies, Collective Identity and Interstate Rivalries  
In Machines as the Measure of Men, Michael Adas draws upon a passage from Mary 
Kingsley’s West African Studies in order to illustrate how, in the nineteenth century, 
technological achievements were deemed proof of British superiority.
760
 Here, Kingsley 
comments as follows:  
 All I can say is, that when I come back from a spell in Africa, the thing that makes me 
 proud of being of the English is not the manners or customs up here, certainly not the 
 houses or the climate; but it is the thing embodied in a great railway engine. I once came 
 home on a ship with an Englishman who had been in South West Africa for seven 
 unbroken years; he was sane, and in his  right mind. But no sooner did we get ashore at 
 Liverpool, than he rushed at and threw his arms round a postman, to that 
 official’s embarrassment and surprise. Well, that is just how I feel about the first 
 magnificent bit of machinery I come across: it is the manifestation of the superiority of 
 my race.
761
 
Kingsley’s comment not only pinpoints the significance of technological accomplish-
ments – in this case, a railway engine – as symbols of British superiority. It also 
illustrates the extent to which machinery mattered in terms of her self-conception as an 
English: eventually, the ‘great railway engine’ she mentions seems to evoke more 
tender feelings toward her home country than customs, architectural style or the 
seemingly ‘typically English’ weather.  
This chapter therefore examines the role nineteenth-century transport and 
communication technologies were ascribed in contemporary reporting in the context of 
the formation of collective identities. In this respect, it investigates two distinct, albeit 
closely interwoven aspects: On the one hand, transport and communication technologies 
were considered what Adas aptly calls ‘measures of men’ in terms of a juxtaposition of 
                                                          
759
 Thrity Umrigar, The Weight of Heaven (New York: Harper Perennial, 2010), 51.  
760
 Cf. Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men, 147.  
761
 Mary H. Kingsley, West African Studies (London: Macmillan, 1899), 386. 
168 
 
Eastern and Western civilizations.
762
 The chapter will thus investigate the roles 
contemporaries attributed to these technologies in an imperial context. It will show that 
the ways in which both Eastern and Western industrial and technological products were 
represented in the contemporary British press supported the idea of Western superiority 
and served as a justification for imperial efforts and policies. 
Further, the chapter is concerned with the creation and consolidation of British 
collective identity and the roles transport and communication technologies played in 
this context. In this connection, it takes into account that machines could act as 
measures of men not only in an imperial context: in fact they also served as an arena for 
interstate rivalries as regards Britain’s relations to its former colonies in North America 
and its continental neighbours.    
First of all, however, a brief word on terminology is necessary. Whereas Kingsley 
points out how being English is a source of pride to her, Adas refers to feelings of 
British superiority. Rather than accusing Adas of semantic inaccuracy, one should keep 
in mind that this English/British metonymy has a long tradition. Linda Colley points out 
that in the eighteenth century ‘England’ was used referring to “much more than just one 
part of the island” and became “a synonym for Great Britain as a whole and very often 
for its  empire as well.”763 Certainly, such inaccuracies could – and indeed frequently 
did – connote the desire of English supremacy over its immediate neighbours and the 
wish to “[subsume] Britain under the auspices of ‘Greater England’.”764 But, as Colley 
and Marshall have emphasized, contemporaries did not necessarily look at it from this 
point of view – the English, the Scots and the Welsh did in equal measure use the terms 
England/English when they actually meant Britain/British.
765
 As will be seen below, the 
‘English’ achievements in the field of transport and communication technologies were 
mostly considered to represent a particular ‘spirit’, ‘genius’ and skillfulness when they 
were juxtaposed to the inventions of other, for instance continental, states (rather than 
being deemed a symbol of English superiority compared to the Scots and the Welsh). 
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Moreover, ‘English’ and ‘British’ were at times used interchangeably in the very same 
article. For this reason, I will not dwell on these distinctions any further.
766
 
On the following pages, I will appraise the factors contributing to the formation of 
imagined communities, specifically in the case of Great Britain, and dwell briefly on the 
role technological achievements played in this context.  
 
7.1 ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ – Imagined Communities and the Significant Other 
Defining the nation as “an imagined political community,”767 Anderson explains that 
“[i]t is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most 
of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives 
the image of their communion.” 768  [italics in original] The nation – or any other 
community, for that matter
769
 – is therefore held together by the mere belief they have 
something in common, be it cultural values, religion or ties to a particular territory.
770
  
In the concept of Anna Triandafyllidou, who elaborates how national identities are 
based on a combination of what she calls inclusive and exclusive factors, this belief in 
certain unifying characteristics is part of the inclusive aspect. She furthermore 
highlights that for members of a group to develop a sense of community, it is sufficient 
to “share with one another more things in common than they share with outsiders.”771 
At the same time, it has become commonplace to stress the significance of precisely this 
outside other from which the particular community can differentiate itself and “against 
which the unity and homogeneity of the ingroup is tested”772 (this being the exclusive 
aspect). In this context, Triandafyllidou introduces the notion of the ‘significant others’, 
which can appear in a wide range of forms – for instance in the shape of an internal 
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ethnic minority or as a rival state – and which impact on the emergence and 
transformation of a nation’s collective identity “by means of their ‘threatening’ 
presence.”773 In this connection, some of the alleged common features shared by the 
ingroup are deemed particularly significant in order to differentiate ingroup from 
outgroup and to demonstrate a feeling of belonging.  
These elaborations are peculiarly interesting as regards Great Britain and the 
construction of British national identity. As Linda Colley has emphasized, Britishness 
was neither the product of an amalgamation of previously existing national or regional 
identities, nor did it supplant them.
774
 Rather, it was an additional, superimposed 
identity (and a particularly good example of what Triandafyllidou means with ‘relative 
value’),775 based on the very fact that the English, Welsh and Scottish, despite all their 
differences, felt they had more in common with one another than they had with 
others.
776
 In the case of Great Britain, the ties to a distinct territory are considered to 
have played a particularly prominent role concerning the creation of collective identity: 
its island position on the edge of Europe, the fact that its external borders were clearly 
circumscribed by the sea – in contrast to continental powers, whose borders had long 
been and still were subject to repeated changes – and the resulting feeling of seclusion 
from enemies contributed decisively to the feeling of distinction on the side of the 
islanders. Consequently, Smith considers a “sense of the ‘uncrossable ring of sea’ (...) 
the most potent of England’s historic ethnoscapes” (an imagery that, as he points out, is 
most aptly captured in John of Gaunt’s deathbed speech).777 Moreover, seafaring and 
naval power were particularly significant both as means to safeguard British 
commercial and military interests in a European context as well as foundation of the 
British overseas empire; consequently, “[c]onfidence in their maritime prowess was 
crucial to British people’s beliefs that they exercised a empire over the seas.”778  
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When Linda Colley declares that the British defined themselves “in reaction to the 
Other beyond their shores,”779 she alludes to two more aspects which need to be taken 
into account. One of these is the seemingly incessant conflict between France and 
Britain, which between the early eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century 
found expression in a series of wars and culminated in the Battle of Waterloo in 1815. 
Colley emphasizes that in terms of the formation of a British imagined community, 
France therefore acted as a ‘significant Other’: the English, Welsh and Scottish 
conceived the Catholic opponent on the other side of the Channel as an omnipresent 
menacing ‘Other’ and therefore moved closer together under the umbrella of British 
identity, “[defining] themselves against the French as they imagined them to be, 
superstitious, militarist, decadent and unfree.”780   
Furthermore, the imperial dimension and its impact on the formation of British identity 
have been highlighted repeatedly. Here, it is again advisable to distinguish between 
internal and external factors. On the one hand, economic interconnections, tides of 
emigration and the resulting personal communication across continents, and literary 
works with imperial topics, just to name a few factors, were experiences shared by the 
English, the Welsh and the Scots alike. This collective experience brought about an 
overall imperial state of mind and served as a platform on which the distinctions 
between English, Welsh and Scottish identities could be overcome.
781
 Accordingly, 
“imperial sentiment was genuinely British in is reach, sufficiently so to make it one of 
the defining characteristics of Britishness in the late nineteenth century.”782 At the same 
time, this common identity was strengthened by the fact that Britain’s colonial 
possessions (specifically its colonies of occupation) and its informal empire represented 
yet further ‘significant Others’. In this connection, Eastern possessions figured most 
prominently: as Edward Said in his monography on Orientalism (originally published in 
1978) has pointed out, “[t]he Orient is not only adjacent to Europe,” but  
 is also the place of Europe’s greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its 
 civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most 
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 recurring images of the Other. In addition, the Orient has helped to define Europe (or 
 the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience.
783
  
As Adas has shown, however, the parameters drawn upon by Western colonial powers 
in order to contrast themselves from non-European civilizations changed over the 
centuries: prior to the Industrial Revolution, religion was the fundament on which 
European self-perception and the alleged superiority vis-à-vis their non-Christian 
colonial possessions was based. Science began to gain a stronger foothold in public 
perception in the course of the eighteenth century. In particular Newton’s findings 
loomed large, and accordingly “Europeans were confident that largely because of 
advances in the sciences they had surpassed all other civilizations, past or present.”784 In 
the course of the nineteenth century (in other words, at the heyday of British Empire), 
technology came to be viewed as the primary marker of human achievement and 
therefore represented the decisive dividing line between the ruling colonial powers of 
the time, on the one hand, and non-European civilizations, on the other. By no means 
were science and technology the only standards of comparison at that point in time; 
religion, for instance, was still a significant gauge, as were governmental systems and 
ethical codes, just to name a few.
785
 Nonetheless, as Adas emphasizes, due to the 
objectivity seemingly inherent to science and technology, these were deemed most 
significant and  
 colonial administrators and missionaries, travelers and social commentators increasingly 
 stressed technological and scientific standards as the most reliable basis for comparisons 
 between societies and civilizations. In an age when what were held to be ‘scientific’ 
 proofs were increasingly demanded of those engaged in the study of natural history and 
 social development, material achievement and anatomical measurements proved 
 irresistible gauges of human capacity and worth.
786
 
In light of Europe’s proceeding industrialization and given the fact that science and 
technology had become central to European self-conception, it is hardly surprising that 
they – under the guise of the civilizing mission – served as a justification for imperial 
ambitions: in the phraseology of the time, it was the ‘white man’s burden’ to employ the 
latest technological achievements to improve the living conditions of less industrialized 
cultures, so that they could participate in the march towards progress.
787
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Lara Kriegel’s analysis of the ways in which India was represented in reporting on the 
Great Exhibition is a good example of how this belief in technology being the ultimate 
gauge manifested in contemporary publications. Kriegel illustrates that Indian products 
provoked both feelings of admiration and “ethnographic curiosity.”788 India was, on the 
one hand, considered a haven of oriental splendour and magnificence and was closely 
associated with the magical stories of the Arabian Nights. Furthermore, the artistry and 
craftsmanship displayed in the exhibits, such as muslin and chintz, was widely 
acknowledged. It was therefore admitted that – in this respect – they were superior to 
British artefacts. Kriegel, however, also demonstrates that this was only one side of the 
coin and that, at the same time, Indian exhibits and the tools with which they were 
produced were considered to indicate that the subcontinent’s development had come to 
a halt a long time ago and that by now, it was devoid of any dynamics. In fact, India was 
deemed the cradle of civilizations, but more in the style of a museum than anything else: 
Indian produce was depicted as a “combination of antiquity and constancy.”789 In so 
doing, one could categorize Indian products as remnants of the past, rather than as 
serious competition to British commodities. Further, Indian modes of production were 
taken to reflect, in the words of Kriegel, “Oriental savagery, barbarity, backwardness, 
wastefulness, and even filth,” 790  whereas Western manufacturing demonstrated 
dedication to utilitarianism and liberty. Overall, it was thus possible to maintain the 
notion of the “relative upper hand”791 of industrialized Western cultures. What is more, 
Kriegel shows how the exhibits presented at the Great Exhibition and the corresponding 
narratives were employed to reinforce a multi-layered hierarchy: the seeming continuity 
displayed in the Indian exhibits distinguished the subcontinent from other non-European 
cultures (for instance, Egypt or West African civilizations), which in the eyes of British 
observers offered nothing but crude and unrefined handiworks or ruins. 
792
 
Following Adas’ argument and Kingsley’s example, I will first of all illustrate how the 
produce of non-Western cultures was represented in the reporting on nineteenth-century 
transport and communication technologies and the Great Exhibition, before I turn to 
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their relevance in terms of British common identity and comparisons between European 
nations.   
 
7.2 The Ornamental and the Useful – A Tale of Western Superiority  
Two weeks after the official opening of the Great Exhibition, the Times publishes an 
article which, in the style of a guide book, informs readers about the exhibits of the 
various countries participating. In this context, it is first of all pointed out that 
 [i]n no fairer or truer mirror can national characters be represented than in their 
 industrial products. Other pictures may deceive, but this must tell the truth. The course 
 of events, guided as it is by a higher power than man’s, does not always illustrate 
 the moral and social attributes of communities. Not so the fruits of labour – the quality 
 and description of material which engross the toil, supply the demand, and engage the 
 tastes and predilections of a people. These tell their story as faithfully as the actions or 
 the physiognomy of an individual indicate his nature.
793
 
The article then describes how Great Britain presents itself:  
 Let us commence at home, and see what appearance this island of ours puts on at the 
 peaceful réunion [sic] of nations, Is [sic] it Britannia, with her trident and plumed 
 helmet and the lion recumbent at her feet, or John Bull’s portly form, carrying weight 
 in every limb, and determination, not unmingled with prejudice, from the crown of his
 broad-brimmed hat to the soles of his top-boots? Far otherwise. Some traces of those 
 popular types of our nationality may be traced, but England has greatly changed. Her 
 genius is mechanism, her master spirit the civil engineer, her tendencies to relieve 
 labour from its drudgery, and delegate to iron, to steam, and to the other powers of the 
 inanimate world as much as possible of the burden of toil.
794
 
Accordingly, the conclusion is drawn that “[i]n our manufactures the mechanical genius 
of the country reigns supreme.”795 Subsequently, the readers’ attention is drawn to the 
contributions of “our empire in the East,” which were also exhibited in the British 
section. The Indian collection, which, as the article points out, consists of “filagree [sic] 
work in silver and gold, brocaded stuffs, curiously executed carvings, rude models of 
machinery,”796 is described as follows:  
Here are gathered together the trophies of ancient civilization and arts, marvellously 
carried down to our own time. Here may be studied the industrial habit of nations 
preserved through centuries without change or progress, yet still wonderful and 
magnificent in the eyes of modern labour. (…) Nearly everything in that collection 
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which is the work of a man’s hand indicates a vast expenditure of time for its production 
and a great display of taste.
797
  
In the eyes of British observers, however, the major drawback to Indian produce is what 
is perceived to be lack of usefulness: 
Yet it is nearly all ornamental rather than useful, in its character. Whenever the really 
useful arts appear rudeness of material and design are visible. A warlike weapon will be 
finished off in the most elaborate style, yet a pair of scissors be manufactured in a 
manner worthy of the South Sea Islanders. The East India Company begin their rule of 
India as if it were a new country. The evidences of barbaric pomp, the State umbrellas, 
the cloth of gold, and robes decorated with pearls and diamonds, concern not them. 
These belong to the natives, to the traditions of the past, and to industries which have 
been bequeathed from age to age as an heirloom.
798
 
Consequently, the conclusion is drawn that  
 [o]ur part of the collection is the raw produce – the mineral, vegetable, and animal 
 treasures undiscovered and unused till our commerce and the wants of our manufactures 
 sought them out. Resting upon them, we strive to build on substantial and permanent 
 foundations the structure of empire and government in India; at least, that is the lesson 
 which the Exhibition seems to teach (….). Such is a brief and imperfect outline of what 
 we conceive to be the character and inward meaning of the vast mass of objects which 
 have been collected within the British half of the Crystal Palace.
799
 
This article is particularly noteworthy as it illustrates a variety of things:
800
 To start with 
(and in accordance with Adas’ elaborations), the article stresses the significance of 
technology and industrial production in the sense that they are not only deemed the 
ultimate gauge of a country’s progressiveness, but are also considered to give some 
indication of its national character. Britain is depicted as a progressive and civilized 
country which, owing to its competence in the fields of civil engineering and mechanics, 
has been able to change ‘greatly’ and, in so doing, has managed to overcome hardship 
and toil. India and other non-European countries,
801
 on the other hand, are reduced to 
their ornamental and handicraft skills: these bear witness to an ancient past, but are of 
no ‘real’ use in the nineteenth century. They are thus considered proof that the 
subcontinent’s development has come to a standstill a long time ago. This, in turn, is 
taken as a justification for Britain’s imperial efforts in India.   
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In “The General Bearing of the Great Exhibition,” it becomes peculiarly manifest how 
exhibits were drawn upon in order to establish hierarchical rankings. Similar to the 
above-quoted article from the Times, the “General Bearing” specifies the exhibits from 
different countries and compares them with one another. To start with, products from 
various island peoples from the Indian Ocean are presented:  
From Labuan, the last specimen of savage life with which this country has become 
connected, we have also clothes and armour, weapons and musical instruments. From 
all the wide domains which lie within or around our Indian Empire we have rich and 
various contributions; from Sincapore and Ceylon, Celebes and Java, Mengatal and 
Palembang. The ruder and more primitive of these regions send us their native food and 
clothing, their fishing nets and baskets.
802
 
It is also pointed out, though, that “art soon goes beyond these first essays. From 
Sumatra we have the loom and the plough, lacquered work and silken wares.”803 In 
contrast to the contributions mentioned above, those from the Indian subcontinent – “so 
long the field of a peculiar form of civilization”804 – are portrayed as “treasures of skill 
and ingenuity, of magnificence and beauty.” 805  Again, it is the decorativeness and 
ornamental value of these artefacts that is being emphasized:  
 And when we come to the higher stages of cultured art – to the works of nations long 
 civilized, though inferior to ourselves, it may be, in progressive civilization and 
 mechanical power, how much do we find in their works which we must admire, which 
 we might envy, which, indeed, might drive us to despair! Even still, the tissues and 
 ornamental works of Persia and of India have beauties which we, with all our appliances 
 and means, cannot surpass. The gorgeous East showers its barbaric pearl and gold into 
 its magnificent textures.
806
  
In consequence, the conclusion is drawn that “Oriental magnificence is still a proverbial 
mode of describing a degree of splendour and artistical richness which is not found 
among ourselves.”807 [italics in original] The question is then raised if and to what 
extent Great Britain can overall still be considered more advanced. Already previously, 
though, readers have been told that “in advancing from [the products of extra-European 
civilizations] to the productions of our own form of civilization (…), we advance also to 
a more skilful, powerful, comprehensive and progressive form of art.”808 At this later 
point, it is once more emphasized that   
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[s]urely our imagined superiority is not all imaginary; surely we really are more 
advanced than they, and this term ‘advanced’ has a meaning; surely that mighty thought 
of a PROGRESS [sic] in the life of nations is not an empty dream; and surely our 
progress has carried us beyond them.
809
 
The reason for such differences between peoples “in a condition of nearly stationary 
civilization, like Oriental nations, and nations which have felt the full influence of 
progress like ourselves,”810 is considered to be the fact that    
 in those countries the arts are mainly exercised to gratify the tastes of the few; with us, 
 to supply the wants of the many. There, the wealth of a province is absorbed in the dress 
 of a mighty warrior; here, the gigantic weapons of the peaceful potentate are used to 
 provide clothing for the world.
811
 
In line with what Kriegel has shown (and in accordance with what has been illustrated 
in Chapter 4), it is again pointed out that, firstly, India is not developing any further, but 
is at a standstill in the past, and secondly, that it is not only the sheer ability to construct 
a certain machine or to manufacture a particular product, but also the extent to which 
the population at large can benefit from any invention, which is considered decisive. In 
the eyes of British contemporaries, India, despite all its astonishing and beautifully 
crafted products, must therefore remain inferior to Great Britain, which is characterized 
by dynamism and progress.  
In an Exhibition Supplement to the Illustrated London News, the seeming lack of 
development is also mentioned. Here, the reader’s attention is drawn to a “variety of 
models of the mills, gins, and other works used in the preparation and manufacture of 
the cotton plant.”812 These are considered to be   
 primitive contrivances of the rudest class, to which, we are sorry to believe, few or no 
 additions or improvements have been made for centuries, showing how much remains 
 yet to be done, when the light of civilisation shall have made its genial influence felt by 
 our oriental brethren.
813
  
Similar reporting can also be found in the Liverpool Mercury. To start with, the article 
emphasizes that other countries are superior to Britain in terms of the decorative 
character of their products: 
 The attention paid to all these matters abroad, as compared with this country, is now 
 daily and hourly felt, and lamented by our own manufacturers, who have certainly been 
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 making great efforts of late to bring up their leeway, and to approach nearer to the best 
 standards of continental taste.
814
  
It is further pointed out that  
 while other countries have been studying chiefly to render their industrial products 
 artistic, we have been struggling to render ours cheap and serviceable; and if it be a 
 question whether they have not gone too far in the one direction, it cannot be doubted 
 that we have been too exclusively bent upon the other. But it is not the great European 
 communities that alone teach us a lesson in this  respect – for we cannot approach the 
 carpets and rugs of Turkey, Tunis, India, and other countries, far behind us as they are 
 in general civilization.
815
 
The conclusion is thus drawn that  
 if England wishes to maintain her position and character in the industrial world, she 
 must cultivate more closely than hitherto not so much the fine arts, per se, as the 
 practical application of  them to useful objects.
816
 
Subsequently, however, it is pointed out that, in other respects, Britain is still way ahead 
of its competitors:  
 And now let us briefly indicate some of the points on which, from the opportunities of 
 comparison which the Exhibition affords, we are justified in thinking that foreign 
 nations may learn something from us. They will find the unmistakeable proofs of a 
 strong and sturdy system of industry adjusted to a broad utilitarian standard. Whatever 
 enters largely into the demand of the consumer, and is indispensable to the subsistence 
 or comfort of the masses, attracts to its production the largest amount of energy, capital, 
 and skill. In order to manufacture cheaply, we have organised an immense and 
 complicated body of machinery, which spins and weaves, and forges and turns iron, and 
 asserts an almost unbounded supremacy over the materials which enter into the use of 
 mankind for clothing, for labour or defence, for household purposes, for locomotion, 
 and for instruction (…). Paisley shawls, Kidderminster carpets, and Nottingham lace, 
 will not stand, respectively, a comparison with those of Cashmere, Aubusson, or 
 Valenciennes; but the difference of prices more than restores the balance of commercial 
 value. 
817
 
Finally, the multifarious improvements obtained in the field of transport technologies 
are listed:  
 In locomotion we have organised a stupendous system, both by land and sea, for the 
 wants of an ever-extending traffic, and the illustrations which are produced in the 
 Exhibition of that system are full not only of the evidences of past success, but also of 
 the indications of future progress. Not to speak of new descriptions of permanent way, 
 new constructions of carriages, new distributions of weight and strain in locomotives, 
 greater economy of space, and more direct action in marine engines, there are hitherto 
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 unattempted methods of propulsion exemplified by models, among which are included 
 aërial machines and a plan for the substitution of the electro-magnetic power for 
 steam.
818
  
In conclusion, readers are told that “in all the leading departments of industry the aim of 
England is still to produce for the masses, to consult utility, and to insure, as far as in 
her lies, the elements of cheapness and good quality.”819 
An article published in the Illustrated London News is particularly noteworthy in that it 
initially stresses the unifying aspects of science and technology:  
 The civilisation of Europe, so far as it depends on religion and science, is, to a great 
 extent, common. If it vary in degree in different countries, it has gone, or is going, 
 through nearly the same phases in all. The sciences of astronomy, geology, and 
 chemistry, for example, and the arts connected with them such as navigation, mining, 
 dyeing, smelting, &c., are common to all the nations of Europe. All the arts of life are 
 founded on some principles common to the whole human race, and are practised in a 
 similar manner. From science being everywhere the same, we draw the inference that 
 the minds of all men are somewhat alike. (…) There are not two astronomies, two 
 mathematics, or two chemistries – one for England and another for Italy; there are not 
 separate sciences for every distinct country, but only one science for all. This similarity 
 of uniformity of knowledge constitutes the true brotherhood of mankind.
820
  
It is furthermore pointed out that the Exhibition  
 has especially made evident and palpable to all the universal prevalence of a common 
 industry, directed to similar purposes, and guided by similar rules. The differences 
 between the productions of China and France, of Hindostan and the United States, are 
 not so remarkable to reflecting minds as their similarity. Not only similar arts exist in 
 the most distant countries, but similar inventions have taken place; and – not to speak of 
 the art – of making paper, earthenware, and ships, gunpowder, printing, and bank-notes 
 have all been invented in China as in Europe.
821
  
Contrary to previous reporting, the article initially makes no mention of the alleged 
backwardness of other civilizations. Instead, it emphasizes the similarities between 
different cultures concerning scientific and technological developments. Consequently, 
it is anticipated that  
 the Exhibition (…) will be of political value. It proclaims as a great truth, that no 
 legislation can be durable, no statesmanship beneficial, which does not fall in, like the 
 Exhibition itself, with the general progress towards acknowledging and promoting a 
 common brotherhood. By showing us that all art is founded on common principles, and 
 on sciences common to all, it impresses on us the important truth, that we shall be 
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 powerful, wise, and happy not as we gain victories over each other, but in proportion as 
 we comprehend that external cause to which all science relates.
822
  
Subsequently, however, the article also refers to the afore-mentioned juxtaposition of 
useful and decorative exhibits: 
 A great part of the Exhibition consists of luxuries and ornaments – of jewels for the few, 
 rather than of bread for the multitude; but it contains also working models of powerful 
 and valuable machines. Bringing the two together, forces on the mind at once a 
 comparison and a contrast between the merely ornamental and the useful arts. A steam-
 engine and the Koh-i-noor are placed before us, and we are called on to choose between 
 them. An improved Jacquard loom, or a power-loom that appears instinct with life, or a 
 printing press, arrests attention as well as the sculpture in the Nave and the glittering 
 works in the French department.
823
 
Finally, however, it is once more the utility of British products and the notion that they 
cater to the needs of the masses that are considered proof of their superiority (and, in 
line with what has been shown in chapter 4, distinguish the nineteenth century from 
earlier times).  
 As the rule, we may say that the useful arts are the handmaids of the multitude; the 
 ornamental arts, of the few. The former (…) are much more rapidly and certainly 
 improved than the latter. Accordingly, while our journals teem with numerous and loud 
 complaints of a general want of taste – of the ornamental arts being neither understood 
 nor appreciated – only admiration is felt for our wonderful mechanical contrivances. 
 The ornamental arts, subserving chiefly the pleasure of the few, have in them something 
 conservative, and they change less and are improved less than the useful arts. In 
 sculpture we are still proud to imitate the Greeks, and rarely hope to attain perfection. In 
 painting we do not surpass the Italians of the Middle Ages. Our carving is, perhaps, less 
 skilful than that of the Chinese; and few of our silversmiths reach the excellence of 
 Benvenuto Cellini. The colours of our garments, their shape and texture, and the 
 ornaments of our houses, are about equal to those of the Hindoos and the Romans. But 
 our power-looms, railroads, locomotives, spinning-mules, telegraphs, tubular bridges, 
 &c., far beyond anything the people of antiquity ever dreamed of, are the pride of this 
 generation. They are our own invention, and we deem them much more worthy than the 
 products of arts we have inherited from the rude nations of antiquity. It may be 
 suspected, therefore, that the superiority sometimes assigned to the ornamental and fine 
 arts is more due to their gratifying the tastes of a few, and to an inherited reverence for 
 them, so far as this generation is concerned, than to their intrinsic worth.
824
    
A few weeks before the closing of the Great Exhibition, the Times comments similarly. 
Concerning the awarding of medals it is highlighted that most attention has been paid to 
ornamental and decorative artefacts, such as “rich brocades, splendid carpets, glowing 
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tapestry, and all that tends to embellish and adorn life.”825 It is further remarked that 
“the captivating luxuries which are adapted to the few have entered more largely into 
our imaginations and our hearts than those objects which are adapted to supply the 
homely comforts and the unpretending wants of the many.”826 The inferiority of British 
products in terms of design and embellishment is readily acknowledged, for “[t]here 
cannot be a question that the results of the Exhibition have demonstrated in the clearest 
manner our backwardness in the higher and more artistic branches of manufactures.”827 
Subsequently, however, it is emphasized that this only plays a secondary role, for there 
are 
 matters that touch us more nearly than even the true principles of colour and form, and 
 of these the most prominent are such as affect our position as caterers for the demand of 
 the million, as manufacturers of cheap and useful commodities adapted to the wants of 
 the masses all over the world. 
828
  
These accounts of the products exhibited at the Great Exhibition therefore already 
illustrate, firstly, the extent to which material products and national culture were 
considered to be correlated, and secondly, to what extent this relation was drawn upon 
in order to construct and perpetuate hierarchical rankings.  
As has been pointed to before, Adas shows how scientific and technological superiority 
served as the foundations of the civilizing mission, adding a moral element to the 
otherwise economic and geopolitical motifs behind imperialist efforts.
829
 It is therefore 
hardly surprising that in accordance with the accounts of the Great Exhibition, this line 
of argument is also taken up in Poles, Wires and Cables, which elaborates the way 
electric telegraphy can be made use of in an imperial context. Here, it is pointed out that  
 in our communication with India, China and Japan, the Electric Telegraph will be not 
 merely a commercial and political, but a Religious Auxiliary! [sic] It will afford another 
 means of disseminating the Bible, of aiding the labours of the Missionary, of making 
 Christianity known among the heathen. (…) [A] great means of promoting Christianity 
 is now placed in your hands, almost as if in acknowledgement of your efforts to 
 promote it.
830
 
It is furthermore pointed out that  
  Persia, India, China and Japan require to be brought into closer communion with 
 Christian nations. These are the countries in which we have our work to do. Hundreds 
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 of millions of souls are  to be saved in those Empires. And the Telegraph, above all 
 other means, will assist our efforts, by bringing them close home to us.
831
  
Moreover, the application of the electric telegraph as a tool in the civilizing mission is 
considered further proof of Western civilizations’ progressiveness and superiority over 
extra-European and non-Christian peoples: whereas “Mahomet proposed to work out his 
religion by the sword: a cruel and destructive instrument,”  
[t]he followers of Christ work out their principles with the Bible: an intellectual and 
civilizing means. But to teach the great truths of Christianity by means of its Great 
Book requires time, opportunity and perseverance. The Telegraph, as an aid to the Bible, 
will annihilate time, open up opportunity, and afford to perseverance that encourage-
ment without which it too frequently becomes dejected despondent.
832
  
 
7.3 Transport and Communication Technologies: National Identity, 
International Rivalry  
In the publications under review, science and technology were not only used to point up 
Western civilization’s alleged superiority over Eastern cultures, though. They were also 
drawn upon in terms of the creation of British national identity and served as a gauge by 
means of which European countries could be categorized. In the above-quoted Poles, 
Wires and Cables, for instance, it is vehemently emphasized that  
[the] Electric Telegraph belongs to ENGLAND. [sic] This wonderful invention of 
Cooke and Wheatstone was originated, developed, and carried through all its details and 
difficulties in England. It belongs, peculiarly, to English science, to English enterprise, 
to English perseverance, and to English men; and England and her people may well be 
proud of it.
833
 
Similarly, the Observer, reporting the attempt of laying a transatlantic submarine cable 
in 1865, points to specific qualities without which this task could not have been carried 
out successfully: 
If Englishmen were much less famous than they are for perseverance and tenacity of 
purpose there would be no reason to suppose that the check they have received in their 
second great attempt to effect telegraphic communication between the shores of Ireland 
and Newfoundland would lead to the problem being thrown aside, as too difficult of 
solution, in our present state of mechanical and scientific knowledge. Were the project 
much less hopeful we should rely confidently on that indomitable determination 
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inherent in the national character for continued effort, until the great and crowning 
triumph of complete success made ample amends for previous failures.
834
 
In the run-up to the Great Eastern’s maiden voyage, the Illustrated London News in a 
similar manner points out that the ship “is not only the greatest national wonder of our 
age, but the noblest single proof of the scientific genius of our country” and further 
considers her a “marvel of shipbuilding and engineering skill, and the one pre-eminent 
triumph of British enterprise and perseverance.”835 All of these passages thus make 
mention of seemingly typically English / British qualities which were deemed necessary 
in order to fulfil the specific task – accordingly, no other country could have succeeded 
in carrying out these projects.   
Hardly surprisingly, it is particularly in the reporting on the Great Eastern steamship 
that the significance of Britain’s island position, on the one hand, and the sea and 
seafaring, on the other, in the context of British self-conception comes to the fore. The 
Illustrated London News considers the ship a “magnificent floating railway to Calcutta 
on our own peculiar element.”836 In The Great Eastern Steam Ship it is pointed out that 
she is “the most magnificent creation of naval architecture that the world has ever seen, 
and a characteristic monument of the genius of England and the glory of her prodigious 
commerce.”837 In The Visitors’ Guide to the Great Eastern, it is highlighted that  
 [t]o us as a maritime people, the construction of ships, both for war and commerce, has 
 been naturally an object of peculiar interest and vast importance; and in that direction 
 art and science combined seem to have wrought extraordinary results. The geographical 
 position of our island-home would make us an isolated people but for our taste and  
 aptitude for the navigation of the waters.
838
 
It is furthermore pointed out that, as a result,  
Englishmen are justly proud of their maritime supremacy. Our insular position has 
rendered this supremacy of the highest importance to us; on it has depended our very 
existence as a nation, and there is therefore singular propriety in our speaking of our 
ships as ‘wooden walls,’ and as the ‘bulwarks of the deep.’839 
What is more, the Great Eastern is embedded in Anglo-Saxon history. Referring to the 
long-standing tradition of seafaring, on the one hand, and the military, political and 
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commercial achievements resulting from it, on the other, the notion of English maritime 
supremacy is reinforced:   
Our naval history is replete with great victories, and lustrous with the names of the great 
naval heroes. Our ancestors asserted their hereditary right to the sovereignty of the seas, 
and that claim was completely established by our naval achievements. In the time of 
war our fleets have been unrivalled, they have guarded our own shore from invasion, 
and blockaded the ports of our enemies; they have extended our empire and 
consolidated our power. In time of peace, our merchant army has been equally 
serviceable, enabling us to establish commercial relations with all nations, to lay the 
foundations of flourishing colonies, to open up new marts for commerce, and to 
increase our trade beyond all precedent. Hence the art of ship-building is so intimately 
connected with the progress of mercantile pursuits, the chief characteristics of our race, 
that we naturally feel deeply interested in its advance.
840
 
In comparison with previous steamships, such as the Comet, the Great Western or the 
Persia, contemporary ships resemble “floating palaces“ and observers may “be 
overwhelmed with wonder at the progress which British skills, wealth, and energy have 
effected in so brief a period.”841 The Great Eastern is therefore considered the “last 
specimen of our modern naval architecture” and “a characteristic monument of the 
genius of England and the glory of her prodigious commerce.”842 (What is more, the 
article makes mention of both the genius of England and of British skills; this is yet 
another indication that the two were used interchangeably.)  
Furthermore, the sea as a defining feature of British national identity is also mentioned 
in connection with other technological achievements. In the context of the laying of the 
1858 transatlantic cable, the Illustrated London News remarks that there can be little 
doubt “not only that we shall speedily have telegraphic communication with India and 
China, but that such communication will be made through our own national domain and 
peculiar property – the Sea.”843  
As has been seen, in the eyes of British contemporaries, transport and communication 
technologies represented what was deemed typically English / British qualities, such as 
tenacity, perseverance, and determination. On this basis, comparisons with other 
European countries are drawn. Concerning the planning and organization of the Great 
Exhibition, it is asserted that there is “no other country under the sun from which the 
invitation to the nations of the world to exhibit productions of their industry could have 
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proceeded with so much grace and propriety as England.”844 In this context, Britain’s 
role in the formation of global transport and communication networks is emphasized:  
With the exception of the United States of America, no other country has sought to 
imitate, far less to rival, the efforts of England to establish regular and rapid 
communication between all parts of the globe. Had any of our continental neighbours 
issued such an invitation, it must have been borne to the ends of the earth in English 
steamers, and visitors would have voyaged to it in ships sailing under the English flag. 
The mighty task of bringing all the nations of the world nearer and closer to each other 
has been, as if by tacit consent, left to be accomplished by English skill, ingenuity, and 
enterprise; and as by us the pathless tracks of ocean have been converted into grand 
highways for ‘joining the countries they divide,’ so the terminus of all these great 
highways has been, without dispute, selected as the most fitting place for the exhibition 
of the world’s industry.845  
As has been alluded to by Hempstead and as indicated in this passage, nineteenth-
century reporting on transport and communication technologies bears witness to a 
growing rivalry between Great Britain and the United States.
846
 Further evidence of this 
can be found in other publications. In an article on the 1858 cable – “sentimentally 
called the Wedding-ring between England and the United States”847 – Lloyd’s Weekly 
Newspaper dwells on the assumption that Americans claim the success of laying a 
transatlantic cable for themselves. Readers are therefore reminded that the magazine has 
earlier expressed  
a sincere hope that the wire lying upon the bed of the great ocean would be a bond of 
good-fellowship between the two great Anglo-Saxon nations. We were far from an-
ticipating that ungenerous and unfair view of this gigantic enterprise which the Yankees 
have adopted. We were not prepared for that endeavour to put England aside which the 
glorifiers of Mr. Field have made in all their speeches and demonstrations.
848
 
The article further points to Britain’s contribution to the endeavour:  
 We knew that Englishmen planned the laying of the cable; that the vast outlay necessary
 to carry out the plan was furnished almost entirely in this country; that the wire was 
 actually manufactured in England; that the paying-out machines came from British 
 factories; and that the scientific gentlemen who paid out the cable, and, in fact, did all 
 the hazardous work, were subjects of the Queen.
849
 
Americans, on the other hand, are blamed of boastfulness and arrogance:  
 Yankees travelling in England have prepared us, by their habit of boasting, and by their 
 depreciation of everything not native to the States, for the great dishonesty of which 
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 they have been lately guilty. Men, whose vision is bounded by their own country, or 
 their own parish – who can allow no peppercorn of praise to a thing which is not theirs – 
 gradually fall into a habit of self-laudation, and of detraction from others, that ripens 
 into deliberate falsity. (...) With Americans, it is impossible for any city in Europe to 
 bear a comparison with New York. English manners are not bad – but Yankee manners 
 are better. The French cook cleverly, but did you ever dine in a first-rate Yankee hotel? 
 And now, the part taken by England in the laying of the Atlantic cable, is not worth 
 mentioning, when it is compared with the genius and enterprise shown by Brother 
 Jonathan in the same undertaking! 
850
 
A few days after the cable ceased functioning, Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper contemplates 
the reasons for this failure and – in a somewhat dismissive tone – suggests that  
 the Atlantic Telegraph was so moved, so tickled with the absurd braggadocio of Brother 
 Jonathan in assuming all the glory of laying it to himself, that it could not help laughing;
 and it laughed so immoderately over Yankee Doodle’s amusing conceit that it fairly 
 split its sides by laughing. Brother Jonathan should not try his powers of exciting 
 laughter too much. The Atlantic Telegraph is a victim to it.
851
 
The Liverpool Mercury also points to how Americans disregard the role Britain played 
in the laying of the transatlantic cable: 
 Most of our readers must have noticed with regret the eagerness of American orators to 
 appropriate to their own country and their own countrymen the whole glory of an 
 undertaking in which British enterprise, skill, science, and daring bore at least an equal 
 share. It is remarkable that, throughout the New York festivities, the name of Sir 
 Charles Bright, the chief engineer to the Atlantic Telegraph Company, was barely 
 mentioned. This exorbitant self-exaggeration on the part of American patriots is neither 
 an amiable nor a creditable trait; and though it would be inconceivably petty to resent 
 such puerilities seriously, we may be pardoned for hinting that difficulty and 
 disappointment are the divinely-ordained correctives for vanity and presumption.
852
 
The conclusion is thus drawn that “when this grand enterprise is crowned with final and 
enduring success, its moral value as regards the relations of the two countries will be 
enhanced by the previous rebuke to national self-conceit.”853 The reporting on the 1858 
transatlantic cable can therefore be said to have served as an arena for interstate rivalries 
between Britain and the US.   
Further, the representation of French technological achievements is worthy of attention: 
As has been illustrated in the beginning, both the Times articles published shortly after 
the inauguration of the Great Exhibition and the publication on its “General Bearing” 
highlight the usefulness of British exhibits and point to the fact that, by means of these 
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products, the “wants of the many” can be relieved. In contrast, the exhibits presented in 
the French section are considered to be of a different nature: “From Italy we enter 
France – and what do we find there? Not the mechanical genius of England, not its 
utilitarian tendencies – not a manufacturing system founded on the supply of the 
masses.”854 It is indeed acknowledged that the French are not “altogether neglectful of 
these” for “[t]hey exhibit a considerable amount of machinery, and a large portion of 
their products touch, if not upon the actual necessities, at least upon the wants, the 
comforts, and the small luxuries of the million.”855 Despite such efforts to do justice to 
the necessities of the population at large, though, French products cater mostly to the 
needs of the more affluent social strata:  
 Then they rise from the embellishment of the cottage to that of the palace. They show 
 that Kings and Queens are their customers. Their bronzes, their lamps and
 chandeliers and candelabra, their ornamental furniture, their cambrics, their shawls, and 
 their silks – all these things are with them works of art rather than products of industry. 
 They neglect not the demands of trade; yet they aspire to purity of design and make it 
 their chief glory.
856
 
In conclusion, however, it is pointed out that “[f]rom their collection we have much to 
learn, and they will likewise be instructed by ours. Both countries will see that their 
industrial tendencies do not clash, and that each is free to pursue a distinct course and to 
fulfil peaceably an independent destiny.”857 
Elsewhere, though, it is emphasized that Britain is way ahead of France in the 
implementation of large technological projects. As has been illustrated, Britain’s 
effectiveness in this respect is deemed to be due to certain national characteristics that 
distinguish the British from other nations. Concerning the laying of the 1866 trans-
atlantic cable, it is consequently pointed out that  
 [o]ur neighbours (…) have liberally admitted in their accounts of the laying of the 
 Atlantic cable that it was an enterprise which only English genius and English pluck 
 could possibly carry to a successful issue. They admit that Frenchmen would have been 
 discomfited at all events by the second, if not by the first failure; and they are pleased 
 to compliment us on our bull-dog tenacity.
858
 
It is particularly Britain’s “commercial enterprise” – to which “no small part of the 
glory connected with the Atlantic Cable is due” and which France seems to lack – that is 
emphasized:  
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 On the failure of the second Atlantic cable there were not wanting evil prophets and 
 witless and irreverent revilers who declared that it was not possible, in the present 
 condition of science, or  with the existing resources of mechanical arts, to connect 
 England and America by an electric wire. Enough money, it was said, had been wasted.
 In France such arguments would have prevailed.
859
 
Rivalries between France and Britain became particularly visible in reporting on the 
Suez Canal. Admittedly, as has been shown earlier, the various publications did at least 
occasionally wax lyrical about the waterway connecting the Mediterranean with the Red 
Sea. Both the fact that the canal was a project largely under the auspices of France and 
the circumstance that British statesmen and engineers had previously presented 
numerous arguments against it, are mostly disregarded in this context, though. The 
Illustrated London News’ reporting in the aftermath of the canal’s inauguration, 
however, is an exception. The article declares that the canal will make “a vast addition 
to the material resources of mankind.”860 Accordingly, the attitude previously displayed 
by the British political elite is criticized:  
 England, we fear, cannot take any great share of the credit due to the realisation of this 
 great project. Whilst it was yet in its initiatory stage she looked upon it doubtingly 
 and coldly, and  her most popular statesman and her foremost engineer concurred in 
 speaking discouraging things concerning it.
861
 
The lesson learnt must therefore be that  
 [f]or the future, we trust she will contemplate vast enterprises undertaken by men 
 of other nations for the common good with an eye to their merits as well as to their 
 demerits, and, if she cannot assist, will carefully abstain from proceedings calculated 
 to impede. True patriotism does not require that we should depreciate the abilities of 
 other countries in any department of thought or  action, and that patriotism which is but 
 an enlarged expression of self-conceit is spurious.
862
 
Previously, however, it has been pointed out that Ferdinand de Lesseps was able to 
carry out this project successfully primarily because he was endowed with some of the 
seemingly typically British characteristics:  
All this required, in no ordinary degree, genius, faith, self-reliance, enthusiasm, patience, 
perseverance, and an indomitable will, and in M. De Lesseps all these qualities were 
combined. (…) The central fire which burned brightly in his own heart made its warmth 
felt throughout the whole organisation which his genius had constructed and adapted to 
give practical effect to his ideas and plans. In him were happily associated the quick 
perception, the vivacity, and the impetuous dash of the French temperament, with the 
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imperturbable resolution, the dogged pertinacity, and, we may add, the obstinate 
persistency of the Anglo-Saxon.
863
 
Elsewhere, however, the significance of the Suez Canal as both a technological 
achievement in general and a potential threat to British supremacy in the East in 
particular is played down, the impact it might potentially have on global flows of goods, 
people and information being trivialized. Already nine months before the official 
inauguration, the Times asserts that  
 [i]f we in this country believed the Suez Canal was ‘a sword to pierce the breastplate of 
 England,’ it was because Frenchmen told us so. How this British breastplate was 
 supposed to be worn, and how the French sword was to pierce it, were mysteries which 
 we ourselves could never rightly fathom.
864
 
Therefore the conclusion is drawn that the canal is “simply a waterway between two 
great seas - a short cut from the Western to the Eastern World, and that is all.”865 
Moreover, the canal’s value as a piece of engineering work is belittled:  
 As a piece of engineering the Suez Canal was not only never an impossibility, but never 
 even so much as a difficulty. The works themselves happen to be peculiarly simple, 
 while the soil is favourable instead of unfavourable to their execution. The burden of the 
 task consisted in its prodigious magnitude, aggravated by the effects of the climate, and, 
 above all, by the want of fresh water; otherwise, far greater mechanical feats have been 
 done in Egypt itself, to say nothing of other countries.
866
 
A few months later, the Times furthermore points out that the Pacific Railroad, which 
has just been completed, is a considerably more complex and significant piece of 
engineering work than the canal: “If the present year should also witness the completion 
of the Suez Canal, it will indeed be a singular coincidence, but even the cutting of the 
Isthmus is a less wonderful exploit than this Pacific Railroad.”867 In a similar manner, 
the Manchester Guardian points out that from a engineering point of view, the canal is 
by no means a noteworthy project:  
 The achievement is not quite so much opposed to previous prediction as was that of 
 railways in practical working or the steam navigation of the Atlantic. Nobody ever said 
 that it was impossible to cut a ditch of any given length, depth, and breadth through the 
 sands of Egypt. Clearly to do so was only a matter of money.
868
 
Nonetheless, it is subsequently pointed out that one should “acknowledge in the 
performance of this feat of engineering energy a splendid triumph of genius and 
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perseverance.”869 A few days later, though, it is once more emphasized that the canal is 
no match for other technological projects:  
 Greater feats of engineering have been executed on many a line of railway at home and 
 abroad  than any that have tasked the ingenuity of the Canal Company’s staff. Indeed, 
 the peculiar glory of M. De Lesseps is to have proved that the physical obstacles to the 
 cutting of the canal were greatly over-rated [sic], and that with time and money it was 
 quite possible to dig a trench from sea to sea and keep it open by perpetual 
 dredging.
870
 
Subsequently, it is speculated that  
 [p]ossibly the money would never have been forthcoming had not Lord Palmerston’s 
 criticisms on the project aroused the national vanity of the French people, and led them 
 to believe that in taking the Canal Company’s shares they were helping to secure the 
 predominance of French ideas and French interests in Egypt. They accepted with 
 characteristic ardour what they regarded as the challenge of the English Minister.
871
 
With the canal now being inaugurated, “it must in candour be owned that they have 
fairly beaten us. (…) It will be said that at least we know how to bear a defeat with a 
good grace.”872  If this is really the case, though, is questionable, as the following 
passage suggests:  
Perhaps we still secretly console ourselves with the belief that the grand object which 
the projectors of the canal had in view will never be attained; that, in an age in which no 
country that has not abundant stores of coal and iron, and skill in working them, can 
aspire to commercial greatness, any improvement of communication by sea must tend to 
our advantage more than to that of any other nation: and that, even should the canal 
supersede not only the Cape route, but the Egyptian railway, the prospect of a revolution 
which should change the whole course of trade, and re-transfer to the countries 
surrounding the basin of the Mediterranean their long-lost maritime supremacy, is as 
visionary as Napoleon’s dream of re-establishing a Latin empire in the New World.873 
Both the reporting on American reactions to the completion of the transatlantic cable, on 
the one hand, and on French projects and products, on the other, demonstrate that at the 
time, technological achievements were considered to be an embodiment of certain 
national characteristics and were drawn upon for the creation of national identities. 
What is more, coverage of these accomplishments bears witness to the circumstance 
that they served as an arena for interstate rivalries.  
This is different with regard to Italy, which was considered a backward country, rather 
than a competitor. As has been seen in chapter 4, it was assumed that the Mont Cenis 
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Tunnel and the intercourse it allowed for would help to accelerate the country’s 
regeneration. Likewise, the tunnel as a piece of engineering work necessitates a 
reevaluation of the Italian people. Concerning the progressing works at the Mont Cenis 
Tunnel and the breakthrough that had just been achieved – in the true sense of the 
word – the Times points out that  “[i]t will gratify the many friends of the Italian people 
to recollect that this has been in its plan and execution an Italian work.”874 Once more, it 
is pointed out that in the past, Italy was deemed inferior and underdeveloped:  
The gifted race (…) came to be looked upon in Europe as incapable of any solid 
achievement. Its genius in certain forms of art was disdainfully admitted; but Italy, 
whatever she might have once been, was held to be now only a land of musicians and 
singers, with some trace of her former ability in painting and sculpture.
875
 
Similarly, Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper declares that the country “had been pronounced 
unfit for a place in the van of material progress – a mother of good opera-writers and 
singers, indifferent artists, and unclean cooks.”876 Clearly, these articles bear witness to 
the circumstance that the fine arts, in which Italy – in the eyes of British observers – 
excels, are less esteemed that scientific and technological accomplishments (so-called 
“solid achievements”). 
The successful construction of the Mont Cenis Tunnel calls for a reconsideration of the 
country: the Times points out that   
[t]hose who know what kind of men Italy does produce will be quite prepared to believe 
that in practical science Italians may come to hold a place among the highest. The fact is 
that 30 years ago, when railway enterprise was in its infancy on the Continent, and even 
France showed no sufficient recognition of its importance, the idea of piercing the Alps 
for the transit of trains was conceived by Italian engineers.
877
 
Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper also emphasizes that “[i]t will be a matter for self 
congratulation to the lovers of the Italian people, to know that this last triumph of 
engineering skill (…) is almost entirely attributed to Italy.” 878  The article further 
declares that the Mont Cenis Tunnel is 
 not only a powerful commercial agent and source of many species of wealth, but a 
signal proof that the Italian race remains as it was – a race exceptionally gifted with 
scientific genius; and, though the qualities have been drugged or fettered, characterised 
by considerable energy and perseverance.
879
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In conclusion, it is pointed out that “[t]he fact that the Mont Cenis tunnel (…) has been 
steadily brought forward during a decade full of events utterly alien to all such peaceful 
undertakings; proves that new Italy is ambitious, and may become worthy of a foremost 
place among the great industrial nations.”880 All told, these two passages taken from the 
Times and Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, respectively, therefore aptly illustrate the role 
attributed to technological achievements when it comes to the assessment of other 
countries.   
 
7.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter set out to examine to what extent transport and communication 
technologies were drawn upon in the context of the formation of national identity, on 
the one hand, and comparisons with other cultures and civilizations, on the other. The 
analysis has shown that science and technology in general were considered to be a most 
significant criterion for evaluating other countries and civilizations and that they were 
deemed to represent national character.   
In the publications under review, British accomplishments in the fields of transport and 
communication technologies were taken to indicate outstanding persistence and 
determination. In general, British industrial products and technological developments 
were considered to bear witness to the seemingly quintessentially British commercial 
and utilitarian spirit. In the eyes of contemporaries, this is where British artefacts 
differed decisively from those of its continental neighbours, on the one hand, and 
Eastern civilizations, on the other, as they put more emphasis on decorativeness and 
ornament and catered mostly to the needs and wishes of a wealthy elite. What is more, 
technologies and artefacts of non-European civilizations were taken to indicate that their 
development had come to a standstill and that they consequently lagged behind the 
times. This was viewed as evidence for Western superiority and thus served as a 
rationale for Britain’s imperial efforts. In the reporting on various transatlantic cables 
and the Suez Canal, in turn, we can find allusions to interstate rivalries between Britain, 
on the one hand, and the United States and France, respectively, on the other.  
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All told, it can thus be noted that science and technology, specifically transport and 
communication technologies, were crucial elements of British self-conception and 
identity in the Victorian era.  
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8. Conclusion to Dissertation   
After a long and eventful journey during which they saved the life of a young Indian 
woman, struggled with a group of Sioux fighters and were finally, upon arrival in 
Britain, remanded in custody by Detective Fix, Phileas Fogg and Passepartout make it 
back to the Reform Club on 21 December 1872: “Phileas Fogg had won his wager, and 
had made his journey around the world in eighty days. To do this he had employed 
every means of conveyance – steamers, railways, carriages, yachts, trading-vessels, 
sledges, elephants.”881He has thus proven that, at least for someone with the financial 
means at hand, it was possible to circumnavigate the world in eighty days and that, in 
the words of his fellow card-player Gauthier Ralph, “[t]he world has grown smaller”882 
with the advent of steamships, railways, canals, tunnels and electric telegraphy. Both, 
the fact that, in the novel, the public is enormously interested in Fogg’s journey, and the 
circumstance that the book found a wide and enthusiastic readership among nineteenth-
century contemporaries served as an incentive to study the attitudes, perceptions and 
expectations that existed among the general public in Victorian Britain towards these 
technologies. To gain a deeper understanding of their expectations, hopes and anxieties, 
this dissertation analyzed the media representation of specific nineteenth-century 
transport and communication technologies. Covering a wide range of topics, one of the 
main intentions was to show that Victorian approaches towards technology were more 
complex and multilayered than we are generally led to believe and reach beyond purely 
technological determinist ideas. In so doing, this dissertation also set out to illustrate 
that Victorian approaches can be said to have anticipated present-day analyses. 
Moreover, investigating contemporaries’ ideas and beliefs related to transport and 
communication technologies, we can gain more profound insights into Victorian 
mentalities on a more general level. On the following pages, the main findings of this 
dissertation will be revisited. Subsequently, potential areas of further research will be 
outlined. 
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8.1 Change, Continuity, Superiority – Representations of Transport and 
Communication Technologies  
The nineteenth century saw a multitude of innovations in the fields of transport and 
communication technologies and witnessed the establishment of global transport and 
communication infrastructure. As has been shown in chapter 2, these did not come 
about overnight, but were the results of long and complex development processes. 
Nonetheless, as has been seen in chapter 4, nineteenth-century contemporaries viewed 
the concentration of these scientific and technological innovations as the defining 
feature of their period and considered them to be the acme of progressiveness – that 
single quality which above all else delineated their era from ones that had gone before.  
Chapter 4 further illustrated how contemporary transport and communication 
technologies were embedded in various cultural, social and historical contexts and what 
these linkages achieved. Firstly, they presented an opportunity to accustom the public to 
new technologies. In comparing them to motifs with which people were familiar – 
biblical figures or Shakespearean imagery, for example – the public was given the 
opportunity to acquaint themselves with the emerging technologies and the possibilities 
they offered. Secondly, these comparisons helped illustrate the dimensions and the 
extent of the transformation, for instance when new transport and communication 
technologies were juxtaposed with the accomplishments of ancient Egypt or Greece or 
compared to well-known mythical figures, such as Hercules or Agamemnon. These 
comparisons were used to highlight just how outstanding these technologies, and, by 
extension, the nineteenth century, were. Thirdly, in drawing on such frameworks, one 
could view nineteenth-century transport and communication technologies as following 
in the footsteps of ancient advanced civilizations – in other words, as the continuation 
and culmination of a lengthy development process.  
Further, the spate of technological developments in the nineteenth century is also taken 
to indicate man’s special position in the divine scheme, not least because – certainly in 
the eyes of contemporaries – these advances enabled man to subjugate nature. This 
approach made it possible for Victorians, living through an era of radical changes, to 
reconcile latest scientific and technological developments with traditional Christian 
beliefs. 
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Additionally, Chapter 7 has shown that the achievements in the fields of transport and 
communication technologies were central to British self-regard and were deemed to 
symbolize Britain’s alleged superiority over other countries. In this connection, the 
utilitarian aspect of British achievements was repeatedly emphasized and was thought to 
distinguish them from other countries’ technologies. Existing interstate rivalries 
between Britain, the United States and France swirled fiercely around the achievements 
and merits of each country in terms of transport and communication technologies. 
Accounts of the products and technologies of non-Western civilizations, specifically 
India, veered between admiration for what the British considered to be exotic beauty 
and mysticism, on the one hand, and a supreme condescension towards their seemingly 
primitive production methods, on the other. Such comparisons with non-Western 
civilizations were therefore taken to symbolize their backward and static condition and 
consequently fuelled the notion of ‘the white man’s burden’. In this way, transport and 
communication technologies were drawn upon to underpin Britain’s imperial efforts.  
The widespread enthusiasm aroused by the new transport and communication 
technologies was by no means unanimous, however. Critical voices questioned the 
common acceptance of man’s subjugation of nature, on the one hand, and were 
skeptical of using the technological advancement of the age as the ultimate yardstick by 
which to measure progress. Reporting of this kind, however, is extremely rare, at least 
in the publications under review. Generally speaking, a picture emerges of a period 
where technology, specifically transport and communication technologies, had become 
a most significant gauge for judging society.   
 
8.2 For Better or For Worse, Who Shall Say? Transport and Communication 
Technologies and Technological Determinism  
In recent years, activists have repeatedly demanded that the Nobel Peace Prize should 
be given to the Internet on the grounds that it fosters international understanding. This 
illustrates that, even today, there is a widespread belief that, once invented and 
introduced, certain technologies will inevitably bring about specific results and thus 
shape society and, in fact, ‘drive history’. From a sociological point of view, this theory 
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of technological determinism and the mini-fables it produces
883
 does not stand close 
examination, as it disregards the role of any other contributing factors.  
Alternative, sociological approaches therefore focus their attention on technologies in 
use. In other words, they understand technology as a social process which human actor 
and technological artefact carry out collectively. In the case of Actor-Network-Theory, 
this dichotomy is altogether denied; instead, human being and technological artefact are 
thought to constitute a new hybrid entity. In doing so, these approaches make it possible 
to factor in other variables, rather than concentrating on the possibilities or risks 
seemingly inherent to one particular technology. These other factors include, among 
other things, the motives and intentions of the actors and their familiarity with the 
technology in question. Technology’s impact on the actions of an individual person and 
society at large is by no means denied, but it is no longer considered to be the one and 
only decisive factor.  
For nineteenth-century contemporaries, it was tempting to ascribe peacemaking 
qualities to the new transport and communication technologies, simply because they 
allowed for a speedier and more reliable exchange of information than ever before. In 
this connection, the electric telegraph and the near-instantaneous communication it 
enabled would seem to have offered the greatest potential. On closer examination, 
however (a primary example being Nickles’ explorations of the effects the electric 
telegraph might have had on the outcome of the Trent Affair of 1861),
884
 it becomes 
obvious that the instant communication the telegraph enabled could sometimes have 
negative and unexpected consequences. Exasperated statesmen, for instance, sending 
bellicose, ill-considered telegrams, could initiate a vicious circle that inflamed rather 
than ameliorated the situation. Human error, transmission failures and 
misunderstandings owing to the brevity of telegraphic messages, were other factors that 
needed to be considered. Such studies therefore illustrate the necessity of taking into 
account non-technical factors if we want to judge the efficacy of nineteenth-century 
transport and communication technologies, specifically the telegraph, as tools of peace. 
Chapter 6 examined to what extent transport and communication technologies were 
represented as ‘messengers of peace’ and whether contemporaries were aware of the 
many other factors that could turn out to be critical in this connection. Indeed, we can 
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find numerous passages which emphasize the peacemaking virtues of these technologies 
and declare that, with speedy channels of communication, international relations must 
inevitably improve. In this context, railways and steamships are made mention of, but it 
is the electric telegraph that is deemed the most important and is described as a valuable 
instrument for crisis management. It has also been shown, however, that this view does 
not go unchallenged in Victorian media coverage. There is, in fact, a deeper 
understanding of the many other factors that need to be taken into account in this 
context. In line with what the use-centred approaches towards technology postulate, the 
significance of the actors’ motives, intentions and perceptions is repeatedly emphasized. 
In this context, it is also noted that telegraphic communication could worsen a given 
conflict situation if statesmen did not use it wisely. Moreover, it is referred to the hopes 
and expectations expressed in connection with previous technological achievements and 
events and how these have been disappointed. One might therefore also draw the 
conclusion that contemporaries have learnt from previous experience.  
The critical examination of the reporting on transport and communication technologies 
has thus cast doubts on the widely held belief that nineteenth-century contemporaries 
were dogmatic devotees of technological determinist beliefs.  
  
8.3 One Vast City – Technologies of Transport and Communication and 
Changing Perceptions of Time, Space and Distance 
Present-day transport, communication and information technologies, most notably the 
internet and mobile telephony, have brought about changes in the way we perceive time, 
space and distance. One of the most fundamental ramifications of these media is that 
our actual geographic location is no longer necessarily of primary importance; instead, 
connectivity has become a major criterion. The transformations witnessed in recent 
decades are often subsumed under slogans such as ‘global village’ or ‘data highway’ 
and have given rise to increased interest in space-related questions in a wide spectrum 
of academic disciplines.  
In a similar manner, nineteenth-century transport and communication technologies, 
specifically the electric telegraph, impacted on contemporaries’ perceptions of time, 
space and distance. In nineteenth-century parlance, these transformations were widely 
referred to as ‘the annihilation of time and space’, which – in retrospective – is often 
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considered evidence that contemporaries did not have sufficient understanding of the 
structural changes brought about by these technologies. 
Chapter 5 therefore examined whether this was really the case or if there were other, 
more sophisticated approaches. For this, it was first of all necessary to set forth the 
various concepts which have been developed to grasp and fully comprehend these 
transformations: Wenzlhuemer’s starting point is a relational model of space, according 
to which there are numerous co-existing spaces, which are shaped by the specific 
interests and questions of the respective actors. With the emergence of new technologies 
of transport and communication, so-called transport and communication space have 
been partially compressed and have been increasingly separated from geographic 
space.
885
 Falk and Abler, on the other hand, focus their attention on several types of 
distance (globe, effort and metaphorical distance), which are also informed by different 
interests. Nineteenth-century transport and communication technologies had an impact 
on effort and metaphorical distance only. The shifting relations between globe, effort 
and metaphorical distance created so-called distance paradoxes.
886
 Both the partial 
compression of transport and communication space and their divergence from 
geographic space, on the one hand, and the shifting relations between globe, effort and 
metaphorical distance, on the other, help to create the impression that distances between 
two places that are well-integrated in the transport or communication network, 
respectively, have shrunk; consequently, we tend to perceive such well-integrated places 
as closer than they actually are.  
Analysis of Victorian newspapers has shown that contemporaries’ understanding of 
these transformations brought about by new transport and communication technologies 
reached beyond the phrase of ‘the annihilation of time and space’. In fact, in the 
publications under review, the slogan seems to be a hyperbole used to summarize the 
shifts experienced. What is more, it appears that it is to be viewed in connection with 
contemporaries’ pursuit of the subordination of nature. The reporting of nineteenth-
century transport and communication technologies also illustrates that there was an 
awareness and understanding of the discrepancies between various spaces and distances 
brought about by these technologies which resembles current-day analyses. Furthermore, 
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the imagery used (vast city, suburb, neighbourhood) is strikingly similar to phrases such 
as ‘the global village’. 
For all its wittiness and lightness of tone, the following passage, which Lloyds’ Weekly 
Newspaper reprinted from the French Courrier du Havre, reveals that contemporaries 
were well aware that neither time, space, nor distance had been abolished. It also 
illustrates that there was a good understanding that the factor time, in terms of global 
communication, had become more important than ever: 
 Suppose (…) that a great edifice in Paris – the Opera, for example – takes fire at a
 quarter past twelve at night on the 1
st
 of September next, the event is immediately 
 telegraphed from Paris to New York, and is dated, ‘Paris, a quarter-past [sic] twelve at 
 night, 1
st
 September.’ The news arrives at New York, let us say in two hours, to make 
 ample allowance for interruptions, &c.; the despatch, dated Paris, 1
st
 Sept. arrives
 at New York at a quarter-past [sic] nine in the evening of the 31
st
 August, so that a New 
 York manager could appear on the stage, and after the three customary bows could 
 thus express himself: - “Ladies and Gentlemen, - I am sorry to have to inform you that 
 the Opera at Paris has been destroyed by fire three hours after the present time. Our 
 director has just transmitted to his Paris confrère his condolence on the disaster which is
 going to happen to him.’887 
 
8.4 Conclusion and Outlook 
This dissertation has shown that in Victorian Britain, transport and communication 
technologies were much more than tools of empire or business only. Instead, they also 
fulfilled a variety of social and cultural functions and were embedded in a discourse of 
national identity and Western superiority. It has also demonstrated that contemporaries’ 
approaches and perceptions of these technologies were not as one-sided as has often 
been assumed and reached beyond a purely determinist perspective. It cannot be denied 
that there is a great number of passages displaying such technologically determinist 
beliefs. As this study analyzed the media coverage of various technologies over several 
decades and, rather than focusing on the weeks immediately before or after a certain 
event, covered a longer span of time, it has also been seen, though, that this is only one 
side of the coin. Along with the seemingly dogmatic beliefs mentioned above, there 
existed a far-reaching awareness of the great number of other factors that could play a 
role in this context, particularly the importance of the actors involved and their interests. 
It has also been shown that nineteenth-century contemporaries had a clear 
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understanding of the changing spatiotemporal arrangements created by the new 
transport and communication technologies, specifically the telegraph. All told, these 
Victorian accounts frequently bear striking resemblance to present-day analyses and 
imagery.  
This dissertation can only be a first step in an effort to re-evaluate nineteenth-century 
approaches and perceptions of technology. The scope of this study had to be limited in 
order to render the material manageable. There is still a substantial body of source 
material which could be analyzed. Future studies could focus on working-class 
publications, scrutinize pamphlets and other ephemeral material and examine visual 
representations in the highly popular illustrated magazines. This would undoubtedly 
provide further insights into contemporaries’ attitudes towards transport and 
communication technologies.  
Given the fact that the press coverage of these technologies served as an arena for 
international competition – particularly with regard to France and the United States – an 
analysis of their media representation in American and French publications may also 
turn out to be highly interesting and challenge the views that were presented in British 
newspapers.  
What is more, the telegraph – despite often being described as a messenger of peace – 
was also deployed for the purposes of warfare, as were steamships and railways. 
Possible questions to be addressed in future studies could be to what degree and in 
which ways these technologies were reported as ‘tools of war’. This is of particular 
interest as it can shed further light on the extent to which contemporaries considered the 
intentions and decisions of the parties involved or took into account any other factors 
that could impinge on the outcome of speedy communication. 
Beyond that, this dissertation has primarily been concerned with transport and 
communication technologies. It has been possible to tease out contemporaries’ ideas 
concerning science and technology on a broader, more general level, particularly given 
the fact that media coverage of the Great Exhibition was taken into account. If, however, 
we want to gain a more complete picture of Victorian approaches to technology in 
general, future studies should look into their perceptions of, for instance, medical and 
environmental technologies, both of which underwent similarly drastic changes and 
developments in the course of the nineteenth century. 
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As Eric Hobsbawm has declared, ‘looking backward’ is essential if we want to face the 
future.
888
 To us, living in an era in which technologies of transport, communication and 
information are more ubiquitous and pervasive than ever before, this study should be a 
timely reminder of the importance of constantly questioning our expectations towards 
these technologies and reviewing the roles we attribute to them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
888
 Cf. Hobsbawm, On History, 52.  
203 
 
9. Bibliography 
 
9.1 Newspapers and Periodicals  
“A Busy Pleasure Week.” Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, 24 September 1871. 
“A Guide to the Great Industrial Exhibition.” Exhibition Supplement, Illustrated
 London News, 10 May 1851.  
“A Second Time has an Expedition.” The Times, 18 July 1858.  
“A Telegram From our American Correspondent.” The Times, 10 May 1869.  
“A Telegraph Round the Globe.” Liverpool Mercury, 21 October 1871. 
 
“American ‘Notions’.” Illustrated London News, 14 June 1851. 
“Among the Passions.” The Times, 18 April 1857. 
“Among the Years.” The Scotsman, 31 December 1869. 
“Carriages and Locomotive Engines.” Exhibition Supplement, Illustrated London News, 
 10 May 1851. 
“Close of the Great Exhibition.” Liverpool Mercury, 14 October 1851.  
“Completion of the Atlantic Tele-Graph.” The Observer, 29 July 1866.  
“Concentrated Progress of the World.” Manchester Guardian, 5 August 1868.  
“Daring and Pertinacity.” Manchester Guardian, 20 November 1869.  
“Egypt: The Opening of the Great Canal.” The Scotsman, 12 November 1869.  
“In the Midst of a Desolating War.” The Times, 26 December 1870.  
“It is an Invariable Custom.” The Observer, 5 December 1869. 
“It is Only a Small Proportion.” The Times, 20 September 1871.  
“Magnificent Plans of Steam Navigation.” The Scotsman, 16 October 1839.  
“Noah’s Ark and the Great Eastern.” The Times, 20 April 1857.  
“On the Applications of Electricity.” Exhibition Supplement, Illustrated London News, 
 10 May 1851. 
“Opening of the Mont Cenis Railway.” Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, 24 September 1871. 
“Opening of the Suez Canal.” Illustrated London News, 27 November 1869.  
204 
 
“Our Address.” Illustrated London News, 14 May 1842. 
“Our Colonial Empire.” Illustrated London News, 20 March 1869.  
“Our Contemporaries.” Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, 4 November 1866.  
“Our Contemporaries.” Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, 7 October 1866.  
“Our Readers Will not Think.” Illustrated London News, 21 August 1858.  
“Sir William Armstrong on Mechanical Inventions.” Manchester Guardian, 5 August 
 1869.  
“Steam Navigation Across the Atlantic.” Manchester Guardian, 23 May 1838. 
“Steam Navigation Across the Atlantic.” The Scotsman, 11 April 1838.  
“Taken Altogether.” The Times, 18 February 1869.  
“Telegraphic Communication With Australasia.” The Times, 9 December 1869.  
“The Accounts Published.” The Scotsman, 11 August 1858.  
“The Alleged Antagonism of Science and Romance.” The Scotsman, 14 August 1858. 
“The Americans and the Atlantic Telegraph.” Liverpool Mercury, 24 September 1858. 
 
“The Anglo-American Telegraph.” Illustrated London News, 4 August 1866.  
“The Atlantic Cable.” Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, 5 August 1866.  
“The Atlantic Telegraph.” Liverpool Mercury, 3 October 1866.  
“The Atlantic Telegraph.” Liverpool Mercury, 30 July 1866.  
“The Atlantic Telegraph.” Liverpool Mercury, 9 August 1865.  
“The Atlantic Telegraph.” Liverpool Mercury, 10 August 1858.  
“The Atlantic Telegraph.” Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, 7 October 1866.  
“The Atlantic Telegraph.” The Observer, 30 May 1858.  
“The Atlantic Telegraph.” The Times, 24 August 1858.  
“The Atlantic Telegraph.” The Times, 6 January 1857.  
“The Atlantic Telegraph and its Probable Results.” The Observer, 8 August 1858. 
“The Atlantic Telegraph at Work.” Liverpool Mercury, 25 August 1858.  
“The Atlantic Telegraph Cable.” The Observer, 27 August 1865.  
“The Atlantic Wedding-Ring.” Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, 5 September 1858. 
205 
 
“The ‘Big Ship’.” Illustrated London News, 13 August 1859. 
“The British Indian Submarine Telegraph.” Illustrated London News, 20 November 
 1869.  
“The British Indian Submarine Telegraph.” The Times, 9 November 1869.  
“The Close of the Year 1842.” Illustrated London News, 31 December 1842. 
“The Departure of the ‘Great Eastern’.” Illustrated London News, 10 September 1859.  
“The East Indian Courts.” Exhibition Supplement, Illustrated London News, 14 June 
 1851.  
“The End of the Exhibition.” The Observer, 13 October 1851.  
“The Enthusiastic Manner.” Illustrated London News, 28 August 1858. 
 
“The Event of the Year.” Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, 2 January 1870.  
“The ‘Great Eastern’.” Illustrated London News, 17 September 1859. 
“The ‘Great Eastern’.” The Times, 30 April 1857.  
“The ‘Great Eastern’ Steam-Ship.” Illustrated London News, 7 November 1857.  
“The Great Enterprise of a Railway.” The Times, 15 June 1870.  
“The Great Exhibition.” Exhibition Supplement, Illustrated London News, 6 September 
 1851. 
“The Great Exhibition.” Illustrated London News, 3 May 1851.  
“The Great Exhibition.” Liverpool Mercury, 10 June 1851. 
“The Great Exhibition.” The Times, 13 October 1851. 
“The Great Exhibition.” The Times, 20 September 1851.  
“The Great Exhibition.” The Times, 24 May 1851. 
“The Great Exhibition.” The Times, 15 May 1851.  
“The Great International Exhibition.” Exhibition Supplement, Illustrated London News, 
 10 May 1851.  
“The Illustrated London News.” Illustrated London News, 2 July 1842.  
“The Land of Egypt.” The Times, 29 November 1862.  
“The Mont Cenis and Brindisi Overland Route.” Illustrated London News, 16 January 
 1869.  
206 
 
“The Mont Cenis Tunnel.” The Scotsman, 20 September 1871.  
“The Mont Cenis Tunnel.” The Times, 20 September 1871.  
“The Mont Cenis Tunnel.” The Times, 19 September 1871. 
“The Mont Cenis Tunnel.” The Times, 2 September 1871.  
“The New Overland Route and the Alpine Railway Tunnel.” Illustrated London News,
 6 February 1869.  
“The New Overland Route and the Mont Cenis Railway.” Illustrated London News,    
 23 January 1869. 
 
“The New Overland Route and the Railway Tunnel of the Alps.” Illustrated London 
 News, 13 February 1869.   
“The New Road Through the Alps.” Liverpool Mercury, 20 September 1871.  
“The Old Year and the New.” Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, 1 January 1871. 
“The Old Year and the New.” Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, 2 January 1859.  
“The Opening of the Suez Canal.” Liverpool Mercury, 19 November 1869.  
“The Opening of the Suez Canal.” The Manchester Guardian, 24 November 1869.  
“The Post Office and the Telegraphs.” The Times, 7 December 1870.  
“The Progress of the Electric Telegraph.” Atlantic Monthly, March 1860.  
“The Pressing Necessity of an Efficient Telegraphic Service.” The Times, 2 March 1868.  
“The Relations Between England and America.” Manchester Guardian, 24 June  1865. 
“The Remount Service of India.” The Times, 25 November 1869.  
“The Success of the Atlantic Cable.” The Times, 30 July 1866.  
“The Suez Canal.” Illustrated London News, 27 March 1869.  
“The Suez Canal.” The Times, 17 November 1869.  
“The Suez Canal.” The Scotsman, 6 December 1869.  
“The Transatlantic Telegraph.” Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper. 12 August 1866.  
“The Trial Trip of the Great Eastern.” Illustrated London News, 15 October 1859. 
“The Ubiquity and the Universal Influence.” The Times, 20 September 1858.  
“The Viceroy of Egypt.” Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, 4 July 1869. 
“The Whole Civilised World.” Illustrated London News, 7 August 1858. 
207 
 
“The World’s Highway to the World’s Exhibition.” Exhibition Supplement, Illustrated 
 London News, 31 May 1851.  
“There is a Mystery About the Suez Canal.” The Times, 25 May 1861.  
“There is Nothing of Which an Englishman.” Liverpool Mercury, 5 July 1811.  
“We Publish to-day.” The Times, 23 August 1858.  
“We Think it no Little Honour.” The Times, 15 July 1858.  
“When we Placed Before the Public.” The Times, 10 December 1869.  
“When we Read the Curt Telegram.” The Observer, 26 December 1869.  
“While the Viceroy of EGYPT.” The Times, 29 June 1869.  
“Why the Atlantic Telegraph Broke.” Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, 19 September 1858. 
“Within a few Hours.” The Times, 27 July 1866.  
 
 
9.2 Online Sources  
Came, Francois. “Two nations linked by blood, sweat and toil.” The Guardian, 6 May 
 1994.http://www.guardian.co.uk/travel/1994/may/06/railtravel.wonders.channelt 
 unnel. Last viewed 3 December 2013.  
 
Eurail. “TGV Trains in France.” http://www.eurail.com/planning/trains-and-
 ferries/high-speed-trains/tgv. Last viewed 6 December 2013.  
 
Internet for Peace. “Internet for Peace, Manifesto.”  http://www.internetforpeace.org/ma 
 nifesto.cfm. Last viewed 3 December 2013. 
 
Internet for Peace. “Internet for Peace, Press Release No. 1.” 
 www.internetforpeace.org/mediadetail.cfm?pressid=1. Last viewed 24 August 
 2013. 
 
Magid, Larry. “Nobel Peace Prize for the Internet?” Huffington Post, 17 March 2010. 
 www.huffingtonpost.com/larry-magid/a-nobel-prize-for-t_b_503394.html. Last 
 viewed 24 August 2013.  
 
Moseley, Ray. “Eurotunnel Opens Amid Pomp, Yawns.” Chicago Tribune, 7 May 1994. 
 http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1994-05-07/news/9405070115_1_channel-tun 
 nel-french-president-francois-mitterrand-french-leader. Last viewed 3 December 
 2013. 
208 
 
 
Schmidt, William E. “The World; All Aboard for the Chunnel of Love-Hate.” The New 
 York Times, 1 May 1994. http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/01/weekinreview/th 
 e-world-all-aboard-for-the-chunnel-of-love-hate.html. Last viewed 3 December 
 2013. 
 
Sotscheck, Ralf. “Leeds rückt näher an Paris,“ taz, 11 January 2012. 
 http://www.taz.de/Schnellzug-Projekt-in-England/!85411/. Last viewed 6 
 December 2013. 
 
UNESCO General Conference. Thirteenth Session. Recommendations Concerning the 
 International Standardization of Statistics Relating to Book Production and 
 Periodicals.19 November 1964. http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=130
 68&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. Last viewed 6
 December  2013. 
 
Visit Norway. “Visit Norway Transport.” http://www.visitnorway.com/de/Transport/
 Fahren-und-Schiffe/Color-Line/. Last viewed 5 March 2012, site now 
 discontinued.  
 
 
9.3 Other Sources  
Queen Elizabeth II. “Speech at the Opening of the Channel Tunnel.” Cheriton, 6 May 
 1994.  
 
9.4 Books and Articles 
Adas, Michael. Machines as the Measure of Men. Science, Technology, and Ideologies 
 of Western Dominance. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989.  
 
Ahrens, Daniela. Grenzen der Enträumlichung. Weltstädte, Cyberspace und trans-
 nationale Räume in der globalisierten Moderne. Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 
 2001. 
 
Ahvenainen, Jorma. The European Cable Companies in South America before the First 
 World War. Helsinki: Finnish Academy of Science and Letters, 2004. 
 
——.  The History of the Caribbean Telegraphs before the First World War. Helsinki: 
 Finnish Academy of Science and Letters, 1996.  
 
——.  “Telegraphs, Trade and Policy. The Role of the International Telegraphs in
 the Years 1870 – 1914.” In vol. 2 of The Emergence of a World Economy 1500- 
 1914,edited by Wolfram Fischer, R. Marvin McInnis and Jürgen Schneider, 505-
 518. Stuttgart: Steiner-Verlag-Wiesbaden-GmbH, 1986.  
 
209 
 
——.  The Far Eastern Telegraphs: The History of Telegraphic Communications
 between the Far East, Europe and America before the First World War. 
 Helsinki: Finnish Academy of Science and Letters, 1981. 
 
Altschuler, Sari Beth. “Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper.” In Dictionary of Nineteenth-
Century Journalism in Great Britain and Ireland, edited by Laurel Brake and 
Marysa Demoor, 371. Academia Press: Gent, 2009. 
 
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism. London: Verso, 1991. 
 
Anonymous. The Silver Jubilee of Submarine Telegraphy to the Far East. London,
 [1894].  
——. The Mont Cenis Tunnel, its Construction and Probable Consequences. 
 London: Charles J. Skeet, 1873. 
——. ‘Poles, Wires, and Cables;’ or, Electric Telegraphs: Their Past and Their Future: 
 Their Commercial Advantages and Christian Aspects. London: E.J. Francis, 
 [1869]. 
——.  The Great Eastern Steam Ship; A Description of Scott Russell’s Great Ship, now
  Building at Millwall, for the Eastern Steam Navigation Company. London: 
  [1857]. 
Armstrong, John, and David M. Williams. “The Steamboat and Popular Tourism.” 
 Journal of Transport History 26, no. 1 (2005):61 -77. 
 
Atthill, Robin. “Dickens and the Railway.” English 13, no. 76 (1961):130-135.  
 
Auerbach, Jeffrey A. The Great Exhibition of 1851: A Nation on Display. New Haven: 
 Yale University Press, 1999. 
 
Ayerst, David. The Manchester Guardian. Biography of a Newspaper. Ithaca, New 
 York: Cornell University Press, 1971. 
 
Bacon, Francis. Novum Organum. In vol. 4 of The Works of Francis Bacon, edited by 
 James  Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath. London: 
 Longman Green, 1858. 
 
Bathe, Basil W. Seven Centuries of Sea Travel. From the Crusaders to the Cruises. 
 New York: Portland  House, 1990.  
 
Baylen, J. O. “The British Press, 1861 – 1918.” In The Encyclopedia of the British 
 Press,  1422 - 1992, edited by Dennis Griffiths, 33-46. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
 1992.  
 
Bell, Duncan, ed. Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and International 
 Relations in Nineteenth-Century Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 2007. 
 
210 
 
Bonea, Amelia. “‘This cable…was not in my words’: News Reporting and Telegraphic
 Communication in Nineteenth-Century India.” PhD diss., Heidelberg University, 
 2012. 
 
Bourne, H.R. Fox. Vol. 2 of English Newspapers. Chapters in the History of Journalism. 
 London: Chatto and Windus, 1887.  
Bowle, John, and Basil Wiley. “Origins and Development of the Idea of Progress.” In
 Ideas and Beliefs of the Victorians. An Historic Revaluation of the Victorian Age
 by the British Broadcasting Corporation, 33-45. London: Sylvan Press, 1950. 
Bowler, Peter J. The Invention of Progress. The Victorians and the Past. Oxford: 
 Blackwell, 1989.   
Boyd, James P. Triumphs and Wonders of the Nineteenth Century. The True Mirror of a 
 Phenomenal Era. Philadelphia: Holman and Co., 1899. 
 
Briggs, Asa. The Age of Improvement, 1783 – 1867. Harlow: Longman, 2000. 
  
——. Victorian People. A Reassessment of Persons and Themes, 1851 – 67. 
 Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975.  
 
British Broadcasting Corporation. Ideas and Beliefs of the Victorians. An Historic 
 Revaluation of the Victorian Age. London: Sylvan Press, 1950.  
 
Brown, Lucy. “The British Press, 1800 – 1860.” In The Encyclopedia of the British 
 Press,  1422 - 1992, edited by Dennis Griffiths, 24-32. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
 1992.  
 
——.  Victorian News and Newspapers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985.  
 
Brunn, Stanley D., and Thomas R. Leinbach, eds. Collapsing Space and Time. 
 Geographic Aspects of Communications and Information. London: Harper 
 Collins Academic, 1991. 
 
Burke, Edmund. A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime 
 and Beautiful. London: Routledge and Paul, 1958. 
 
Buschauer, Regine. Mobile Räume: Medien- und Diskursgeschichtliche Studien zur 
 Tele-Kommunikation. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2010. 
 
Carey, James W. “Technology and Ideology: The Case of the Telegraph.” Prospects. An 
 Annual of American Cultural Studies 8 (1983):303-325.  
 
Carey, James W., and John J. Quirk. “The Mythos of the Electronic Revolution.” 
 American Scholar 39, no. 3 (1970):395-424. 
 
Castells, Manuel. The Rise of the Network Society. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.  
 
211 
 
Castells, Manuel, Mireia Fernández-Ardevòl, Jack Linchuan-Qiu and Araba Sey. 
 Mobile Communication and Society. A Global Perspective. Cambridge, MA: 
 MIT Press, 2007.  
 
Chase-Dunn, Christopher, Yukio Kawano and Benjamin D. Brewer. “Trade 
 Globalization Since 1795: Waves of Integration in the World-System.” 
 American Sociological Review 65, no. 1 (2000):77-95.  
 
Choudhury, Deep Kanta Lahiri. Telegraphic Imperialism. Crisis and Panic in the 
 Indian Empire, c. 1830-1920. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
 
Colaiaco, James A. “The Historian as Insider: G. M. Young and Victorian 
 England.” Review of Victorian England: Portrait of an Age, by G. M. Young. 
 The History Teacher 16, no. 4 (1983):523-539.  
  
Coleman, Bruce. Conservatism and the Conservative Party in Nineteenth-Century
 Britain. London: Arnold, 1988. 
 
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. Volume 2 of Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. 
 Edited by Earl Leslie Griggs. Oxford: Clarendon, 1956.  
 
Colley, Linda. Britons. Forging the Nation, 1707 – 1837. New Haven: Yale 
 University Press, 1992.  
 
Conrad, Walter, ed. Geschichte der Technik in Schlaglichtern. Mannheim: Meyers 
 Lexikonverlag, 1997. 
 
Cranfield, Geoffrey A. The Press and Society. From Caxton to Northcliffe. London: 
 Longman, 1978.  
 
Curran, James. “Press History.” In Power Without Responsibility. The Press and 
 Broadcasting in Britain, by James Curran and Jean Seaton, 5-113. London:
 Routledge, 1989. 
 
Czitrom, Daniel J. Media and the American Mind. From Morse to McLuhan. Chapel 
 Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982. 
 
Davin, Anna. “Women Telegraphists and Typists.” In Women in Industry and 
 Technology. From Prehistory to the Present Day, edited by Amanda Devonshire 
 and Barbara Wood, 213-223. London: Museum of London, 1996. 
 
Davis, John R. The Great Exhibition. Stroud: Sutton, 1999.  
 
Dear, Ian, and Peter Kemp, eds. The Oxford Companion to Ships and the Sea. Oxford: 
 Oxford University Press, 2005. 
 
Degele, Nina. Einführung in die Techniksoziologie. Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 
 2002. 
Dehs, Volker. Jules Verne. Eine kritische Biographie. Düsseldorf: Artemis und 
 Winkler, 2005. 
212 
 
Döring, Jörg, and Tristan Thielmann, eds. Spatial Turn. Das Raumparadigma in den 
 Kultur- und Sozialwissenschaften. Bielefeld: Transcript, 2008. 
 
Downey, Gregory J. Telegraph Messenger Boys: Labor, Technology, and Geography, 
 1850 – 1950. New York: Routledge, 2002.  
 
Drummond, Diane. “The Impact of the Railway on the Lives of Women in the 
 Nineteenth-Century City.” In The City and the Railway in Europe, edited by 
 Ralf Roth and Marie-Noëlle Polino, 237-255. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003. 
 
Durie, Alastair J. “Tourism and the Railways in Scotland: the Victorian and Edwardian 
 Experience.” In The Impact of the Railway on Society in Britain. Essays in 
 Honour of Jack Simmons, edited by A.K.B. Evans and J.V. Gough, 199-209. 
 Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003.  
Eckart, Wolfgang U. Illustrierte Geschichte der Medizin. Von der französischen 
 Revolution bis zur Gegenwart. Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2011. 
Eder, Franz X., ed. Historische Diskursanalysen. Genealogie, Theorie, Anwendungen. 
 Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006. 
 
Edgerton, David. The Shock of the Old. Technology and Global History Since 1900. 
 London: Profile Books, 2006.  
 
——. “From Innovation To Use: Ten Eclectic Theses on the Historiography of 
 Technology.” History and Technology 16, no. 2 (1999):111-136. 
 
Eisenstein, Elizabeth. The Printing Press as an Agent of Change. Communications and 
 Cultural Transformations in early-modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 1979. 
 
Ejrnæs, Mette, and Karl Gunnar Persson. "The Gains from Improved Market Efficiency: 
 Trade  Before and After the Transatlantic Telegraph." European Review of 
 Economic History 14, no. 3 (2010):361-381. 
 
Ellul, Jacques. The Technological Society. New York: Vintage Books, 1964. 
 
Entrikin, J. Nicholas, and Vincent Berdoulay. “The Pyrenees as Place: Lefebvre as 
 Guide.” Progress in Human Geography 29, no. 2 (2005):129-147.  
 
Esler, Anthony. Review of The Railway Journey. The Industrialization of Time and 
 Space in the Nineteenth Century, by Wolfgang Schivelbusch. American 
 Historical Review 93, no. 5 (1988):1296-1297. 
 
Falk, Thomas, and Ronald Abler. “Intercommunications, Distance, and Geographical 
 Theory.” Geografiska Annaler, Series B. Human Geography 62, no. 2 
 (1980):59-67.  
 
Fitzgerald, W. F. Vesey. The Suez Canal, the Eastern Question, and Abyssinia. London:
 Longmans, Green, and Co, 1867. 
 
213 
 
Fletcher, Max E. “The Suez Canal and World Shipping, 1869 – 1914.” Journal of 
 Economic History 18, no. 4 (1958):556-573.  
 
Foucault, Michel. “Of Other Spaces.” Diacritics 16, no. 1 (1986):22-27.  
 
——. The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language. New York: 
 Pantheon Books, 1972.  
 
Fox, Stephen. Transatlantic: Samuel Cunard, Isambard Brunel, and the Great Atlantic 
 Steamships. New York: Harper Collins, 2003. 
 
Freeman, Michael. Railways and the Victorian Imagination. New Haven: Yale 
 University Press, 1999. 
 
Garbade, Kenneth D., and William L. Silber. "Technology, Communication and the 
 Performance of Financial Markets: 1840-1975." The Journal of Finance 33, no. 
 3 (1978):819-832. 
 
Gardner, Philip. “Literacy, Learning and Education.” In A Companion to Nineteenth-
 Century Britain, edited by Chris Williams, 353-368. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 
 2004.  
  
Giddens, Anthony. The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991.  
Goheen, Peter G. “The Impact of the Telegraph on the Newspaper in Mid-Nineteenth 
Century British North America.” Urban Geography 11, no. 2 (1990):107-129. 
 
Grandage, Sarah. “Imagining England: Contemporary Encodings of ‘this sceptred isle’.” 
 In This England, That Shakespeare. New Angles on Englishness and the Bard, 
 edited by Willy Maley and Margaret Tudeau-Clayton, 127-146. Farnham:
 Ashgate, 2010.  
 
Green, Lelia. Communication, Technology and Society. London: Sage, 2002. 
 
Griffiths, Dennis, ed. The Encyclopedia of the British Press, 1422 – 1992. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1992. 
 
Grisewood, Harman. Foreword to Ideas and Beliefs of the Victorians. An Historic 
Revaluation of the Victorian Age, by the British Broadcasting Corporation, 9-14. 
London: Sylvan Press, 1950.  
 
Gruzd, Anatoliy, Barry Wellman and Yuri Takhteyev. “Imagining Twitter as an 
Imagined Community.” American Behavioral Scientist 55, no. 10 (2011):1294-
1318.  
 
Hamilton, Keith, and Richard Langhorne. The Practice of Diplomacy. Its Evolution, 
 Theory and Administration. London: Routledge, 2011. 
 
Hampton, Mark. Visions of the Press in Britain, 1850 – 1950. Urbana: University 
 of Illinois Press, 2004.  
 
214 
 
Hartmann, Frank. Globale Medienkultur. Technik, Geschichte, Theorien. Wien: WUV, 
 2006. 
 
Hayne, M. B. The French Foreign Office and the Origins of the First World War, 
 1898 – 1914. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.  
 
Headrick, Daniel R. “A Double-Edged Sword: Communications and Imperial Control in 
 British India.” In Historical Social Research – Historische Sozialforschung. 
 Global Communication: Telecommunication and Global Flows of Information 
 in the Late 19
th
 and Early 20
th
 Century, edited by Roland Wenzlhuemer, 51 – 65. 
 Cologne: Center for Historical Social Research, 2010.  
 
——. The Invisible Weapon. Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851 –
 1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
 
——. The Tools of Empire. Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth 
 Century. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981. 
 
Hempstead, Colin A. “Representations of Transatlantic Telegraphy.” Engineering 
 Science and Education Journal 4, no. 6 (1995):17-25.  
 
Herren, Madeleine, Martin Rüesch and Christiane Sibille. Transcultural History: 
 Theories, Methods, Sources. Berlin: Springer, 2012. 
 
Hewitt. Martin. “Introduction: Victorian Milestones.” In The Victorian World, edited by 
 Martin Hewitt, 1-53. London: Routledge, 2012. 
 
Hobhouse, Hermione. The Crystal Palace and the Great Exhibition. Art, Science and 
 Productive Industry. A History of the Royal Commission for the Exhibition of 
 1851. London: Athlone Press, 2002. 
 
Hobsbawm, Eric. On History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997.  
 
Hoskins, Halford L. British Routes to India. New York: Longmans, Green and Co, 1928. 
 
Houghton, Walter E. The Victorian Frame of Mind, 1830 – 1870. New Haven: Yale 
 University Press, 1957.  
Hughes, Thomas. “The Evolution of Large Technological Systems.” In The Social 
 Construction of Technological Systems. New Directions in the Sociology and 
 History of Technology, edited by Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and 
 Trevor J. Pinch, 51-82. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1989.  
 
Hugill, Peter J. Global Communications since 1844. Geopolitics and Technology. 
 Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1999. 
 
Hurd, John II. “Railways and the Expansion of Markets in India, 1861-1921.” 
 Explorations in Economic History 12, no. 3 (1975):263-288.  
 
Huurdeman, Anton A. The Worldwide History of Telecommunications. Hoboken, New 
 Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, 2003. 
215 
 
Hård, Mikael, and Andrew Jamison. Hubris and Hybrids. A Cultural History of 
 Technology and Science. New York: Routledge, 2005. 
 
Innis, Harold A. Empire and Communications. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950.  
 
Iriye, Akira, and Yves-Pierre Saunier, eds. The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational 
 History. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
 
Jacks, David S., and Krishna Pendakur. “Global Trade and the Maritime Transport 
 Revolution.” Review of Economics and Statistics 92, no. 4 (2010):745-755.  
 
Jackson, Thomas. The Visitor’s Guide to the Great Eastern. Holyhead, 1860. 
 
Jackson, William. The Pomp of Yesterday. The Defence of India and the Suez Canal, 
 1798 – 1918. London: Brassey, 1995.  
 
Jenkins, Terence A. Parliament, Party and Politics in Victorian Britain. Manchester:
 Manchester University Press, 1996.   
 
Joerges, Bernward. “Do Politics have Artefacts?” Social Studies of Science 29, no. 3  
 (1999):411-431. 
 
Jones, Aled. “The Press and the Printed Word.” In A Companion to Nineteenth-Century 
 Britain, edited by Chris Williams, 369 – 380. Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 2004.  
 
Jones, H. Stuart. Victorian Political Thought. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000.  
 
Jørgensen, Marianne, and Louise J. Phillips. Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method. 
 London: Sage, 2002.  
 
Kajetzke, Laura. Wissen im Diskurs. Ein Theorienvergleich von Bourdieu und Foucault. 
 Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008. 
 
Karabell, Zachary. Parting the Desert. The Creation of the Suez Canal. New York: A.A. 
 Knopf, 2003. 
 
Kasson, John F. Civilizing the Machine. Technology and Republican Values in America, 
 1776 -1900. New York: Hill and Wang, 1999. 
 
Kaukiainen, Yrjö. “Shrinking the World: Improvements in the Speed of Information 
 Transmission, c. 1820-1870.” European Review of Economic History 5, no.1 
  (2001):1-28. 
 
Kaul, Chandrika. Reporting the Raj: The British Press and India, c. 1880 – 1922. 
 Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003. 
 
Keller, Reiner. Diskursforschung. Eine Einführung für SozialwissenschaftlerInnen. 
 Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 2011. 
 
Kellett, John R. The Impact of Railways on Victorian Cities. London: Routledge and 
 Kegan Paul, 1969.   
216 
 
Kern, Stephen. The Culture of Time and Space, 1880 – 1918. Cambridge, MA: 
 Harvard University Press, 2003. 
 
Ketabgian, Tamara. The Lives of Machines: The Industrial Imaginary in Victorian 
 Literature and Culture. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 2011.  
 
Kidd, Alan. Manchester. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002.  
 
Kielbowicz, Richard B. “News Gathering by Mail in the Age of the Telegraph. 
 Adapting to a New Technology.” Technology and Culture 28, no. 1 (1987):26-
 41. 
 
Kingsley, Mary H. West African Studies. London: Macmillan, 1899. 
 
Kinross, Patrick Balfour. Between Two Seas. The Creation of the Suez Canal. John
 Murray, 1968.  
 
Köster, Werner. Die Rede über den ‘Raum’. Zur semantischen Karriere eines 
 Deutschen Konzepts. Heidelberg: Synchron Wissenschaftsverlag der Autoren, 
 2002.   
 
Kretschmer, Winfried. Geschichte der Weltausstellungen. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 
 1999.  
 
Kriegel, Lara. “Narrating the Subcontinent in 1851: India at the Crystal Palace.” In The 
 Great Exhibition of 1851: New Interdisciplinary Essays, edited by Louise 
 Purbrick, 146-178. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001. 
 
Krueger, Christine L., ed. Functions of Victorian Culture at the Present Time. Athens: 
 Ohio University Press, 2002.  
 
Läpple, Dieter. “Essay über den Raum: Für ein gesellschaftswissenschaftliches 
 Raumkonzept.” In Stadt und Raum: Soziologische Analysen, edited by Hartmut 
 Häußermann, Detlev Ipsen, Thomas Krämer-Badoni, Dieter Läpple, Marianne 
 Rodenstein and Walter Siebel, 157-207. Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus, 1992. 
 
Langdale, John. "Impact of the Telegraph on the Buffalo Agricultural Commodity 
 Market: 1846-1848." Professional Geographer 31, no. 2 (1979):165-169.  
 
Larsen, Timothy T. “Literacy and Biblical Knowledge: The Victorian Age and Our 
 Own.” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 52, no. 3 (2009):519-535. 
 
Latour, Bruno. “On Technical Mediation – Philosophy, Sociology, Genealogy.” 
 Common Knowledge 3, no. 2 (1994):29-64.  
 
——. “Mixing Humans and Non-Humans Together. The Sociology of a Door-Closer.” 
 Social Problems 35, no. 3 (1988):298-310. 
 
Lee, Alan J. The Origins of the Popular Press in England, 1855 – 1914. London: 
 Croom Helm, 1976.  
 
217 
 
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, and Samuel Clarke. Der Leibniz-Clarke-Briefwechsel. 
 Translated and edited by Volkmar Schüller. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1991. 
 
Lew, Byron, and Bruce Cater. “The Telegraph, Co-ordination of Tramp Shipping, and 
 Growth in World Trade, 1870 – 1910.” European Review of Economic History 
 10, no. 2 (2006):147-173. 
 
Löw, Martina. Raumsoziologie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001.  
——. “The Constitution of Space. The Structuration of Space Through the Simultaneity
 of Effects and Perception.” European Journal of Social Theory 11, no. 1 (2008): 
 5-24.   
MacKenzie, Donald, and Judy Wajcman, eds. The Social Shaping of Technology. 
 Buckingham: Open University Press, 1999. 
Marsden, Ben, and Crosbie Smith. Engineering Empires: A Cultural History of 
Technology in Nineteenth-Century Britain. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2007.  
Marshall, P. J. “Empire and British Identity: The Maritime Dimension.” In Empire, the 
Sea and Global History. Britain’s Maritime World, c. 1760 – c. 1840, edited by 
David Cannadine, 41- 59. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
Marx, Karl. The Poverty of Philosophy. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
 c. 1962 [c.1847].  
Marx, Leo. “The Idea of ‘Technology’ and Postmodern Pessimism.” In Does 
 Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, edited 
 by Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx, 237-257. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
 1995. 
——. The Machine in the Garden. Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America. 
 London: Oxford University Press, 1979.  
McAlpine, Neil, and Austin Smyth. “Urban Form, Social Patterns and Economic Impact 
 Arising from the Development of Public Transport in London, 1840 – 1940.” In 
 The City and the Railway in Europe, edited by Ralf Roth and Marie-Noëlle 
 Polino, 169-182. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003.  
McLuhan, Marshall. Understanding Media. The Extensions of Man. London: 
 Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968.  
 
——. The Gutenberg Galaxy. The Making of Typographic Man. London: 
 Routledge and Paul, 1962. 
McNeil, Ian. “Introduction. Basis Tools, Devices and Mechanisms.” In An
 Encyclopaedia of the  History of Technology, edited by Ian McNeil, 1-43. 
 London: Routledge, 1990.   
218 
 
McWilliam, Rohan. Review of The Victorian World Picture: Perceptions and 
 Introspections in an Age of Change, by David Newsome. Victorian Review 24, 
 no. 1 (1998):94-96. 
Mengel, Ewald, ed. The Railway Through Dickens’s World. Texts from Household 
 Words and All the Year Round. Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1989. 
Menke, Richard. Telegraphic Realism. Victorian Fiction and Other Information 
 Systems. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008. 
Merchant, Carolyn. The Death of Nature. Women, Ecology, and the Scientific 
 Revolution. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1983.  
Metzer, Jacob. “Railroad Development and Market Integration: The Case of Tsarist 
 Russia.” Journal of Economic History 34, no. 3 (1974):529-550.  
Mills, Sara. Discourse. London: Routledge, 1997. 
Milne, Maurice. “Press, Provincial.” In Victorian Britain. An Encyclopedia, edited by 
 Sally Mitchell, 630-631. New York: Garland Publishing, 1988. 
Mistry, Rohinton. Family Matters. London: Faber and Faber, 2006. 
 
Montuschi, Eleonora. “Order of Man, Order of Nature: Francis Bacon’s Idea of a 
 ‘Dominion’ Over Nature.” Paper presented at the workshop “The Governance of 
 Nature,” LSE, London, 27-28 October 2010.  
 
Morus, Iwan Rhys. “‘The Nervous System of Britain’: Space, Time and the Electric 
 Telegraph in the Victorian Age.” The British Journal for the History of Science 
 33, no. 4 (2000):455 - 475.  
Murphie, Andrew, and John Potts. Culture and Technology. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
 2003.  
 
Mussell, James. The Nineteenth-Century Press in the Digital Age. Basingstoke:
 Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
 
Newey, Katherine M. “‘Dramatic and Musical Chit Chat’: Theatrical Writing in The 
 Athenaeum and The Illustrated London News in 1843.” Victorian Periodicals 
 Review 23, no. 4 (1990):167-179.  
 
Newsome, David. The Victorian World Picture. Perceptions and Introspections in an 
 Age of  Change. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1997. 
 
Newton, Isaac. Sir Isaac Newton’s Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy and 
 his System of the World. 1686. Translated by Andrew Motte. Translation revised 
 by Florian Cajori. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960. 
Nicholls, Jack. “The Impact of the Telegraph on Anglo-Japanese Diplomacy during the 
 Nineteenth-Century.” New Voices 3 (2009):1-22.   
219 
 
Nickles, David Paull. “Diplomatic Telegraphy in American and German History.” In 
 Atlantic Communications. The Media in American and German History from the 
 Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century, edited by Norbert Finzsch and Ursula 
 Lehmkuhl, 135-152. Oxford: Berg, 2004. 
——.  Under the Wire. How the Telegraph Changed Diplomacy. Cambridge, MA: 
 Harvard University Press, 2003. 
——.  “Telegraph Diplomats: The United States’ Relations with France in 1848 and
 1870.” Technology and Culture 40, no. 1 (1999):1-25.  
Nock, O. S., ed. Encyclopedia of Railways. London: Octopus Books, 1977. 
 
Novo, Laura. “Education, Elementary.” In Victorian Britain. An Encyclopedia, edited 
 by Sally Mitchell, 241-243. New York: Garland Publishing, 1988. 
 
Nye, David E. American Technological Sublime. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994. 
 
Osterhammel, Jürgen. “Imperien.” In Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen 
 und Theorien, edited by Gunilla Budde, Sebastian Conrad, and Oliver Janz, 56-
 67. Göttingen: Vanderhoek and Ruprecht, 2006.  
 
——.  Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts. 
 Munich: C.H. Beck, 2004. 
 
Outram, Dorinda. The Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Pearsall, A. W. H. “Ports and Shipping.” In An Encyclopaedia of the History of 
 Technology, edited by Ian McNeil, 519 -554. London: Routledge, 1990. 
 
Peña, Carolyn Thomas de la. Review of Dark Light. Electricity and Anxiety from the 
 Telegraph to the X-Ray, by Linda Simon. American Historical Review 110, no. 3 
 (2005):806-807.  
 
Perkin, Harold. The Age of the Railway. London: Panther Books, 1970. 
 
Potter, Simon J. News and the British World: The Emergence of an Imperial Press 
 System, 1876 – 1922. Oxford: Clarendon, 2003. 
 
Powell, David. Nationhood and Identity. The British State Since 1800. London: I. B. 
 Tauris, 2002.  
 
Purbrick, Louise, ed. The Great Exhibition of 1851. New Interdisciplinary Essays. 
 Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001. 
 
Rammert, Werner. Technik aus soziologischer Perspektive: Forschungsstand, Theo-
 rieansätze, Fallbeispiele. Ein Überblick. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 
 1993.  
 
Ransom, P. J. G. The Mont Cenis Fell Railway. Truro: Twelveheads Press, 1999. 
 
220 
 
——. “Rail.” In An Encyclopaedia of the History of Technology, edited by Ian McNeil,
 555-608. London: Routledge, 1990.  
 
Rantanen, Terhi. When News Was New. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.   
 
——. “The Globalization of Electronic News in the 19th Century.” Media, 
 Culture and Society 19, no. 4 (1997):605-620. 
 
Raymond, Joad. Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain. Cambridge: 
 Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
 
Read, Donald. The Power of News. The History of Reuters, 1849 – 1989. Oxford: 
 Oxford University Press, 1992. 
 
Roberts, Adam. The History of Science Fiction. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 
Robin, Ron. “Historians and the Nation State.” In The Palgrave Dictionary of 
 Transnational History, edited by Akira Iriye and Pierre-Yves Saunier, 486-493. 
 Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.   
Rössler, Patrick. Inhaltsanalyse. Konstanz: UVK, 2005.  
Rossberg, Ralf R. Geschichte der Eisenbahn. Künzelsau: Sigloch Service Edition, 
 1997. 
Rothermund, Dietmar. Indiens wirtschaftliche Entwicklung. Von der Kolonialherrschaft 
 bis zur Gegenwart. Paderborn: Schöningh, 1985. 
 
Rowland, Wade. Spirit of the Web. The Age of Information from Telegraph to Internet. 
 Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1999. 
Ruffing, Reiner. Bruno Latour. Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink, 2009. 
Rushdie, Salman. Shalimar the Clown. London: Vintage, 2006. 
 
Said, Edward. Orientalism. London: Penguin, 2003.  
 
Sarasin, Philipp. Michel Foucault zur Einführung. Hamburg: Junius, 2005.  
 
Schivelbusch, Wolfgang. Geschichte der Eisenbahnreise. Zur Industrialisierung von 
 Raum und Zeit im 19. Jahrhundert. München: Hanser, 1977. 
 
Schlögel, Karl. Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit. Über Zivilisationsgeschichte und 
 Geopolitik. München: Hanser, 2003. 
Scholl, Lars U. “The Global Communications Industry and its Impact on International 
 Shipping before 1914.” In Global Markets:The Internationalization of the Sea
 Transport Industries since 1850, edited by David J. Starkey and Gelina Harlaftis
 195-215. St. John’s: International Maritime Economic History Association, 
 1998. 
221 
 
Schulz-Schaeffer, Ingo. “Akteure, Aktanten und Agenten. Konstruktive und rekon-
 struktive Bemühungen um die Handlungsfähigkeit von Technik.” In 
 Sozionik. Soziologische Ansichten über künstliche Sozialität, edited by Thomas 
 Malsch, 129-167. Berlin: Edition Sigma, 1998. 
Searight, Sarah. Steaming East. The Forging of Steamship and Rail Links between 
 Europe and Asia. London: Bodley Head, 1991.  
Shaw, William H. “’The Handmill Gives you the Feudal Lord’: Marx’s Technological 
 Determinism.” History and Theory 18, no. 2 (1979):155-176.  
 
Sidebottom, John K. The Overland Mail. A Postal Historical Study of the Mail Route to 
 India. London: Allen and Unwin, 1948. 
 
Simmons, Jack. The Railway in Town and Country, 1830 – 1914. Newton Abbot: David
 and Charles Publishers, 1986.  
 
Simon, Linda. Dark Light. Electricity and Anxiety from the Telegraph to the X-Ray. 
 Orlando: Harcourt, 2004.  
 
Sinnema, Peter W. Dynamics of the Pictured Page. Representing the Nation in the 
 Illustrated London News. Ashgate and Brookfield: Aldershot, 1998. 
 
Smith, Anthony. “‘Set in the Silver Sea’: English National Identity and European 
 Integration.” Nations and Nationalism 12, no. 3 (2006):433-452. 
 
Smith, Edgar C. A Short History of Naval and Marine Engineering. Cambridge 
 University Press, 1938.  
 
Smith, Merritt Roe. “Technological Determinism in American Culture.” In Does 
 Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, edited 
 by Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx, 1-35. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995.  
 
Smith, Merritt Roe, and Leo Marx, eds. Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma 
 of Technological Determinism. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995.  
 
Smith, W. H. “The Early Days of ‘The Illustrated London News’.” In History as Hot
 News. 1842 -1865. The World of the Early Victorians as seen through the 
 Eyes of the Illustrated London News, edited by Leonard de Vries, 9-12. London: 
 John Murray, 1967.  
 
Solymar, Laszlo. “The Effect of the Telegraph on Law and Order, War, Diplomacy, and 
 Power Politics.” Interdisciplinary Science Reviews 25, no. 3 (2000):203-210. 
 
Spratt, Hereward. One Hundred Years of Transatlantic Steam Navigation, 1838 – 1938. 
 London: Science Museum, 1938. 
 
Standage, Tom. The Victorian Internet. The Remarkable Story of the Telegraph and the 
 Nineteenth Century’s Online Pioneers. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998. 
 
222 
 
Stein, Jeremy. “Reflections on Time, Time-Space Compression and Technology in the 
 Nineteenth Century.” In Timespace: Geographies of Temporality, edited by Jon 
 May and Nigel Thrift, 106-119. London: Routledge, 2001.  
 
Steinbach, Susie L. Understanding the Victorians: Politics, Culture and Society in 
 Nineteenth-Century Britain. London: Routledge, 2012. 
  
Stoess, Carl. The Suez Maritime Canal. A Sketch of the Undertaking. Liverpool: Webb, 
 Hunt and Ridings, 1869.  
Sussman, Herbert. Victorian Technology. Invention, Innovation, and the Rise of the 
 Machine. Santa Barbara: Praeger Publishers, 2009. 
Tarr, Joel. A., Thomas Finholt and David Goodman. “The City and the Telegraph: 
 Urban Telecommunications in the Pre-Telephone Era.” Journal of Urban 
 History 14, no.1 (1987):38-80.  
 
Taylor, Miles and Michael Wolff, eds. The Victorians Since 1901. Histories, 
 Representations and Revisions. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004. 
Thomas, Keith. Man and the Natural World. Changing Attitudes in England 1500 -
 1800. London: Allen Lane, 1983. 
 
Thompson, John B. The Media and Modernity. A Social Theory of the Media. 
 Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995.  
 
Torretti, Roberto. “Space.” In vol. 9 of Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited 
 by Edward Craig, 59-66. London: Routledge, 1998.  
 
Triandafyllidou, Anna. “National Identity and the ‘Other’.” Ethnic and Racial Studies
 21, no. 4 (1998):593-612. 
 
Turner, Frank M. Review of The Culture of Time and Space, 1880 – 1918, by Stephen 
 Kern. The International History Review 7, no. 3 (1985): 455-458.  
Turnock, David. An Historical Geography of Railways in Great Britain and Ireland. 
 Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998. 
Umrigar, Thrity. The Weight of Heaven. New York: Harper Perennial, 2010. 
Verbeek, Peter-Paul. What Things Do. Philosophical Reflections on Technology, 
 Agency, and Design. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005.  
Verne, Jules. Around the World in 80 Days. Blacksburg: Wilder Publications, 2009 
 [1873].  
 
Verneaux, René. Vol. 1 of L´Industrie des Transports Maritimes au XIXe Siècle et au 
 Commencement du XXe Siècle. Paris: Pedone, 1903.  
 
223 
 
Viebrock, Helmut. “Dickens und das Dampfroß.” In Wirklichkeit und Dichtung. Studien 
 zur Englischen und Amerikanischen Literatur, edited by Ulrich Halfmann, Kurt 
 Müller, and Klaus Weiss, 75-90. Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1984. 
 
Vincent, David. The Rise of Mass Literacy. Reading and Writing in Modern Europe. 
 Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000.  
 
——.  Literacy and Popular Culture. England 1750 – 1914. Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 1989.  
 
Warf, Barney, and Santa Arias, eds. The Spatial Turn. Interdisciplinary Perspectives.
 London: Routledge, 2009. 
 
Wenzlhuemer, Roland. Connecting the Nineteenth-Century World: The Telegraph and 
 Globalization. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
 
——.  “Editorial – Telecommunication and Globalization in the Nineteenth Century.” 
 In Historical Social Research – Historische Sozialforschung. Global 
 Communication: Telecommunication and Global Flows of Information in the 
 Late 19
th 
and Early 20
th
 Century, edited by Roland Wenzlhuemer, 7 - 18. 
 Cologne: Center for Historical Social Research, 2010.  
 
——. “Globalization, Communication, and the Concept of Space in Global History.” 
 In Historical Social Research – Historische Sozialforschung. Global 
 Communication: Telecommunication and Global Flows of Information in the 
 Late 19
th
 and Early 20
th
 Century, edited by Roland Wenzlhuemer, 19-47. 
 Cologne: Center for Historical Social Research, 2010. 
 
——.  “Metropolitan Telecommunication. Uneven Telegraphic Connectivity in 19th-
 Century London.” Social Science Computer Review 27, no. 3 (2009):437-451.  
 
——. “The Dematerialization of Telecommunication. Communication Centres and 
 Peripheries in Europe and the World, 1850 – 1920.” Journal of Global History  
 2, no. 3 (2007): 345-372. 
 
Weyer, Johannes. Techniksoziologie. Genese, Gestaltung und Steuerung sozio-
 technischer Systeme. Weinheim: Juventa Verlag, 2008.  
Whewell, William. “The General Bearing of the Great Exhibition on the Progress of Art 
 and Science.” In Lectures on the Results of the Great Exhibition of 1851, 1-34. 
 London: David Bogue, 1852.  
White, J. H. Review of The Railway Journey. Trains and Travel in the Nineteenth 
 Century, by Wolfgang Schivelbusch. Technology and Culture 24, no. 3 
 (1983):515. 
 
White, Lynn. Medieval Technology and Social Change. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963. 
 
 
 
224 
 
Williams, D. M. “Liverpool Merchants and the Cotton Trade 1820 – 1850.” In:
 Liverpool and  Merseyside. Essays in the Economic and Social History of the 
 Port and its Hinterland, edited by J. R. Harris, 182 – 211. London: Frank 
 Cass and Co., 1969. 
 
Williams, Raymond. Television. Technology and Cultural Form. London: Fontana, 
 1974.  
 
Wilson, Arnold T. The Suez Canal. Its Past, Present, and Future. London: Oxford 
 University Press, 1933. 
 
Wilson, Ellen Judy. Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment. Edited by Peter Hanns Reill. 
 New York: Facts on File, 1996.  
 
Winner, Langdon, “Do Artifacts have Politics?” Daedalus 109, no. 1 (1980):121-136.  
 
Winseck, Dwayne R., and Robert M. Pike. Communication and Empire. Media, 
 Markets,and Globalization, 1860 – 1930. Durham: Duke University Press, 2007. 
 
Winston, Brian. Media Technology and Society. A History: From the Telegraph to the 
 Internet. London: Routledge, 1998. 
 
Wobring, Michael. Die Globalisierung der Telekommunikation im 19. Jahrhundert. 
 Pläne,  Projekte und Kapazitätsausbauten zwischen Wirtschaft und Politik. 
 Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2005. 
 
Wolmar, Christian. Engines of War. How Wars Were Won and Lost on the Railways. 
 New York: Public Affairs, 2010. 
 
Wood, John Richard. “Observer.” In Dictionary of Nineteenth-Century Journalism 
 in Great Britain and Ireland, edited by Laurel Brake and Marysa Demoor. 466. 
 Gent: Academia Press, 2009.  
 
Wragg, David. Commuter City. How the Railways shaped London. Barnsley: 
 Wharncliffe Books, 2010. 
 
Yang, Daqing. Technology of Empire: Telecommunications and Japanese Expansion in 
 Asia,1883 – 1945. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2010. 
Young, G. M. Victorian England. Portrait of an Age. London: Oxford University 
 Press, 1977.  
Young, Paul. Globalization and the Great Exhibition.The Victorian New World Order. 
 Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
 
